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DISCLAIMER 
 
This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency 
of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government 
nor any agency thereof, nor any of their employees, makes any warranty, 
express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for 
the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, 
product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not 
infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific 
commercial product, process, or service by trade name, trademark, 
manufacturer, or otherwise does not necessarily constitute or imply its 
endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States Government 
or any agency thereof. The views and opinions of authors expressed 
herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States 
Government or any agency thereof. 
 
 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
America’s dependence on petroleum-based fuels for the transportation sector creates serious energy 
security, economic, air quality and other environmental challenges. Greater use of alternative fuel 
vehicles (AFV) is part of the solution to these challenges and natural gas vehicles (NGV) are an AFV 
option that offers substantial environmental, economic and energy security benefits. Despite these 
advantages, after more than forty years of industry and government investment in NGV and fueling 
infrastructure technology research and development (R&D), NGVs still account for only a very small 
percentage of the total U.S. vehicle inventory and transportation fuel use. 
 
For NGVs to make a greater contribution, there must be an acceleration of vehicle deployment and, 
critical to achieving that goal, greater infrastructure development. The U.S Department of Energy, 
through it’s National Energy Technology Laboratory, tasked the Clean Vehicle Education Foundation 
(CVEF) with assessing the current status of NGV fueling infrastructure and vehicular natural gas 
consumption in order to evaluate successes and failures, the market factors that impacted these 
outcomes and what steps should be taken next to facilitate further station development. While the task 
statement placed particular emphasis on heavy-duty niche markets where vehicle deployment and fuel 
consumption have been greatest, it also directed that the report address public NGV fueling 
infrastructure as natural gas fueling technology and standards are viewed by many as the logical 
pathway or bridge to future hydrogen infrastructure market development. 
 
NGV fueling infrastructure development cannot be viewed in a vacuum absent the influences of 
vehicle availability, government policy, market sales and service support, economic incentives and 
other market drivers. Individual favorable market drivers all existed at one point or another over the 
past forty years but were rarely in place at the same time. This directly impacted the type and amount 
of fuel station development, the level of station utilization and which stakeholders participated. 
 
Historically, the NGV market – and its fueling infrastructure development – went through three 
general “phases” between 1965-2005. The first phase (1965-1990) was a period of slow growth, 
driven mostly by utilities and primarily for their own use although outreach to customers gradually 
built a customer base. The second phase (1990-1996) was a boom period of vehicle sales, station 
installation and ever-increasing fuel throughput, driven by a combination of government policy, 
increasing utility interest in developing an NGV market and the major auto companies’ engagement of 
the technology and its potential. During the third phase (1997-2005), NGV market development was 
derailed, as many utilities’ NGV market development programs were decimated by gas utility 
deregulation and auto manufacturers introduced their factory-built NGVs then discontinued them 
(except Honda) when federal fleet mandate policies were circumvented or never materialized and 
vehicles sales fell far short of expectations. The unfulfilled expectations of the LDV market were 
somewhat offset by growing sales to operators of heavy-duty fleets, especially transit agencies and - to 
a lesser degree – airports, school districts and refuse companies.  
 
By year-end 2005 (the reference point for CVEF’s data collection efforts), the nation’s estimated 
92,000 NGVs consumed nearly 200 million GGEs, fueling at approximately 1100 stations. Of the 
189.5 million GGEs allocated in CVEF’s survey of 2005 data, 39.5 million GGEs was LNG and the 
rest was CNG.  The transit sector accounted for the largest throughput (68.3%) followed by airports 
(8.1%), refuse (7.6%), government (4.9%), short-haul (3.0%), utilities (2.7%), schools (2.5%) and 
“other” (2.6%). Geographically, the Western region accounted for the highest fuel throughput (65.3%), 
followed by the Mid-Atlantic region - including New York (15.4%), the South Central region (7.3%), 
the Southeast region (4.5%), the Northeast (3.3), the Midwest region (2.2%) and Rocky Mountain 
region (2.0%). Throughput by niche sector varied from one region to the next; transit dominated in 
five of the seven regions. 
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Of the 1100 stations, roughly 16% are operated by independent (non-utility) fuel providers, 27% are 
operated by utilities, another 37% are operated by federal, state or local governments and quasi-
government entities (e.g., transit, school, airport), 17% percent are operated by private businesses 
(e.g., linen services, package companies, building trades contractors), and the remaining 3% percent 
are operated by individual consumers. Furthermore, 15% of the CNG stations accounted for roughly 
65% percent of total U.S vehicular CNG throughput. Another 75% of CNG stations accounted for the 
35% of CNG fuel throughput. The remaining 10% percent of CNG stations were dormant or dispensed 
negligible amounts of fuel, amounting to less than 1% percent of the U.S total. Many of the dormant 
or underutilized CNG stations are government- or utility-owned-and-operated and, most, only for their 
own CNG fleets, which are dwindling. Others allow public access but do not conduct market outreach 
to build load. Many of these stations are in need of repairs and/or upgrades to make them viable - 
regardless of who owns and or operates them. Undoubtedly, there will be further attrition in the station 
counts as underutilized stations that are not upgraded by the present owner-operators, or purchased by 
independent fuel providers, are eventually decommissioned.  Knowledgeable NGV industry analysts 
view this is a continuation of the infrastructure “market correction.” 
 
The NGV market is poised for growth but additional help from the federal government is needed and 
warranted. This includes public statements from the President and other high-level policymakers in the 
Executive Branch concerning the benefits of NGVs and their role in helping the nation meet its air 
quality and transportation energy portfolio diversification goals. Congress should extend the vehicle, 
station equipment and motor fuels excise tax credits far enough out (at least 10 years) so that the 
marketplace is assured that inclusion of these credits in their life-cycle cost analyses for these 
investments is a valid assumption.  Also, funding for NGV RD&D needs to be restored, at least to its 
previous level - if not higher. These funds are needed so that further emissions, efficiency and 
performance improvements to vehicles and engines can be made, new fuel storage materials and 
systems can be developed, and manufacturer’s introduction of new NGVs may be accelerated, among 
other goals. Positive Executive Branch statements about NGVs’ role in the nation’s alternative fuel 
strategy and allocation of funding for NGV RD&D initiatives - like those that have been made for 
biofuels - will encourage private industry investment in the NGV market and also go a long way in 
prompting GM, Ford, DaimlerChrysler, Toyota, Nissan and other major automotive manufacturers – 
all of whom offer NGV models elsewhere in the world – to develop and market NGVs here in the U.S. 
 
Government action must be accompanied by greater NGV industry action. Most important, it must 
increase its market presence through enhanced sales, marketing and communications activities. For 
example, utilities that suspended or eliminated their NGV market development efforts must be re-
engaged and shown how NGV programs can benefit their communities and their organization’s 
bottom line. Their involvement at the local level, often with existing customers, will raise awareness 
and generate additional leads for suppliers to pursue. Station development/O&M companies and 
equipment suppliers that are not doing so already, need to invest more resources in sales and 
marketing and/or provide greater support to their dealers to amplify their voice in the marketplace. 
NGV industry stakeholders also need to engage others outside their traditional circle of advocate-allies 
who may benefit from advancing the NGV market. These include petroleum retailers who increasingly 
market other alternative fuels like biodiesel and E85. It also includes fleet sales, lease and finance 
companies that can benefit from offering their clients additional “green” options that improve the 
bottom line. Last, but certainly not least, NGV advocates need to garner greater national media 
attention for the technology’s many benefits by showcasing successful applications. These 
communications need to be targeted to fleets in their trade publications and also to the general public 
via mass communications to raise awareness and seed the market for future consumer market growth.  
 
Today’s NGV industry sales and marketing efforts tend to focus on opposite extremes of the market. 
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At one end are the very-high fuel use accounts that require the design and construction of large 
sophisticated fueling stations and – in many cases – desire operation and maintenance services. These 
high-profile accounts generate revenue streams necessary to attract the interest of national station 
developer/O&M companies. At the opposite end are very low volume accounts that need relatively 
inexpensive and easily maintained fueling packages that fleets own and operate, typically. Small CNG 
equipment package manufacturers’ generally rely on their dealer/representatives to prospect for and 
close the sales on these accounts. Both are important to the continued growth of the industry. In 
addition, there are literally thousands of potential prospects that have fueling needs that fall below the 
volumes necessary to attract station development/O&M companies for an on-site station but for whom 
multiple small equipment packages is not a practical solution. Generally, these stations require the 
services of an engineering firm that can help the client determine needs, then design the installation 
and select the appropriate equipment. Equipment that meets these needs is available but the companies 
that produce it have few sales-marketing resources plying the market, relying instead on a limited 
number of experienced engineering and/or general contracting firms initiate the sale. As a result, many 
prospects located in regions other than the “usual hot spots” (e.g., California, New York, Texas) are 
largely ignored, yet they present a good economic case for fleet owned-and-operated CNG stations.   
 
One of the barriers to developing a more robust retail CNG station infrastructure has been lack of 
resources. Fuel providers need to recoup their substantial investment in property, equipment, design, 
construction, maintenance and operations and marketing by growing fuel throughput quickly. Amoco 
pursued this path in 1995-1998 but exited the market when BP bought the company and slower-than-
projected sales growth did not meet the new owners’ expectations. One approach to retail station 
development that appears to be working well and shows promise for future growth is to co-locate retail 
fueling capability at a host fleet’s depot with “outside-the-fence” public access. The incremental cost 
of extra compression and storage capacity is less than if building from scratch and the added 
investment for the retail-side dispenser(s) and payment processing hardware is reasonable. A possible 
downside to this approach is that many fleets’ depots are located in undesirable or inconvenient areas 
(e.g., industrial parks, warehouse districts).  This type of “add-on” retail fueling capability should be 
given grant priority, especially in areas lacking existing public infrastructure. 
 
Another approach to developing retail fueling infrastructure is to pool the fueling needs of one or more 
anchor fleets at an independent location that is convenient to the anchor fleet(s) and also to 
miscellaneous CNG vehicle operators (e.g., consumers, small business with one or two vehicles). 
Identifying this perfect mix of anchor customer(s) need, main thoroughfare proximity and access and 
real estate availability is easier said than done. These station development projects seem to work best 
when there are local government policies in place that promote NGV deployment either through 
mandates and/or economic incentives. 
 
Several independent and utility fuel providers have had success in installing CNG fueling equipment 
at existing traditional retail petroleum site where gasoline and/or diesel is sold. Typically, a lease 
agreement is signed where the CNG fuel provider owns, operates (monitors) and maintains the 
equipment and the retailer gets a royalty on the natural gas as well as the added profitable in-store 
traffic. The upside to this approach is that retail gas stations are typically sited at prime high-visibility 
locations where there is convenient access and an established customer base. The only downside is 
that retail gas station/mini-marts are typically not configured for larger vehicles. NGV industry 
stakeholders may be well advised to pursue “big box” retailers (e.g., Costco, Wal-Mart) to include 
CNG as an option at fuel retailing store locations. Multi-site “truck stop” developers, which have 
many of the right characteristics for CNG station co-development (large footprint, easy on/off 
highway access, retail and fleet fueling islands, experience/familiarity with branded fuel card systems, 
existing natural gas service), may be another avenue worth pursuing more aggressively.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
A. Definition of Need 
 
America’s dependence on petroleum-based fuels for the transportation sector creates serious 
energy security, economic, air quality and other environmental challenges. The U.S. 
represents about five percent of the world’s population but consumes twenty-five percent of 
the world’s oil. Since 1985, worldwide oil production has lagged behind consumption, 
creating competition for a dwindling resource. U.S. dependence on oil – some call it addiction 
- long ago exceeded domestic production capacity and forced the nation to increasingly rely 
on imports, primarily from unstable regions of the world, making the U.S. economy 
vulnerable to unfriendly political regimes and – potentially – terrorists. And, despite 
improvements in fuel refining, engine efficiency and emissions control technology, gasoline 
and diesel emissions continue to degrade air quality in many urban areas, exacting social and 
economic tolls, as evidenced by diminished quality of life, lost productivity and increased 
healthcare costs. In addition, concerns about the relative impacts of different carbon-based 
fuels on greenhouse gas production have heightened awareness of the need to diversify our 
transportation energy portfolio.  
 
Greater use of alternative fuel vehicles (AFV) is part of the solution to these challenges. A 
variety of AFV options - each with their own relative advantages and disadvantages - have 
been developed and marketed to American consumers and businesses. Natural gas vehicles 
(NGVs) are an AFV option that offers substantial environmental, economic and energy 
security benefits. Natural gas is an abundant domestically produced fuel, NGVs emit far less 
pollutants than their gasoline- and diesel-fueled counterparts, and they have demonstrated 
proven performance in all vehicle sizes and duty-cycles. Despite these advantages, after more 
than forty years of industry and government investment in NGV and fueling infrastructure 
technology research and development (R&D), NGVs still account for only a miniscule 
percentage of the total transportation market. Today, NGVs account for less than one-fifth 
percent of the nation’s vehicle inventory and natural gas accounts for less than one-half 
percent of on-road transportation fuel use.  
 
There are several underlying reasons for the slow market acceptance and penetration of NGV 
technology. The biggest challenge for much of the past forty years has been that, by their very 
nature, gaseous fuel NGVs and fueling infrastructure are different than gasoline and diesel 
vehicles and stations, and people tend to resist change.  In addition, despite their lower 
operating costs, NGVs’ higher purchase price than comparable gasoline or diesel vehicles is 
still a market entry obstacle. The fact that hybrid vehicles, which cost more than their gasoline 
counterparts, have achieved considerable market acceptance and sales is a good indication that 
attitudes about “new and different” technology and paying a premium for a more 
environmentally favorable vehicle are changing. An important distinction between hybrids and 
NGVs is that buying a hybrid does not require switching to a new fuel and changing fueling 
habits. Hybrids run on the same gasoline or diesel available at thousands of retail fuel stations 
that have become part of American’s day-to-day driving routine. 
 
Given that NGVs’ environmental, economic, energy security and performance attributes are 
on par with or better than gasoline and diesel vehicles, the lack of vehicle availability, the 
NGV price premium and less-than-ubiquitous fueling infrastructure would appear to be the 
primary hurdles left to overcome. These challenges are interwoven. New federal tax credits for 
vehicles and fuel have reduced purchase costs and strengthened the economic case for NGVs, 
shortening the simple payback period and further improving life-cycle cost savings. Increasing 
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demand will likely re-engage the non-participating major auto and truck manufacturers to 
offer more vehicles and, as sales grow, lower the premium for NGVs. More NGVs in need of 
fuel will create market-driven demand and investment in fueling infrastructure and, through 
economies of scale, reduce fueling station costs. Conversely, installation of a more ubiquitous 
and more convenient NGV fueling infrastructure will elevate confidence in the consumer and 
business sectors that NGVs are a good investment and spur sales. While increasing auto and 
truck manufacturers’ participation in the NGV market is an important step that must be 
addressed, the primary focus of this report is NGV fueling infrastructure. 
 
While comprehensive statistical data about the NGV market is lacking, the Clean Vehicle 
Education Foundation (CVEF) estimates that there are 1050-1100 existing natural gas fueling 
locations – down from a high of nearly 1300 in 1998, and there are 85,000-90,000 NGVs on 
the road – down from an estimated peak of 105,000-110,000 in 2003.  These seemingly 
downward trends are counter-indicative of the future, however, as market forces are 
converging to create an environment very favorable to growth.  In fact, growth is already 
occurring in several niche sectors, as discussed later in this report. 
 
For NGVs and vehicular natural gas to make a greater contribution to diversifying the nation’s 
transportation energy portfolio, there must be an acceleration of vehicle deployment and, 
critical to achieving that goal, greater infrastructure development. 
 
B. Scope of Work 
 
It is against this background that the U.S. DOE contracted CVEF to develop “a comprehensive 
roadmap for targeted development of natural gas refueling infrastructure projects (Compressed 
Natural Gas -CNG, Liquefied Natural Gas - LNG and/or a combination of the two) to support 
successful deployments of light- and heavy-duty vehicles in niche markets.”  Furthermore, the 
contract work scope statement says that the roadmap should “address the drivers and barriers 
to the successful deployment of natural gas vehicles, research and document the lessons 
learned from existing projects, and develop criteria that allow decision-makers to focus limited 
resources.”  Also included is “the development and implementation of a plan for the collection 
of natural gas (CNG and LNG) vehicle fuel sales information with emphasis on high-fuel use 
fleets in the transit, refuse, airport/taxi, school bus and short-haul niche sectors.”  
 
Further guidance and direction provided in subsequent supporting documents and discussions 
with U.S. DOE program managers identified the need for the report to address development of 
public refueling capability, which is projected to serve as the foundation for support of future 
hydrogen infrastructure.  While focusing on fleets generates the highest vehicular natural gas 
throughout, it does not necessarily facilitate public fueling infrastructure for reasons that will 
be discussed in more detail later in this report.  However, there has been success in melding 
the two interests in limited circumstances and these successes are explored further as are 
potential ways to build on this experience. 
 
Part II of this report reviews the evolution of natural gas vehicle market and supporting fueling 
infrastructure, the past, present and potential future roles of utilities, independent NGV station 
developers and traditional petroleum retailers and lessons learned along the way. It examines 
critical financial and logistical factors affecting development of fueling infrastructure. It 
highlights similarities and dissimilarities between public and private station development, 
ownership and operation, offering best practices culled from operators that have successfully 
melded the two. Furthermore, while not a policy paper per se, this report addresses the 
important role that public policy plays in spurring - or deterring - natural gas vehicle and 
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refueling infrastructure development.  
 
Part III summarizes U.S. vehicular natural gas consumption by region and by niche sector. It 
also identifies some of the shortcomings and potential improvements that must be made in the 
NGV and vehicular natural gas consumption data collection and reporting process for it to be 
useful in helping government policymakers and industry stakeholders direct resources 
effectively. 
 
 
II. ROADMAP FOR DEVELOPMENT OF NGV FUELING INFRASTRUCTURE 
 
A. Methodology  
In preparing Part II, CVEF referenced materials published over the last twenty years 
addressing the NGV industry’s development. These include directories of existing and 
planned CNG and LNG fuel stations, utility company annual reports and numerous NGV 
stakeholder- and government-underwritten white papers addressing NGV market and 
technology development. Using these documents as background, CVEF conducted dozens of 
interviews with the following types of stakeholders: 
 
1. Utility representatives at companies that are still active in NGV market development and 
those at previously active companies that have since suspended their programs 
 
2.  Independent NGV station development and operations and maintenance companies 
 
3.  Station engineering design consultants, equipment suppliers and general contractors 
 
4.  Staff at national, state and regional NGV associations, gas associations, energy consulting 
firms and media knowledgeable about NGV issues 
 
5.  CNG and LNG fleet managers from targeted niche sectors, including those who: 
 
a) own and operate their fueling facilities, 
 
b) own their fueling stations but contract out their operations, 
 
c) purchase their vehicular natural gas fuel from a station developer-operator at a 
complete “bundled” price. 
 
B. Historical Review of NGV Market and Supporting Infrastructure Development 
 
NGV fueling infrastructure development cannot be viewed in a vacuum, as it is driven by 
many market factors. For this reason, it is helpful to understand how these factors have 
affected NGV market and infrastructure growth as the industry has matured. Despite major 
advances in vehicle, fuel storage and station technology over the past forty years, market 
penetration of NGVs is still far below its full potential. Key components necessary to 
successful development of the NGV market, including reliable vehicle and station technology, 
favorable environmental policy, adequate marketing resources and economic incentives have 
all existed at one point or another but have rarely been in place at the same time.  The result is 
that the industry has been in a constant state of metamorphosis, undergoing periods of growth 
and contraction, sometimes simultaneously in different regions.  
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The following review of the major developments and trends provides a context within which 
to view the current market, glean insights into lessons learned and shape future efforts.  As a 
summary, it does not attempt to document every market event or regional nuance. A more 
detailed summary of the history of NGV market growth and infrastructure development is 
attached (Appendix A). 
 
1. 1965-1990: Gas Utilities Slowly Build An NGV Market From the Ground Up 
 
The was a period of slow, gradual growth that started with a few pioneering utilities and 
eventually comprised about fifty utilities and a large assortment of national, regional and 
local vehicle conversion and station equipment vendors. The focus of the fledgling 
industry was internal, but gradually grew to include a small customer base more and more 
utilities became interested in the technology and its potential to meet national air quality 
and transportation energy goals. These early adopter utilities shared information about 
NGV technologies and applications and eventually, after formation of the Gas Research 
Institute (GRI) created a more formal RD&D funding process, invested in improvements 
to vehicle, engine system, on-board fuel cylinder and fuel station technologies and 
development of national codes and standards. 
 
By 1990, CVEF estimates that there were about 10,000 NGVs fueling at slightly less than 
four hundred CNG stations and consuming eight million gasoline-gallon-equivalents 
(GGE) of vehicular natural gas. While a few were dedicated vehicles, most were bi-fuel 
vehicles that were operated on natural gas most of the time, a reasonable assumption given 
that nearly ninety-five percent of these vehicles were LDVs and most of them were in 
utilities’ own fleets. Of the 500 heavy-duty vehicles on the road, all were field conversions 
done by utilities for their own trucks and/or customers’ vehicles or by the major engine 
OEMs, which had field demonstrations underway to test the technology. 
 
All but a few dozen of the NGV stations were operated by LDCs or their affiliates and 
about eighty percent of them were operated by just ten LDCs. The rest were owned and 
operated by non-utility fleets or, in a very few cases, by local/regional independent station 
operators.  Time-fill technology was still predominant although interest in, and 
experimentation with, fast-fill technology was underway at utilities own depots and some 
customer locations. Because the industry was still developing fuel container, nozzle and 
dispenser standards, the national CNG fueling infrastructure comprised a rather 
disorganized mix of different technologies and equipment from one utility service area to 
the next. It was possible to navigate large sections of the U.S. without getting “stranded” 
by moving from one utility network to the next, as long as you had the appropriate 
adaptors and gas cards for each utility. 
 
2. 1990-1996: Boom Times For NGV Market Development 
 
This was a period of dramatic NGV market growth, as measured by number of 
parameters: yearly increases in the number of NGVs deployed, the expanding list of 
utilities actively engaged in NGV marketing and, most relevant to this report, the number 
of new CNG stations added and the amount of vehicular natural gas fuel consumed. This 
boom was driven, in part, by federal (and some states’) government policies to address air 
quality and energy diversity goals including the Energy Policy Act (EPAct) of 1992 and 
the Congestion Mitigation and Air Quality (CMAQ) program initiated under the 
Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA) of 1991. EPAct 1992 included 
AFV purchase mandates for federal, state and fuel provider fleets and the potential to 
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mandate private and local government fleets if national energy diversification goals were 
not met. The CMAQ program provided substantial grants to help fleets switch to cleaner 
fuels. Another important driver was the major automotive manufacturers’ pronouncements 
that they would develop NGVs for market entry by mid-late decade. For the first time, a 
major petroleum marketer, Amoco, entered the market installing retail CNG station “test” 
networks in several metro areas and establishing an LNG business unit developed a 
limited customer base in Texas and, a bit later, California and Arizona. 
 
By 1996, there were nearly 55,000 NGVs on the road fueling at more than 1250 CNG 
stations dispensing almost 50 million GGEs. This was five times the number of vehicles, 
three times the number of stations and more than a six times the throughput volume as 
compared to 1990, and double-digit growth was projected for the next several years. 
LDVs now accounted for eighty-four percent of the vehicle inventory as advances in 
natural gas heavy-duty engines spurred sales, especially to the transit industry as CMAQ 
funds were largely directed to this segment. Some of the station development that 
occurred during this period was ill conceived and/or poorly executed as some utilities built 
facilities based more on overly optimistic expectations than economic fundamentals. This 
over-development later contributed to some utilities’ diminishing of enthusiasm for – and 
support of – NGV market development. As discussed further below, several hundred of 
these underutilized stations would eventually be decommissioned over the next decade as 
the market went through a “correction.” 
 
3. 1997-2005: Utility Deregulation, Unfulfilled Expectations Derail NGV Momentum 
 
During this phase, a long and painful gas utility deregulation process of mergers, 
acquisitions and cost cutting wiped out many NGV marketing staffs and programs and, in 
some cases, idled their CNG station operations, just as the major automotive 
manufacturers were launching their limited number of CNG models. During this period, 
several independent fuel providers interested in developing, owning and/or operating 
other’s stations entered the market, often by buying the NGV assets of gas utility 
companies that were exiting the market either voluntarily or by PUC decree.   
 
The federal government’s decision to not mandate that local governments and private 
fleets purchase AFVs eliminated one of the market drivers that many had counted on to 
launch NGV market development to the next level. Furthermore, lax enforcement of 
EPAct AFV purchase and fuel use guidelines allowed mandated fleets to skirt the intent 
by buying Flex-Fuel Vehicles (FFV) without using the alternative fuel. Projected light-
duty NGV sales did not materialize and, by year-end 2005, all the major automotive 
companies except Honda had either left the market entirely or were about to leave.  
 
Small Volume Manufacturers (SVM) of engine conversion-retrofit components and 
systems, who had been the NGV industry’s primary suppliers of gaseous fuel technology, 
came under increasing EPA regulatory pressure to document that there equipment was 
keeping up with emissions advances of the major auto manufacturers. New testing, 
documentation and certification requirements forced many without the technical or 
financial resources to exit the market. For those few SVMs that remained, substantially 
increased certification costs forced them to eliminate some vehicle models and increase 
their costs. This exiting of many SVMs and the eventual departure of all but one OEM left 
the market with limited LDV options to offer customers. This has had a direct impact on 
the number of station development projects that move forward.  
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The number of NGVs on-road in 2003 peaked between 105,000 and 110,000 and then 
declined to about 92,000 by 2005, due to more vehicles being taken out of service than 
new ones being added. During this period, there also was net attrition in the total NGV 
station count as installation of new stations lagged closures of older underutilized stations. 
By year-end 2005, CVEF estimates that there were 1050-1100 stations in operation. On 
the positive note, continued sales successes in the heavy-duty niche markets, especially 
the transit sector, generated ever-larger fuel throughputs. Total vehicular natural gas 
consumption in 2005 was approximately 200 million GGE, comprising 39.5 million GGE 
of LNG (roughly 60 million LNG gallons) and 159 million GGE of CNG.   
 
4.  2006-2007: Tax Credits, Emissions Advantages, Petroleum Prices Energize NGV Market 
 
The fourth phase, which began in 2006 and continues today, is witnessing a reinvigoration 
of the NGV market. The factors that slowed market acceptance and penetration all have 
been - or are – being addressed. General lack of familiarity and comfort with gaseous fuel 
vehicle and station technology probably is still the greatest challenge, although businesses 
and consumers are beginning to embrace the fact that alternative technologies and fuels 
are essential to our nation’s goals of improved air quality and reduced reliance on 
imported oil. The technical hurdles the industry faced early on – like those endured by any 
new or emerging industry - have been overcome through constant improvement to the 
point that NGV performance is now equal, if not better than, gasoline and diesel vehicles. 
New federal tax credits for NGVs and motor fuels excise taxes have substantially lowered 
NGVs’ initial purchase price premium and further improved life-cycle cost savings, 
making them the better buy for many fleets and some consumers. 
 
While light-duty vehicle (LDV) availability from the major auto manufacturers remains a 
hurdle, Honda remains committed to the market with the Civic GX and several 
conversion-retrofit systems manufacturers remain with products that pass the same 
stringent emissions testing protocols as the OEMs. Heavy-duty natural gas engines’ 
advantages over diesel engines, already recognized by the transit industry, continue to 
open new niche markets for natural gas, which is garnering the attention of truck chassis 
manufacturers, several who now offer natural gas as a factory-built option in select models 
 
In terms of station counts, CVEF estimates that the number of new stations added has 
been offset by closures of smaller underutilized stations so the net count remains at 1050-
1100 stations. However, independent developer/O&M company purchases, upgrades and 
re-launching of previously utility- and municipal-owned-and-operated stations (usually as 
public access locations) has added value to the fueling infrastructure. When combined 
with increase in consumption by existing and new high-fuel use accounts (both CNG and 
LNG), CVEF estimates that total vehicular natural gas consumption at year-end 2006 was 
approximately 205 million GGEs. 
   
C. Types of Stations, Access and Development, Ownership and Operations Options   
For the discussions and recommendations that follow, the following definitions are used with 
respect to station types, access options and various development, ownership and operation 
models. The relative merits of each are discussed further below under Fueling Station Trends. 
 
1. Access Options 
 
a) Private Access 
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Access is provided only to the owner’s vehicle(s).  Typically, fueling equipment is 
located at central fleet depot, often in secure area and/or requiring access code or key 
to activate dispensing equipment. No other private or public accounts have access. 
Examples: utility, transit and government public works depots where public fueling is 
not allowed. 
 
b) Public Access 
 
(1) Limited Public Access 
 
Access to fueling capability is limited by physical barrier, e.g. the dispenser is 
located in secure area open during limited hours of operation and/or requiring pre-
approved access key or gate code, or by administrative requirement, e.g., 
dispenser requires pre-approved fuel card or billing code to activate. Generally, 
transient customers are prohibited and cash and/or credit card sales are not 
available. Examples: Utility or government public works fleet yards where a 
limited number of pre-approved “guest” fleets are authorized to use “host” fueling 
site.   
 
(2) Full Public Access 
 
Comparable to using a traditional retail gasoline or diesel station, site access is 
unencumbered and fueling capability is open to all via use of proprietary fueling 
cards, major credit cards and/or cash (if station is manned). Examples include 
dedicated public retail natural gas stations (e.g., those operated by Clean Energy, 
Pinnacle, Trillium, AVSG), CNG dispensers located at traditional petroleum 
locations, and CNG dispensers installed adjacent to typically-private-access-only 
fleet yards (e.g., at a transit agency or government public works depot that agrees 
to provide public access “outside the fence”). 
 
2. Station Types 
 
a) Time-Fill 
 
Fueling is accomplished over extended period of time, typically overnight or during 
lulls in daily operating hours, using time-fill posts. Gas is compressed and gradually 
delivered directly to vehicle fuel cylinders. No significant (if any) on-site fuel storage 
is included and there’s no fast-fill capability. Because of the need to park vehicles for 
long periods of time, this type of fueling capability is most common at fleet owner-
operator sites such as utility yards, school bus depots and government public works 
yards. However, there are still cases where utilities own and maintain these stations on 
their customers’ sites for their customers’ use.  
 
b) Fast-Fill 
 
Fueling is accomplished in relatively the same time as liquid fuels (e.g., several 
minutes). Gas is compressed and stored in on-site fuel storage containers at elevated 
pressures (typically 4500-5000psi), from which CNG is transferred to the vehicle fuel 
cylinders through fast-fill dispensers. This type of fueling capability is used anywhere 
that vehicles need to fuel quickly, including all public access sites and many private 
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access locations where time-fill fueling capability does not meet operational needs.    
 
c) Combination-Fill 
 
This type of station includes both time-fill and fast-fill dispensing capability. These 
types of stations are often found on fleet owner-operator sites where mid-day fueling 
capability is needed to meet public access needs and/or to supplement the fleet’s time-
fill capability.  
 
3. Station Ownership and Operations Options 
 
There are several basic models of station development, ownership and operations. Each 
has its own associated risks and benefits and none is the “right” approach for all 
circumstances. Within each of the options outlined below, there are further iterations that 
are beyond the immediate scope of this report, such as the type and level of detail in the 
bid specification, (e.g., performance- versus design-specification).  
 
a) Fleet Owner-Operator 
 
In this scenario, a public or private fleet operator elects to build a station and operate 
it. Scheduled preventative maintenance and/or emergency repairs may be performed 
either by in-house staff or contracted service provider. This type of station is nearly 
always located at the fleet’s base site or, in some cases (e.g., a government-owned site 
for multiple departments) nearby. The station may include time-fill, fast-fill or both 
fueling capabilities. The station may or may not offer some level of public access and, 
if it does, the fleet owner-operator sets the fuel price.   
 
b) Independent Owner-Operator  
 
In this scenario, a utility or independent fuel provider that is not the fleet operator 
owns and operates a station. The fuel price is established by the fuel provider, which 
in the case of the utility, may be regulated by the PUC. The fuel provider or their 
contracted agents handle all operations and maintenance (O&M). In the best-case 
scenario, the station will be built at a location that is easily accessible to the public and 
near or adjacent to an anchor fleet. The owner-operator may elect to purchase property 
or lease it, as is the case with some utility owned-and-operated stations installed at 
retail petroleum fuel stations in Utah and some larger stations installed on airport 
property. 
 
The station may also be located “inside the fence” on a fleet operator’s property under 
a capital lease or an operating lease agreement with option to buy clause, typically 
after five-to-seven years. The price of the fuel to the host fleet is negotiated for the life 
of the agreement and, if the station also includes “outside the fence” public access, the 
station developer-operator typically sets the retail price. Upon conclusion of the lease, 
ownership of the equipment usually transfers to the host fleet, which then may elect to 
(1) take over O&M or, as discussed next, (2) contract with the original station 
developer to provide these services, usually on a fee-per-gallon basis, or (3) shop the 
O&M contract to multiple bidders. 
 
c) Outsourced Operations and Maintenance 
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Regardless of who owns the station equipment and/or land, operations and 
maintenance may be outsourced to an independent contractor who may or may not be 
the original builder of the station.  In most of these cases, the O&M contractor charges 
the station owner (usually a fleet operator) on a fee-per-gallon basis. The amount of 
the fee is negotiated based on factors such as length of contract, total yearly and 
contract projected throughput, gas and electric utilities and who pays them, 24/7 
monitoring of equipment operations, scheduled preventative maintenance and related 
parts replacement (e.g., labor, filters, compressor oil), emergency repair services and 
rate schedules and other O&M costs. The contract may or may not include 
procurement of the gas commodity, either from the local utility, a gas brokerage or 
other source. Bids for O&M contracted services may be requested by the station 
owner as part of the station construction agreement or entered into later under separate 
negotiation, (e.g. in cases where an existing station owner-operator elects to forego 
handling these responsibilities in-house and opens station O&M to competitive bid). 
 
As discussed in more detail in the historical summary of NGV market development 
(Appendix A), CNG station design and construction has similarities to other compressed 
air and gas applications but there are differences that can be troublesome for those not 
familiar with engineering these systems. There are literally thousands of small- and 
medium-sized fleet operations across the country that are well positioned to use NGVs but 
do not have existing fueling infrastructure conveniently available. Many can make a good 
economic case to develop an on-site fueling station for their own use (and potential use by 
other area fleets and consumers) but not generate enough fuel throughput to meet the 
economic hurdle that might attract an independent fuel provider willing to build, own and 
operate a station for them. If serving as the anchor fleet at an independent fuel provider’s 
off-site fueling location is not an acceptable option, then these fleets are best served by 
contracting the services of a knowledgeable CNG station design firm that can help them 
determine current and future fueling station needs, design a station and prepare a 
construction bid request that makes the most of equipment and system efficiencies. 
   
Once built, proper station operations and maintenance assure that performance and 
savings goals will be realized. A poorly run station likely will cost more to operate, incur 
unscheduled station downtime and result in missed or delayed deployment of fleet. For 
large fleets, the trade-off between the added cost of paying for these services versus taking 
responsibility – and risk – in-house will depend on the individual operation.   
 
D. Factors Affecting NGV Fueling Infrastructure Development 
 
Multiple factors influence the practicality and economic viability of a vehicular natural gas 
fueling station. For purposes of this review, these have been loosely categorized below into 
three areas: policy, financial and logistical/operational and general.  
 
1.   Policy 
 
Successful development of a sustainable market for alternative fuel vehicles and fueling 
infrastructure requires that governments enact, enforce and clearly communicate long-
term policies favorable to market introduction and encouraging of private industry 
investment.  The areas of policy most relevant to the development of the NGV and fueling 
infrastructure market are those that address improvement of air quality (including 
greenhouse gases) and diversification of our transportation energy portfolio for improved 
national energy security. State PUC regulatory policies also have proved to be important 
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to the development of the NGV industry as most natural gas used in the U.S. still flows 
through a regulated delivery system. These are addressed further below.  
 
a) Air Quality, NAAQS, Local and Regional Clean Air Policies and Programs 
 
Research has documented the negative impacts of poor ambient air quality on health 
and the economic toll in worker absenteeism, lost productivity and lower crop output. 
Transportation energy use produces tons of carbon monoxide (CO), particulate matter 
(PM), ozone from nitrogen oxide (NOx) and volatile organic compound (VOCs) 
emissions. Ozone and PM are regulated by EPA as criteria pollutants and carbon 
dioxide (CO2) is a greenhouse gas. EPA’s National Ambient Air Quality Standards 
(NAAQS) mechanism requires that the nation’s large metropolitan areas monitor 
criteria pollutants in their area and, depending on the quality of that air, take steps to 
improve it over a defined period of time. Generally, for each criteria pollutant, a 
metropolitan area may be defined as “in attainment,” “near attainment” or various 
progressively worse states of “non-attainment.” Currently, there are nearly 400 
counties in metropolitan areas across the country in non-attainment with one or more 
of the criteria pollutants. Over 149 million people live in these polluted areas. 
 
Metropolitan planning organizations (MPOs) representing areas designated as near-
attainment or non-attainment, and areas of attainment that were formerly near- or non-
attainment, are required to implement plans to reduce those pollutants. These emission 
reduction plans typically address both stationary sources, e.g. industrial facilities and 
power plants, and mobile sources.  Examples of mobile source strategies include 
mandatory vehicle emission inspection programs, traffic mitigation measures (such as 
HOV lanes) and, most pertinent to this report, fleet emissions reductions programs. 
MPOs often target local government, school district, transit agency and other “public” 
fleets first because of their high visibility and the expectation that “government” 
should lead by example. 
 
Fleet emissions reduction plans often include mandates and/or incentives for fleet 
operators to equip their vehicles with emission reduction devices and/or use 
alternative fuels, including the retrofit or replacement of their current vehicles with 
alternative fuel vehicles and installing fueling infrastructure.  
 
(1) Mandates 
 
Mandates are a double-edge sword. While they accelerate market penetration of 
NGV and other AFV technologies, they also can create market animosity or 
resentment toward these technologies. Some argue that mandates are only needed 
for technologies that can’t capture market based on their own merits. Others 
counter that government should help commercialize technologies that provide 
societal benefits (e.g., clean air, lower healthcare costs). The best known example 
of an air quality-driven fleet mandate program is in California’s South Coast Air 
Quality Management District (AQMD), where the “1100 Series Fleet Rules” 
require that street sweepers, school buses, refuse trucks and other vehicles 
operated by municipalities or their contracted service providers run on cleaner 
fuels. AQMD’s application of these mandates to private fleets were challenged in 
court and initially struck down. 
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(2) Incentives 
 
As discussed further below in the section on “Available Grants,” state air quality 
authorities may use incentives, usually in the form of grants, to facilitate public 
and private fleets’ use of alternative fuels and vehicles.  Funding for these state 
vehicle emissions reduction activities varies across the board. Some states rely 
entirely on what funds they receive from the federal government through the 
CMAQ program while others use vehicle registration fees, bonds and other 
mechanisms to raise additional funds for these projects.  The most significant state 
and local air quality authority-driven fleet emission reduction programs are in 
California, where Carl Moyer Program grants and regional AQMD grants reduce 
the cost of NGVs and related fueling infrastructure. California’s progressive and 
aggressive programs to curb vehicle emissions and improve air quality have 
provided more funding over the last fifteen years than all other states combined. 
Other important state initiatives include Texas’ Emission Reduction Program 
(TERP) and several New York programs implemented by the State Energy 
Research & Development Authority (NYSERDA). 
 
b) Diversification of National Transportation Energy Portfolio 
 
(1) Federal Energy Policies and Programs 
  
Since the 1970’s, the federal government has implemented a number of initiatives 
to reduce the transportation sector’s reliance on petroleum motor fuels.  These 
initiatives have included: mandatory increases in fuel economy for motor 
vehicles; production incentives for alternative fuels; reduced excise tax rates for 
alternative fuels; funding mass transit; mandating the acquisition of alternative 
fuel vehicles; tax incentives for advanced vehicle technologies; funding for 
advanced fuels and vehicles RDD&D, among other things.  Some of these 
initiatives benefited development of the NGV market either directly or indirectly. 
Most of the federal government initiatives and funding have been directed at 
biofuels. Unfortunately, the overall net effect of these policies on reducing 
reliance on petroleum has been, at best, to slow the increased rate of petroleum 
use. A thorough review of all the initiatives and their impact, while a worthwhile 
endeavor, is beyond the scope of this report. Following is a short summary of the 
initiatives that most directly affected NGV market development. 
 
(a) CAFÉ 
 
The Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFÉ) requirements created under 
the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975 and since modified several 
times not only slowed down the growth in oil demand by increasing the fuel 
efficiency of new motor vehicles, it encouraged production of AFVs. 
Enactment of the Alternative Motor Fuels Act (AMFA) in 1988 created 
valuable CAFÉ credits for auto manufacturers. This helped engage the major 
auto manufacturers to allocate more resources to AFV options including 
NGVs. Unfortunately, the relative value of NGVs’ CAFÉ credits to most of 
the major automakers became negligible over time as government policy 
leaned ever more strongly toward ethanol fuels and manufacturers geared 
most of their efforts toward development of Flex-Fuel Vehicles (FFVs). FFVs 
earned CAFE credits and, due to their lower relative cost and ability to run on 
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regular gasoline (instead of the intended E85), were an easier AFV option for 
consumers and EPAct-governed fleets to choose.  
 
(b) CMAQ Program 
 
One of the most important federal initiatives to NGV market development has 
been the CMAQ program initiated under the Intermodal Surface 
Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991. It has provided billions in federal 
funding to help local authorities address transportation related emissions, 
including a significant level of funding for alternative fuel projects. This 
funding has been particularly important in encouraging increased use of 
alternative fuels in the transit bus sector, where natural gas powered buses and 
fueling infrastructure have been one of the primary beneficiaries of the 
program. CMAQ funding also has been an important source of co-funding for 
many smaller public and private NGV deployment projects. While well-
funded, competition at the local level for CMAQ program grants is fierce and 
political; alternative fuel projects must receive priority if they are to 
successfully vie against other projects for funding. 
 
(c) Energy Policy Act (EPAct) 1992 
 
EPAct 92 established aggressive national goals for replacing petroleum motor 
fuels with alternative and replacement. To stimulate demand for alternative 
fuel vehicles and alternative fuels, the law required the federal government 
first and, then later, state government and fuel provider fleets to acquire light-
duty AFVs.  The acquisition requirements were phased in over time so that an 
increasingly larger percentage of new light-duty acquisitions must be 
alternatively fueled.  An amendment made several years later modified the 
programs to allow fleets to satisfy up to 50 percent of their annual AFV 
acquisition requirements by using biodiesel blends of at least 20 percent. 
Additional discretionary rulemaking authority was provided with respect to 
private and local government fleets but, in a rulemaking in 2004, DOE 
determined that such a rulemaking was not “necessary” based on its 
consideration of a number of factors required in the law. Other than the fleet 
mandates, EPAct focuses mainly on voluntary efforts (forming the basis for 
the National Clean Cities Program) and the law strictly limits DOE authority 
to require fuel retailers or vehicle manufacturers to produce or sell alternative 
fuel vehicles or alternative fuels.  The law also provided a number of tax 
incentives, including tax deductions for qualified clean fuel vehicles and 
infrastructure. As discussed in more detail below in “Financial,” tax 
deductions have little impact for most fleets.  
 
EPAct 1992 was intended to spur sales of AFVs and did create some demand 
for NGVs by the mandated fleets. However, as detailed more thoroughly in 
the historical review (Appendix A), the 2004 decision not to promulgate 
private and local government fleets rules “took the wind out of the sails”. The 
introduction of FFVs, with their ability to more easily satisfy EPAct’s 
requirements (if not its intent), and the biodiesel credit provisions further 
negated the impact of EPAct 1992 on NGV market development.  
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(d) EPAct 2005 
 
EPAct 2005 included several provisions of importance to NGV market 
development. These include small changes to the fleet acquisition program 
that should improve its implementation and market impact, authorization of 
significant funding for demonstration programs involving AFVs and fuel-
efficient vehicles to be administered through DOE’s Clean Cities Program 
and, most important, two new tax credit provisions – one for alternative fuel 
vehicles and the other for alternative fueling infrastructure investment. The 
law also contained a significant section on hydrogen, authorizing the 
development of hydrogen-fueled vehicles. While the implementation of the 
hydrogen initiatives is still in progress, the NGV market could benefit from 
this program as gaseous-fueled NGVs and fueling infrastructure technologies 
are the precursor – sometimes referred to as the “bridge” or “pathway” 
technologies - to hydrogen.  Finally, EPAct 2005 included a mandate called 
the Renewable Fuels Standard (RFS) for the fuels industry to include 
renewable fuels in the nation’s transportation energy portfolio.  Much of the 
focus of this program is on blending alternative fuels with petroleum fuels 
(e.g., ethanol, biodiesel) but methane from biomass may be able play a role. 
This remains to be seen as the RFS is in development at the time this report 
was being written.  
 
The most significant changes to the fleet acquisition mandate program are the 
requirement that federal agency fleets use alternative fuels in dual-fuel 
vehicles, and the directive to the General Services Administration to equally 
allocate the purchase price premium for AFVs across requisitioning agencies’ 
entire new fleet purchases, thus eliminating the cost differential.  
 
The funding authorization for AFV demonstrations could be beneficial to 
NGV market development if (1) authorized funds are appropriated by 
Congress, (2) funds are directed to NGV and fueling infrastructure programs. 
 
By far, the most important NGV-related measures of EPAct 2005 are the tax 
credits for buyers of alternative fuel vehicles and fueling equipment. The tax 
credits, which apply only to dedicated natural gas-, propane- and hydrogen-
powered vehicles, go to the buyer and are available for fifty to eighty percent 
of the incremental cost of the vehicle. These credits, which range from 
$2,500-$32,000 depending vehicle GVWR, significantly reduce NGVs’ price 
premium, thus shortening the payback period and further improving life-cycle 
savings. The fueling equipment credit also goes to the buyer and is equal to 
thirty percent of the cost of equipment placed in service that year with a credit 
cap of $30,000. In cases where the buyer is tax exempt, vehicle and fuel 
equipment tax credits may be taken by the seller(s). When combined with the 
motor fuels excise tax credit included in the SAFETEA-LU (Transportation 
Act) of 2005, the vehicle and fueling equipment tax credits, effective January 
1, 2006, are proving to be a catalyst to NGV market development. 
 
(e) Federal Investment in NGV Infrastructure R&D 
 
In the 1990’s and up to FY 2003 the Federal Government through the 
Department of Energy and its national laboratories invested up to 20% of their 
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NGV R&D budget in development of CNG, LNG and L/CNG fueling 
infrastructure technologies. These funds (max amount of $1.96 million in 
2002) were part of a larger cooperative R&D program that included co-
funding from the industry primarily through the Gas Research Institute-GRI 
(now Gas Technology Institute - GTI) and the Institute of Gas Technology 
(now part of GTI). This cooperative R&D program covered all aspects of 
fueling infrastructure design including but not limited to dispensing, metering, 
gas conditioning (dryers and oil recovery), gas composition analysis, 
optimization of operational protocols, fueling connector development and 
support for codes and standards. During the last few years of the DOE R&D 
program, funding was directed specifically to research on small scale 
liquefiers for LNG from pipelines and biomethane from landfills and other 
sources and to develop processes for generating CNG from LNG storage 
systems. In 2004, DOE zeroed out their support for NGV R&D for both 
vehicle engine development and NGV infrastructure. The NGV industry has 
proposed to Congress that DOE reinstate their NGV R&D program to meet 
the goals of the nation in increasing the utilization of alternative fuels. 
 
(2) State Policies to Reduce Petroleum Use 
 
In recent years, a number of states have adopted policies to reduce petroleum 
demand.  Many of these policies have been implemented to further environmental 
objectives such as clean air and reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.  Some 
states are driven primarily by the promise of developing a domestic market for 
home-grown fuels, such as ethanol or biodiesel. These policies and incentives 
include tax incentives for AFVs, high occupancy lane exemptions for fuel 
efficient and alternative fueled vehicles, sales tax exemptions for certain types of 
vehicles, lower fuel tax rates for alternative fuels, investment tax credits for 
ethanol production facilities, and grants for fueling infrastructure.  Many state 
governors have adopted executive orders that require state government fleets to 
acquire AFVs and use alternative fuels when such fuels are available.  Several 
states require government fleets to exceed the acquisition requirements contained 
in EPAct 1992.  Of the tax incentives, the most important seem to be production 
tax credits and reduced fuel taxes. 
 
It is difficult to determine what impact initiatives adopted by states will have, as 
many are relatively new.  Moreover, many state measures have the effect of 
supporting or contributing to the achievement of existing federal initiatives rather 
than necessarily generating additional demand for alternative or replacement 
fuels. 
 
Potentially one of the most significant state actions is California’s adoption of 
greenhouse gas emission reductions for new automobiles.  The regulations could 
significantly increase the fuel efficiency of motor vehicles in California and other 
states that have moved to adopt it.  However, the provision is currently being 
challenge in court and it is not certain whether the regulations will take effect as 
planned in 2009. 
 
c) State Public Utility Commission Regulatory Policies 
 
State PUC regulatory policies can facilitate or hinder development of vehicular natural 
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gas fueling infrastructure in several ways. For example, several states’ PUCs allow 
LDCs to rate-base CNG station capital investment and operating expenses on the basis 
that these expenditures facilitate the utilities’ own fleet operations while also 
providing ratepayers access to lower cost transportation fuel. Other PUCs take the 
view that not all ratepayers are NGV operators and therefore CNG station investments 
should not be rate-based, at least not fully rate-based. The arguments for and against 
hinge on the value the PUC places on the greater societal benefit to all ratepayers that 
a more roust NGV fueling infrastructure provides (e.g., improved air quality, 
diversified energy portfolio). 
 
A developing trend in state utility regulation that can have positive or negative 
impacts on LDC involvement in NGV fueling (depending on how it is implemented) 
is “decoupling,” which deals with how PUC rates are structured.  Customers’ gas rates 
are divided into two parts – the commodity charge and the demand charge.   The 
commodity cost is the price the LDC pays for the natural gas itself.  LDCs do not 
“mark up” the price they pay for gas.  Rather, it is a pass through – i.e., customers pay 
what the LDC pays.  The demand cost comprises all the other costs that the LDC 
incurs to provide gas service – including the LDC’s profit.  Under a decoupled rate 
structure, the commodity charge includes just the commodity costs, and all the 
demand costs are included in the demand charge. Under this rate structure, the LDC is 
economically indifferent to how much gas a customer uses.  Customers pay 1/12th of 
all the approved non-gas costs for the year (the demand charge) in monthly 
installments plus the actual cost of any gas they use.  
 
To better understand this concept, consider the way cable TV charges for service.  The 
commodity charge for a cable company is zero.  In other words, it costs no more for 
the company to provide service to someone who watches TV all day than to someone 
who never watches.  All their costs (including shareholder profit) are recovered in the 
demand charge, which is their standard monthly fee.  They are economically 
indifferent to how much TV customers watch.  A decoupled rate for gas would be 
similar except that in addition to the standard monthly demand charge, the customer 
would also get charged for the actual gas used. 
 
Unfortunately, today, most PUC-approved rates are hybrid rates, where some of the 
demand costs is collected as part of the commodity charge.  In these cases, the LDCs’ 
shareholders do benefit economically when customers consume more gas, and 
consequently, the LDCs have little incentive to promote gas conservation or energy 
efficiency. 
 
To address this situation, some PUCs now are implementing or considering 
implementing decoupled rates.  Further, some PUCs don’t just want LDCs to be 
indifferent about how much gas customers consume; they want them to be to be 
advocates for conservation and energy efficiency.  To do this, some PUCs are 
providing incentives, whereby the LDC’s shareholders get a better rate of return if the 
LDC successfully implements conservation and energy efficiency programs.  
 
How could these decoupled/incentive rates affect an LDC’s interest in pursuing 
NGVs?  If implemented poorly, it could severely dampen interest.   For example, if 
the LDC just focuses on volume reductions, they would have no incentive to promote 
NGVs.  If implemented well (such as in California), NGV use could be encouraged.  
In fact, PUCs could provide specific incentives for the growth of natural gas use in 
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NGVs. 
 
2. Financial 
 
In researching station development and operations for this report, there was surprisingly 
little consistency in station costs, regardless of the measure used (e.g. cost per GGE, cost 
per scfm, cost by region, etc) as site-specific variables, including those outlined below, 
weighed heavily. 
 
a) Station Development 
 
(1) Land Purchase Cost or Lease Expense 
 
Unless sufficient land is already available at an existing location owned by the 
station owner and/or made available at a favorable lease rate to the developer-
operator (e.g., at an existing fleet yard or fuel depot/station), the cost of land is 
usually a major contributor to an NGV fueling facility site cost and the resulting 
price per GGE. Following is a brief summary of factors affecting land cost. 
 
(a) Location: Stating the obvious, one of the biggest factors affecting real estate 
cost is location, location, location. The closer a prospective site is to other 
residential and commercial development and traffic patterns, the more 
desirable the site is to competing interests and, thus, commands a higher price. 
Generally, the more urban the location, the higher the price. In addition, 
regional variations in land cost are substantial. Land costs for an urban site in 
the Los Angeles, New York or Washington D.C. metro areas may be as much 
as three times that of a similar site in St. Louis or Indianapolis, for example. 
Proximity to major highways or thoroughfares, an important consideration in 
facilitating public and private fleets’ access and use, also increases land cost. 
 
(b) Size of property: Considerations include the footprint of the compression and 
storage equipment that will be needed to meet the expected fuel throughput 
rates; the number of fueling islands and types of dispensers, e.g., low-volume 
versus high-volume dispensers and whether there is inside- and/or outside-
the-fence fueling planned; necessary clearances and/or setbacks from adjacent 
properties; the types and sizes of vehicles expected to fuel at the property and 
their traffic access and maneuvering space requirements (e.g., refuse trucks 
need greater turning space and prefer unidirectional entrance-exit routes to 
avoid the need to back-up).  
 
(c) Availability of utility services: If electric, natural gas and telecommunication 
utilities are not readily accessible or insufficient to meet station equipment 
needs (e.g., inlet gas pressures, electric service voltage/amperage), they will 
have to be brought in or upgraded, adding expense. Property adjacent to 
existing utilities commands a higher premium than those more distant from 
these services. 
 
As mentioned above, a more favorable option to buying land may be to lease it. 
For example, a western utility has successfully expanded its network of utility-
owned-and-operated stations by leasing a small footprint of an existing traditional 
fuel retail location at a favorable rate in exchange for paying the retailer a royalty 
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on the natural gas in addition to the traffic building benefits the station may 
generate.  Another example is a transit or refuse operation that out-sources its on-
site fuel station development and operations needs to an independent party that 
leases the land for a minimal fee as part of fuel pricing structure. 
 
(2) Site Development, Construction and Permitting Costs 
 
Site development requirements and costs can vary widely. If a new station is to be 
built at an existing fuel station, for example, there may be equipment removal or 
remediation requirements (e.g., underground gasoline or diesel fuel tanks). 
Depending on projected changes to traffic in and out of the site, local jurisdictions 
may impose road access improvement requirements (e.g., turning lanes, traffic 
signals, etc). In addition, despite the existence of model building codes (including 
NFPA 52) covering NGV station construction, code requirements differ from one 
location to another and can have a significant impact on station cost. Lighting, 
signage and security fencing requirements are other considerations that factor into 
total site cost. Construction labor rates also vary widely from one region or 
jurisdiction to another depending on general economic health of the construction 
trades and availability of union versus non-union labor. Depending on 
jurisdiction, site development, construction and occupancy permit fees can be 
quite substantial. 
 
(3) Fueling Equipment Cost 
 
Each fuel station design and operations differs. Generally, a natural gas station’s 
equipment needs and costs will be based on the type of fuel to be dispensed 
(CNG, LNG or L/CNG), number of vehicles projected to fuel there, the total daily 
throughput estimates and, in some cases, whether nearby back-up fueling 
capability is available.  
 
A CNG station’s fueling equipment needs and costs will be based on 
compression, storage, dispensing, fuel-metering/management and redundancy 
requirements. Available utility services also impact station design, equipment 
selection and operational strategy. 
 
(a) Compressors - Compressor sizing and cost factors include: total fuel 
throughput and peak flow needs, inlet gas pressure and its impact on 
horsepower requirements to achieve the desired flow rates; the need for – and 
amount of - redundancy required and how this may affect compressor(s) 
sizing; electric-drive versus gas engine-drive prime mover(s); incremental 
cost per added scfm (i.e. different compressor packages have different “sweet 
spots”); type and sophistication of the controller; remote monitoring 
capabilities. 
  
(b) Gas Dryers – Dryer sizing and cost factors include: volume and flow rates of 
fuel to be processed; inlet gas pressure and moisture content; automated or 
manual regeneration capability. 
 
(c) Storage – Factors affecting storage equipment sizing and cost include: 
whether any storage is needed; the type of system (e.g., buffer versus 
cascade); amount and pressure of total storage needed to help meet peak 
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demand periods; type of storage container selected (ASME, DOT, etc); 
controls. 
 
(d) Number and Type of Dispensers – Factors to consider include whether to use 
time-fill posts, fast-fill dispensers or both; the pressure, flow rate and types of 
nozzle(s); number of fueling dispensers needed to meet peak demand. 
 
(e) Fuel Metering / Transaction Recording / Payment Processing Capability – 
Factors affecting equipment selection and costs include: whether a card reader 
system is necessary (i.e., will the station offer public access); the 
sophistication of the card reader system (e.g., California requires a video 
screen for first-time fueler training); modem systems. 
 
As is the case with a petroleum fuel station, an LNG station’s equipment needs 
and costs will depend primarily on the distance to the nearest supply and 
transportations costs, the amount of fuel storage needed to meet needs between 
deliveries, and the number of dispensers. Of course there are fuel metering and 
data recording system requirements but LNG stations do not usually include the 
more sophisticated (and more expensive) card reader systems that are required for 
public access CNG locations.  
 
b) Differential Between Natural Gas and Petroleum Fuel Prices 
 
One of the key economic drivers of NGV sales and related infrastructure development 
is the cost differential between natural gas and gasoline or diesel fuel. Favorable fuel 
price advantages translate into shorter payback periods and lower life-cycle cost. On a 
national average, natural gas historically has maintained a significant cost advantage 
as compared to both gasoline and diesel fuel, and that favorable differential is 
projected to increase even more over the next decade according to EIA forecasts. 
General factors affecting the amount of differential include: crude oil prices; regional 
availability/distance from petroleum refining capacity; whether the fuel is for internal 
fleet operations or sold to the public and, if the latter, whether the operator is a for-
profit business or a not-for-profit organization (e.g. government agency, transit fleet, 
school district); state and federal taxes. Additional factors include: for LNG, 
availability of supply and distance to fueling location; for CNG, regional gas 
commodity and pipeline transportation costs, and prevailing natural gas and electric 
utility tariffs.  
  
c) Availability of Grants 
 
Other than in rare cases where a mandated NGV fleet is forced to build fueling 
infrastructure regardless of cost, NGV fuel station development is driven by 
economics. In some high-fuel use fleet applications, such as refuse or transit, an initial 
deployment of NGVs may be sufficient to meet the economic “tipping point” required 
by the station operator. In most cases, however, the initial projected fuel throughput of 
a station is insufficient to justify investment, especially by the private sector. Federal 
DOT, EPA and DOE grants and those offered through state and local energy, 
environment and economic development agencies have been instrumental in reducing 
costs enough to move many projects forward. Conversely, lack of grants has stopped 
projects from progressing. 
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While federal, state and local grants likely will continue to play a critical role in 
improving project economics, the total available funds are far less than the current 
demand and the shortfall will undoubtedly increase as market interest in NGVs and 
other alternative fuel technologies grows, creating even greater demand. This point is 
illustrated by the number of applications received versus those funded under DOT’s 
CMAQ, DOE’s State Energy Projects and EPA’s Supplemental Environmental 
Projects, Clean School Bus and Diesel Emission Reduction programs.  
 
d) Availability of Tax Deductions and Credits 
 
(1) Tax deductions 
 
EPAct 1992 included a package of tax incentives to encourage the purchase of 
alternative fuel vehicles (AFVs) and installation of alternative fueling stations.  
The size and incremental cost of AFVs were two primary factors in determining 
the tax deduction amount for AFVs.  They ranged from tax deduction of $2,000 
per passenger car or light truck up to $50,000 for on-road vehicles with a gross 
vehicle weight rating of more than 26,000 pounds.  The tax deductions could be 
taken for new original equipment vehicles or newly installed aftermarket 
conversion equipment.  Furthermore, only the initial purchaser of the equipment 
qualified for the tax incentive. A $100,000 tax deduction was also made available 
for businesses that installed fueling equipment for dispensing alternative fuels.  
The tax incentives in EPAct 1992 were scheduled to originally expire after 2004.  
 
The incentives in EPAct 1992 ultimately did not have much impact on the market 
for alternative fuel vehicles.  Part of the reason is that tax deductions are not much 
of an incentive for private businesses, which already are permitted to depreciate 
the cost of capital equipment. Tax deductions simply allow companies to 
accelerate the depreciation of their equipment, taking a larger upfront deduction in 
the first year of owning a new alternative fuel vehicle or fueling station. Thus, the 
overall benefit is small.  The benefit to consumers that are not able to depreciate 
property is more significant but still not large enough to offset the initial higher 
cost of most alternative fuel equipment.  And because the incentives in EPAct 
1992 were tax deductions and not tax credits they only had the affect of lowering 
taxable income by a certain amount.  Tax credits, on the other hand, are much 
more valuable because they reduce a person’s tax obligation on a dollar-for-dollar 
basis whereas a dollar of tax deduction is only worth about $0.15 - $0.30 
depending on the applicable tax bracket. 
 
(2) Tax credits 
 
As noted above, EPAct 2005 included new federal tax credits for investment in 
natural gas vehicles, fueling equipment and motor fuels excise taxes, effective in 
2006. A number of states also offer tax credits, as do some local jurisdictions. The 
federal vehicle and station equipment purchase credits are income tax credits as 
are most of the available state and local tax credits. The motor fuels tax credit is 
an excise tax credit. 
 
Income tax credits can be an effective way to improve NGV economics if the 
entities involved have tax liabilities or, if not, the value of these credits may be 
captured through other marketplace mechanisms.  
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Income tax credits only have negotiating value to tax-exempt entities such as 
governments, school districts, transit agencies and airport authorities if their 
suppliers have sufficient tax liability to take them. Thus far, tax-exempt 
organizations experience with auto, bus and truck dealers and NGV fuel station 
developers and equipment suppliers has been mixed as these suppliers have had 
limited tax liabilities. Furthermore, the larger the order, the less likely any one 
supplier has been able to absorb the full value of the credits and pass them back in 
the form of lower price or improved contract terms. Another way tax-exempt 
entities may indirectly capture the value of these income tax credits is to acquire 
vehicles and fueling station equipment through a capital lease arrangement with a 
municipal finance-lease company or other third-party. Under this type of 
acquisition scenario, the leasing company takes the full tax credit then reduces the 
basis of the vehicle cost in their calculation of lease payments and fees.  
 
Motor fuels excise tax credits improve NGV economics regardless of whether the 
fuel seller is tax-exempt or not and experience thus far with the new federal tax 
credits has been very positive.  
 
In preparing this report, NGV industry stakeholders and fleet operators alike noted 
that decisions about vehicle and station economics are based on minimum vehicle 
and station life (e.g., five-eight years minimum for vehicles and up to ten years for 
fueling station equipment).  Uncertainty about continuation of motor fuels excise 
tax credits and vehicle tax credits beyond the current expiration dates, September 
30, 2009 and December 31, 2010, respectively, is making some fleet operators 
hesitant to move forward with their vehicle deployment and station development 
projects. CVEF recommends that these credits be extended far enough into the 
future to eliminate uncertainty and facilitate long-term decision-making.  
 
3. Logistical/Operational 
 
Although presented last, the logistical and operational needs and concerns of customers 
are paramount. For a fleet manager considering installation of their own fueling site, the 
economic, emission reduction and other operational benefits of NGVs may appear – on 
paper – to be overwhelming but, unless he/she has already had positive experience and is 
familiar with using NGVs and fueling infrastructure, implementing this option is counter-
intuitive.  Following are some of the logistical and operational concerns that factor into 
the potential viability of a fuel station project moving forward. 
 
a) Projected Fuel Throughput, Flow Rates and Storage Needs  
 
The most obvious criteria to be evaluated in deciding whether and how a station is to 
be developed is the volume of fuel to be dispensed, either to the single fleet proposed 
to have access (i.e. private access-only station), or to the anchor fleet(s) and transient 
customer base that will use the public station.  As discussed in more detail above 
under Station Development Costs, volume needs to be assessed in terms of total daily 
throughput, peak hourly throughput, flow rates and storage needs. 
  
b) Fueling Reliability 
 
Fleet operations are supportive of, or secondary to, the core product or service of any 
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business. A fleet management team’s job is to be invisible, delivering seamless 
reliability day-in and day-out.  Those that choose to use NGVs must be able to rely on 
their vehicles and know that their fueling capability is guaranteed because, in most 
areas of the country, there is insufficient “back-up” fueling via nearby CNG stations 
to provide fueling if a station goes down. 
 
c) Fueling Convenience 
 
If a proposed station is to rely on transient customers to meet all or, most likely, part 
of its required throughput goal, it has to be conveniently located.  For a fleet operator, 
the time spent fueling a vehicle is unproductive. Every minute a vehicle travels out of 
its way to or from a fuel station, it is not performing its primary task (e.g., delivering 
something or someone from point A to point B), and it is costing additional labor. For 
example, assuming that, on average, traveling out of the way just four miles off a 
planned suburban route adds twelve minutes (roundtrip) to the bakery truck driver’s 
schedule and the driver has a fully-loaded hourly labor rate of $42.00 costs an extra 
$8.40 per tank fill or $.34 per gallon (based on 25GGE tank). In a business that counts 
profitability in the pennies, this added time and cost is substantial. It may, however, be 
within reason if the overall savings on the fuel warrants the added time. For larger 
fleets, fuel stations, if not located on-site, must be conveniently located on or near a 
main thoroughfare close to their business or along their normal route of travel. 
 
Another aspect of fueling convenience is accessibility, especially if the station is off-
site and allows public access. This includes traffic lanes and signals, the number of 
vehicles expected to be in and around a station and their expected fueling patterns, and 
the footprint and layout of the space. Vehicles that have to negotiate heavy traffic, 
endure extra traffic light stops then wait for access to a dispenser log additional time, 
i.e. cost. Large vehicles need to be able to enter a fueling station and exit without the 
need to turn around or maneuver in tight side- and overhead-clearances, especially if 
the station allows public access and there may be additional smaller vehicles moving 
about. Concern about accident liability is one of the main reasons cited by current 
private-access-only station operators for not allowing public fueling at their location.   
 
d) Payment Processing and Tax Administration 
 
When natural gas is dispensed into an NGV owned and operated by a taxable entity, it 
incurs a federal motor fuels excise tax obligation and, in most states, a state motor 
fuels excise tax as well. Independent CNG and LNG fuel providers expect to deal with 
payment processing hardware and software and the related collection and payment of 
various local, state and federal taxes on taxable sales; it is part of their core business – 
fuel delivery. For fleet operators who are asked to consider allowing public access to 
their private CNG or LNG fueling site (e.g., “outside the fence”), this creates 
additional cost and administrative burdens. Fleets that install on-site fueling capability 
for their own NGVs can use a far simpler and less expensive fuel metering and data 
recording system than that required for a station that will dispense to other public and 
private accounts. In addition to citing other concerns outlined above (e.g., space 
availability, liability, fuel capacity), many fleets are reluctant to take on these extra 
burdens, as they are not a part of their core business. 
 
The simplest way around this hurdle is to engage the services of a fuel metering and 
payment processor that monitors the dispensing equipment card readers, records each 
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fueling transaction, applies the appropriate taxes, invoices, collects payment and 
provides detailed reports back to the station owner. This is usually done a monthly 
fee-plus-GGE surcharge basis.  Some fuel providers use these services and many 
private fleets use similar but less sophisticated hardware and software to record their 
own fleet vehicle fuel use; upgrading to a full public access payment processing 
system (e.g., those that accept major credit cards and branded fuel cards) adds cost but 
is essentially an extension of that capability. 
 
e) Availability and Skill Level of Station Operations and Maintenance Personnel 
 
Proper operation and maintenance of a CNG or LNG fueling station requires skilled 
technicians familiar with the respective technologies. On a day-to-day basis, critical 
equipment performance parameters (e.g., oil temperatures, flow rates, storage 
pressures) should be monitored for anomalies and addressed before damage or failure 
occurs. Regular scheduled preventative maintenance is also imperative and, in the 
unfortunate case of equipment failure, repairs need to be made immediately. 
Attracting and retaining skilled mechanics is already a difficult task for many fleet 
operators; finding technicians with the added knowledge and/or experience with gas 
compressor systems, dryers, CNG or LNG fuel storage hardware and controls is even 
more difficult.  
 
The time resources and cost of skilled personnel may be spread across multiple 
locations, as is the case with most independent fuel providers and O&M companies. In 
some large fleet operations, these costs are absorbed in-house. For example, several 
large natural gas fleets (e.g., Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority) have 
accomplished these tasks using skilled in-house mechanics trained in equipment PM 
and repair. Other large fleets have outsourced these via station O&M contractors (e.g. 
Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority). 
 
 
E. Status of Current Natural Gas Fueling Infrastructure 
 
The limited number of vehicular LNG installations in the U.S. (estimated at 40-45) primarily 
is a function of economics determined, in large part, by availability of – and distance from - 
LNG supply. As more LNG import terminals are approved and brought on line and new small-
scale liquefaction technologies are commercialized and placed, supply options will increase, 
as will the applicability and financial viability of LNG fueling on a greater scale. While CNG 
and LNG station development project dynamics share some similarities, there are far more 
differences in the technologies, the applications, the supplies and other key factors involved in 
the sale and post-sale support. The discussion that follows focuses primarily on CNG fueling 
infrastructure. 
 
Part III of this report provides more detail about vehicular natural gas consumption by niche 
sector and regional. Interviews with station owners and operators conducted in preparation of 
that section, including those operated by utilities, independent fuel providers and fleet 
operators, revealed much about the current inventory of CNG fueling infrastructure. It 
comprises a mix that runs the gamut from large to small and from modern well-utilized public- 
and private-access stations, to those that are grossly underutilized either because the customer 
base never materialized or the original throughput dwindled through attrition of bi-fuel and 
dedicated CNG vehicles and little was done to generate new load.  Generally, the more recent 
the station was built or upgraded, the better it is utilized because, as note earlier, most of the 
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investments in CNG stations over the last several years were undertaken based on confirmed 
or soon-to-be-added load. 
 
1. Who’s Operating Existing CNG Stations  
 
Of the approximate 1100 CNG stations in operation, CVEF estimates that sixteen percent 
are operated by independent (non-utility) fuel providers, twenty-seven percent are 
operated by utilities, another thirty-seven percent are operated by federal, state or local 
governments and quasi-government entities (e.g., transit, school, airport), seventeen 
percent are operated by private businesses (e.g., linen services, package companies, 
building trades contractors), and the remaining three percent are operated by individual 
consumers.  
 
2.  CNG Station Utilization 
 
Based on 2005 throughput data collected and analyzed for Part III of this report, CVEF 
estimates that about fifteen percent of the CNG stations accounted for roughly sixty-five 
percent of total U.S vehicular CNG throughput. Seventy-five percent of CNG stations 
accounted for the other thirty-five percent of CNG fuel throughput and the remaining ten 
percent of CNG stations were dormant or dispensed negligible amounts of fuel, amounting 
to less than one percent of the U.S total. 
 
Furthermore, based on installed fueling capacity, CVEF estimates that approximately 
thirty percent of CNG stations are grossly underutilized, defined as stations that dispensed, 
on average, no more than fifteen percent of their capacity in 2005. Many of the CNG 
stations contacted by CVEF dispensed as little as one percent of their capacity. 
 
There were wide regional variances in this data. When transit accounts were taken out of 
the data set (because of their high-utilization factors and the fact that transit accounted for 
approximately fifty percent of total U.S. CNG throughput), western state CNG stations 
had higher utilization factors than anywhere else in the nation with California having the 
highest utilization. 
 
3. Dormant and Underutilized CNG Stations Need Investment to Be Viable 
 
Many of the dormant or underutilized CNG stations are government- or utility-owned-
and-operated and, most, only for their own CNG fleets, which are dwindling. Others allow 
public access but do not conduct market outreach to build load. Based on interviews with 
station operators, many of these stations are in need of repairs and/or upgrades to make 
them viable - regardless of who owns and or operates them. One factor that will affect this 
decision is the level and cost of upgrading the facility. Some stations basically are intact 
but out of commission for one reason or another and repairable at relatively low cost. 
Other stations need significant investment to upgrade them from their current 2400psi or 
3000psi fuel dispensing capability to 3600psi and/or to replace or repair dryers, controls 
and other critical components. Investments in these stations must be offset through 
increased fuel throughput. Whether these investments are made or not will depend, in part, 
on the outlook for potential load growth, available funds and the current station owner’s 
interest and commitment to the CNG station. In many cases, the investment likely will not 
occur and the station will eventually close. This may be viewed as continuation of the 
“market correction” discussed above and should not be perceived as indicative of NGV 
market health.  
 30
 
      
F. Recent Trends in CNG Station Development, Ownership and Operations 
 
1.  Summary of New Capacity Added in 2004-2007 
 
The CNG refueling capacity added over the last several years may be divided into two 
general categories: capacity installed at a new location; capacity added at an existing 
location to meet projected demand growth.  
 
a) New CNG Station Development 
 
CVEF estimates that between 90-110 completely new CNG stations were added to the 
CNG fueling infrastructure during the 2004-2007 period. This estimate does not count 
upgrades and “re-launching” of existing underutilized stations, as discussed below, 
nor does it include installations serving forklifts, ice resurfacing machines and other 
off-road applications. About eighty percent of these new stations were small-capacity 
stations (less than 50scfm), five percent were medium-capacity stations (50-400scfm) 
and fifteen percent were large capacity stations (over 400scfm). When measured in 
terms of throughput, large-capacity high fuel use stations have definitely had the 
biggest impact.  This is where most of the sales and marketing efforts of the 
independent fuel retailers and station development/O&M companies is directed 
because of station economics 
 
About twenty-five percent of the new stations were installed at new locations for 
existing CNG clients (e.g., LA MTA, Arlington County Public Works, City of Fresno 
Rural Transit), another sixty percent were installed for new NGV clients (e.g., 
numerous small towns and school districts in CA, Long Beach Public Schools, 
Portland ME Transit). The remaining fifteen percent were brand new retail locations 
developed by independent fuel providers. 
 
b) Investments in Existing CNG Station Infrastructure 
 
Like any other infrastructure, investments need to be made periodically to replace 
parts and, on occasion, to change out worn or spent critical components.  For active 
well-utilized stations, this process is ongoing and is not the focus of the comments that 
follow. 
 
(1) Added Capacity to Existing CNG Sites 
 
Several large and high-profile CNG station projects completed between 2004-
2007 occurred at existing sites and involved the addition of compression, storage 
and dispensing equipment to serve the added load of additional vehicles (e.g., 
DFW Airport, New York MTA). On a station count basis, these were few in 
number but they added significantly to U.S. vehicular CNG throughput. In 
addition, dozens of operators of existing small-capacity stations (e.g., a school 
district with several buses, towns with a small CNG fleet) added fueling capacity, 
although these projects’ net increase to the total U.S. fueling capacity is minimal.  
 
(2) Reinvigoration of Underutilized Stations 
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In addition to developing new projects from the ground up, a few independent fuel 
providers are purchasing existing dormant or underutilized stations from utilities, 
states and municipalities, making upgrades to compression and storage and 
installing credit card payment processing systems to make the locations “retail 
ready.”  These projects sometimes require site development work to create public 
accessibility, including creation of “outside the fence” dispensing capability. If 
needed, property lease agreements are signed in cases where the equipment is 
located on utility, state or municipal property. Because these investments are 
justified by – and are driven by - additional load, the independent fuel companies 
are directing considerable sales efforts at simultaneously securing one or more 
local NGV anchor fleets. The net effect is that existing CNG capacity is 
reinvigorated (and often enlarged), access is opened to the public and throughput 
is increased. 
 
2.  Increasingly, Independent Station Developers and Equipment Vendors Take The Lead 
 
LDCs that actively engage in NGV market development, either directly or working with 
trade allies to support sales and marketing activities, now numbers less than a dozen. Most 
other LDCs, including many previously engaged in NGV market development, now either 
devote little resources to the effort or have neither NGV marketing nor technical staff to 
respond to customer queries. Increasingly, independent fuel providers, station 
development/O&M companies and equipment vendors and their dealers are taking the 
lead in developing new projects. Collectively, however, the number of companies and the 
amount of sale and marketing resources they’re able to devote to developing the NGV 
market is far less than when more utilities were active. In addition, the geographic 
coverage is spotty.   
 
There are less than ten non-utility station development/O&M companies in the market. Of 
those companies, only one is well resourced enough to establish sales teams in multiple 
markets, and several target only the largest station development/O&M projects with a few 
regional sales people. The remaining three or four companies are local or regional and 
have limited sales-marketing resources deployed on the street. About a half-dozen 
compressor package manufacturers rely heavily on a few select active dealers and/or 
design consultants to develop leads to which they respond with bids but these 
manufacturers conduct very little direct marketing outreach to customers.  In addition, the 
few heavy-duty engine manufacturers, one major automotive OEM and two SVMs 
occasionally generate new station development leads from their sales efforts but they’re 
not able to execute these fueling facilities without getting station developers or equipment 
packagers involved. This lack of “feet on the street” is a major obstacle to more robust 
NGV market development. Interest in NGVs and fueling infrastructure that is created 
through presence at fleet trade shows, conferences and web casts and/or through media 
coverage is not always supported at the local level due to gaps in the local/regional sales-
service network.  
 
3. Heavy-Duty Fleets and Larger Stations Receive Greatest Effort 
 
Heavy-duty fleet applications and larger stations have become the primary focus of most 
market development activities.  This focus on heavy-duty fleets and larger stations does 
not diminish the importance or value of market development initiatives taken by small 
fueling packagers, Honda or the SVMs.  As noted above, all but one major automotive 
LDV OEM (Honda) left the market by mid-year 2006 and most other LDV OEM vehicle 
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model options were gone before then unless the prospective fleet customer was amenable 
to purchasing through the SVM channel. Many states’ general services administrations 
and some local government jurisdictions will not allow or shy away from purchasing 
through SVMs. Government fleets, which until recently accounted for a large percentage 
of the small fueling equipment package purchases, no longer have an OEM option for 
pick-up trucks and cargo vans. Consequently, sales of small fueling equipment packages 
have dropped off significantly in the last two years. Meanwhile, sales of heavy-duty 
engines to manufacturers of transit-style and school buses, refuse trucks and other 
vocational work trucks (e.g., sweepers) have been growing. For reasons of vehicle 
availability and station economics, independent fuel providers and station development/ 
O&M companies have focused much of their efforts on these types of accounts. 
 
4.  Pooling CNG Throughput: Retail Stations, Anchor Fleets and Outside-The-Fence Sites 
 
Generally, stations need to generate enough fuel sales to justify the investment, especially 
if the station is to be owned and operated by a fuel retailer. To achieve this critical 
economic benchmark, it may be necessary to “pool” the needs of multiple customers 
through the development of a retail fuel site. 
 
One option is to build a CNG station on developer-owned property at a location that is 
near to one or more local “anchor” fleets and which also is convenient and attractive 
enough to grow additional customer load. Identifying this perfect mix of anchor customer 
need, main thoroughfare proximity and access and real estate availability is easier said 
than done. These station development projects seem to work best when there are local 
government policies in place that promote NGV deployment either through mandates 
and/or economic incentives.  An example is a retail station developed at an airport that has 
policies that mandate or provide incentives for taxis and other private shuttle fleets to use 
NGVs.   
 
Another option that is occurring more frequently is the co-location of retail fueling 
capability adjacent to an anchor fleet’s own depot or yard by extending fuel lines and 
installing dispensing equipment outside the fence of the host fleet. The compressor 
equipment, dryers and storage are sized to serve both the host’s fueling facility and the 
retail island(s), thereby achieving the best economies of scale. The station may be located 
on or adjacent to the host fleet’s property and it may be owned by the host fleet or, more 
typically, by the independent fuel provider who handles all the fuel transactions and 
related administrative burdens. Some public and private fleet operators have established 
outside the fence public accessibility on their own but this is more the exception and 
almost always involves the awarding of grants and other incentives to offset the added 
equipment expense.  
 
Another option that utilities and independent natural gas station developers have used is to 
partner with petroleum fuel retailers to install natural gas on leased space at existing 
gasoline and diesel stations. Typically, the natural gas fuel provider retains ownership of 
the CNG equipment and handles O&M while the gas station owner handles transactions 
and related administrative burdens for a cut of the proceeds (e.g., royalties, transaction 
fees). This option also has it own challenges including whether there is enough available 
space for the additional compression, storage and dispensing equipment and, if expected 
to handle large vehicles, whether the station is designed and sited appropriately (e.g., 
traffic access and clearances, canopy height).  
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G.  Recommendations  
The following recommendations are intended to help spur NGV market growth and, 
consequently, fueling infrastructure growth. Some require direct involvement of government, 
either through the implementation of alt fuel vehicle policies and programs (e.g., in support of 
air quality and energy diversification goals) and/or tax policies. Others are the primary 
responsibility of the present and potential NGV industry stakeholders. 
 
1. At the highest federal level, (e.g., President and Executive Branch Secretaries and senior 
managers), communicate publicly the importance of NGVs and NGV fueling 
infrastructure in helping our nation meets its transportation energy diversification and air 
quality improvement goals. This will establish clearly the role that NGVs can and should 
play, as has been communicated about other alternative fuels and vehicles. 
 
2. Issue private fleet and local government fleet AFV purchase requirements as authorized, but 
not yet promulgated, under EPAct 1992. Furthermore, enforce existing requirements 
governing federal fleets’ purchase of AFVs and use of alternative fuel in those vehicles.  
 
3. Reinstate federal NGV RD&D funds for: 
 
a) Continued improvement and development of new, cleaner, more efficient light-, 
medium- and heavy-duty natural gas vehicle engines, the integration of those engines 
into natural gas vehicles for on-road and off-road applications, and the demonstration 
of the proper operation and use of NGVs This will accelerate the market introduction 
of improved factory-built vehicles and lower the OEMs engineering cost, thereby 
reducing the premium these companies must charge to recoup their engineering 
investment. 
 
b) Expanded availability of NGVs by assisting manufacturers in the certification to EPA 
and/or CARB standards. 
 
c) Development and improvement of codes and standards for the continued safe 
operation of NGVs, natural gas fueling infrastructure and their components 
 
d) Improvement in the reliability and efficiency of natural gas fueling infrastructure and 
certification of natural gas fueling station infrastructure to national recognized 
industry safety standards 
 
e) Improvement in the reliability and efficiency of onboard natural gas fuel storage 
systems, development of new natural gas fuel storage materials and certification of 
onboard natural gas fuel storage containers to nationally recognized industry safety 
standards 
 
f) Development and demonstration of natural gas engines in hybrid vehicles 
 
g) Development and improvement of biomethane recovery, processing and liquefaction 
technologies to expand the supply and availability of CNG and LNG.  
 
4.  Increase the grants made available for purchase of alternative fuel vehicles and fueling 
infrastructure through federal and state programs  
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5.  Revise current federal tax incentive legislation for vehicles and station investment to allow 
tax-exempt organizations to more-readily take advantage of these credits; options include 
allowing these tax exempt organizations to take the credits as payroll tax credits, or to 
make these credits available as direct grants. 
 
6.  Extend the federal vehicle, fuel equipment and motor fuels excise tax credits sufficiently 
beyond their current expiration date to instill confidence in public and private fleet 
operators that these incentives will remain in effect long enough for them to be fully 
applied through the life of the equipment, and better yet, long enough to have the desired 
effect of accelerating market adoption of the technology and the resulting manufacturing 
economies of scale.  
 
7.   Re-engage the major automotive OEMs to produce and market light- and medium-duty 
NGVs.  
 
8.  Create lead development and “soft-order” consortia to facilitate major truck chassis OEMs 
introduction of factory-built heavy-duty natural gas powered vehicles.  
 
9.  Continue to focus NGV fueling infrastructure development efforts on high-fuel use fleet 
locations where throughput justifies equipment investment (e.g., transit agencies, refuse 
operations, port transfer terminals, airports, food distribution terminals, beverage 
distributors, textiles services).  Expand efforts targeting high fuel use accounts that fall 
below the throughput threshold that attracts the independent station development/O&M 
firms as these prospects often have good economic payback and life-cycle cost 
characteristics that justify fleet ownership and operation of their stations.   
 
10.  Provide additional grants, tax credits and/or other incentives for fleet operators that 
include public access “outside the fence” dispensing capability from their stations, thereby 
furthering the goal of expanded public fueling infrastructure  
 
11.  Expand the outreach of the current NGV stakeholder network by: 
 
a) Re-engaging natural gas utilities to once again become active in NGV issues including 
market development (either directly or indirectly through sales-marketing and 
technical support of local NGV industry trade allies) and public education about CNG 
vehicle and fueling infrastructure safety. 
 
b) Station development/O&M companies and equipment vendors that are not already 
doing so, allocating additional sales-marketing resources to pursue the market more 
aggressively, either directly or through support of their dealer networks (e.g., sales 
tools, mailing lists)   
 
c) Engaging petroleum marketers including independents and major oil and gas 
companies regarding the value-added benefits of marketing vehicular natural gas fuel 
at their retail stations, just as many of them are beginning to market E85 and other 
alternative fuels. 
 
d) Engaging commercial fleet lease-finance companies to communicate the benefits of 
NGVs to their clients and offer this option. 
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e) Engaging municipal lease-finance companies to take advantage of the federal vehicle 
and fueling equipment tax credits, thus lowering the basis of the their vehicle 
acquisition cost and thus lowering the capital lease fees to their government fleet 
accounts. 
 
f) Garnering greater national media attention for NGV benefits and successful 
applications through trade press and business and mass communications channels 
 
 
III. VEHICULAR NATURAL GAS CONSUMPTION DATA 
 
A. Definition of Need - Scope of Work  
U.S. DOE EERE program managers and NGV industry stakeholders agree that compiling an 
assessment of the total vehicular natural gas fuel consumption and allocating that fuel use by 
market niche will help guide U.S. government alternative fuel policies and natural gas vehicle 
(NGV) industry programs. 
 
Toward that goal, the contract work scope statement calls for “the development and 
implementation of a plan for the collection of natural gas (CNG and LNG) vehicle fuel sales 
information that will add the most value by concentrating on fuel use data collection efforts 
for CNG/LNG niche markets (e.g. transit bus, school bus, airport taxis and shuttles, short-haul 
freight carriers, and refuse haulers) and aggregating and reporting the collected data at the 
State and National levels.” It further stipulates that, “both retail and wholesale sales from 
private and public pumps will be included.” 
 
Note: While Canadian and U.S. NGV markets are closely linked in terms of equipment and 
service suppliers, adherence to similar US EPA vehicle certification requirements and vehicle, 
station and fuel container codes and standards, only U.S data was requested and included in 
this report. 
 
B. Assessing Past and Present NGV Data Collection Program 
 
Examination of past efforts to measure vehicular natural gas fuel use over the past two 
decades provides useful insights about different data collection and extrapolation 
methodologies and their relative strengths and shortcomings. 
 
1. Early NGV Data Collection by Natural Gas Local Gas Distribution Companies 
 
From approximately 1982 until 1998, the American Gas Association (A.G.A.) surveyed 
its natural gas local distribution company (LDC) members concerning NGV inventories 
and vehicular natural gas fuel use in their respective service territories. 
 
Most of A.G.A.’s early NGV-related data collection efforts emanated out of the Fleet 
Working Group, an ad-hoc subset of A.G.A.’s Operations Committee, working in 
conjunction with A.G.A.’s Technology Committee and the Gas Research Institute (GRI).  
At the time, these surveys provided the most comprehensive assessment of the NGV 
market, as most NGVs were either LDC-owned-and-operated or had been converted as 
part of the LDCs’ NGV market development efforts. Furthermore, nearly all NGVs relied 
on LDC-owned-and-operated fueling stations or those installed at the host site by the 
LDC. 
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In1988, as the NGV market gained momentum, A.G.A. members interested in enhancing 
NGV programs formed the independently funded and managed Natural Gas Vehicle 
Coalition (NGVC), which was later renamed NGVAmerica in 2006.  NGVC continued to 
work with GRI and A.G.A.’s operations division to collect data on vehicles and fuel use. 
However, as the gas utility industry transitioned to a deregulated marketplace in the mid-
to-late 1990s, many LDCs scaled back or discontinued their NGV market development 
activities. Eventually, A.G.A’s Fleet Working Group dissolved, GRI’s end-use programs 
including its NGV programs were scaled back dramatically or discontinued and without 
the necessary resources, NGVC’s surveys of utilities’ NGV activity ceased in 2001. 
 
Regarding validity and completeness of the data collected by the utility industry, it is 
important to note that not all LDCs with NGVs operating in their service territories were 
A.G.A. members nor did all A.G.A. member companies choose to participate in these 
surveys. Also, different LDCs used different methodologies to calculate vehicle 
inventories and fuel use estimates provided to A.G.A. 
 
2. AFVs’ Role in National Energy Initiatives Drives DOE Need for Better Data 
 
The federal government became a more active and prominent player in the collection of 
NGV market data beginning in the early 1990s. Driving this data collection process was 
Congress’s passage of the EPAact 1992, which mandated that federal, state and fuel 
provider fleets purchase alternative fuel vehicles (AFVs) – including NGVs - and that they 
report their purchases annually to the US DOE’s Energy Information Agency (EIA) using 
Form DOT/OTT-101 “Annual AFV Acquisition Report for State and Alternative Fuel 
Provider Fleets” (DOT/OTT-101). It is important to note that local governments and 
private fleets were not similarly mandated, nor have they been since. Also important, 
EPACT ‘92 AFV purchase requirements for federal, state and fuel provider fleets includes 
exemptions for smaller fleets, vehicles not centrally fueled and vehicles used in critical 
services (e.g., security, emergency response). Most important, EPACT ’92 does not 
require that mandated fleets use alternative fuel in the vehicles purchased. As such, data 
gleaned from DOT/OTT 101 submittals, while useful in measuring specific EPACT 92 
objectives, does not provide a complete picture of the NGV market. 
 
EPACT ’92 also directed EIA to collect information about AFV manufacture, conversion 
and use in order to satisfy public inquiries and to provide Congress with a measure of the 
extent to which the objectives of EPACT ’92 were being met. While EIA created a 
reporting mechanism that attempts to quantify all AFVs manufactured and/or converted as 
well as determine where they were in use and to what extent they used alternative fuel 
(EIA Form-886 “Annual Survey of Alternative Fueled Vehicle Suppliers & Users”), the 
agency does not have the authority to mandate that local government fleets and private 
fleets respond to the survey.  EIA eventually persevered in obtaining AFV manufacturing 
numbers from original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) and most small volume  – i.e. 
conversion system - manufacturers (SVMs), but there is no in-place tracing mechanism to 
track where these vehicles are deployed once manufactured.  With limited program 
resources and authority with which to create such a tracking mechanism, EIA, like A.G.A. 
and NGVC before it, increasingly has relied on miscellaneous information sources – 
including aging AGA-NGVC database reports, press release searches and anecdotal 
accounts - to create the target list to which send the annual Form-886 survey. The effort, 
while commendable, is under-resourced and far from comprehensive. 
 
An additional data source available to EIA program managers and statisticians comes 
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from EIA-Form 176 (“Annual Report of Natural and Supplemental Gas Supply and 
Disposition”), which requires that utilities account for the disposition of natural gas 
passing through their distribution lines - including sales of vehicular natural gas. 
 
Unfortunately, the accuracy of much of that utility-provided data is suspect because, 
unless specifically required by their state public service/utility commission (PSC) – often 
a function of whether an NGV-specific tariff is in place, few have formal tracking 
mechanisms for vehicular natural gas use or sales. A sample crosscheck of EIA-176 data 
against other information sources indicates inconsistent application of the form’s data 
reporting guidelines, wide discrepancies and, generally, under-reporting of vehicular 
natural gas sales. For example, a utility in one southern state reported vehicular natural gas 
sales volumes that were nearly thirty percent lower than the amount of fuel used by just 
one transit system operating in its service territory, let alone the amounts used by 
additional known NGV customers in the area. 
 
With these data source deficiency caveats noted, EIA produces the two most widely 
referenced reports regarding CNG and LNG vehicles in use and their related fuel use: the 
“Transportation Energy Data Book” and “Natural Gas Annual.” In recent years, however, 
it has become increasingly difficult for the agency to validate their NGV data. Given the 
uncertainty about data gleaned from EIA-Form 176, EIA’s vehicular natural gas estimates 
rely heavily on extrapolations of estimated NGV inventories multiplied by typical fuel use 
per vehicle. Without more accurate vehicle tracking mechanisms, NGV inventory 
estimates must be extrapolated from years of aggregated OEM data, depleted by estimated 
vehicle life-cycle attrition rates, and cross-referenced against miscellaneous EIA-886 
surveys and DOT/OTT-101 compliance reports, which – as noted earlier - account for 
only a portion of all NGVs in service.  EIA analysts must then estimate average fuel 
consumed per AFV, factoring in assumptions about vehicle types, duty cycles and how 
often bi-fuel vehicles are fueled with alternative fuel.  The results are coarse estimations 
based on extrapolations of outdated and incomplete sub-data sets, which EIA’s own 
statistical professionals agree are questionable. 
 
3. Clean Cities Coalition Data Collection Efforts 
 
More recently, the US DOE Clean Cities Program has attempted to collect and aggregate 
alternative fuel vehicle counts and, by extrapolation, alternative fuel use by requiring that 
its coalitions provide annual reports for their respective areas (including CNG and LNG). 
Most coalition estimates are based on responses to surveys by member-stakeholders and 
other known fleets operating within their areas. While this data reporting process has 
proven to be useful in illustrating the impact of outreach and education programs in Clean 
Cities Coalition areas, there are significant numbers of NGVs operating in areas not 
designated as Clean Cities. Furthermore, there are no requirements that NGV operators be 
members of - or respond to - coalition surveys and fuel usage is not included in the 
reporting process. 
 
It is against this background that US DOE Clean Cities Program managers requested that 
an independent effort be undertaken to assess available resources of accurate vehicular 
natural gas fuel use data and to implement a repeatable collection program, the results of 
which would be used to validate and/or fine-tune existing reports. 
 
C. Investigation of Data Availability and Collection Methodologies  
After preliminary interviews with representatives from A.G.A., EIA, NREL, multiple Clean 
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Cities Coalitions and NGVAmerica’s utility and equipment members, CVEF investigated 
multiple approaches to calculate CNG and LNG fuel usage to see which might be most fruitful 
and repeatable for future data collection efforts.  These approaches are outlined below, as are 
summaries of the feasibility of each. 
 
1. Collection of Utility-Provided State Public Service/Utility Commission Data 
 
According to National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC) staff, 
state PSC reporting requirements differ significantly and, while NARUC has mechanisms 
in place to survey their members concerning NGV-related tariffs and reporting 
requirements, no such NARUC survey has been conducted. Interviews with staff at a 
sampling of state utility service commissions and at NGVAmerica utility member 
companies highlighted the fact that only the states with NGV-related tariffs had any 
reporting requirements, and even then, the information required by the regulatory 
authority varied significantly. None required allocation of fuel use or sales by niche 
market sector. 
 
For example, in Connecticut, the PSC requires reporting about vehicular natural gas fuel 
sales but not fuel used by utilities in their own fleets. In Utah, where the local distribution 
company (LDC), Questar, has an active NGV market development program 
complemented by a favorable PUC regulatory environment, vehicular natural gas is not 
required to be separately metered. Fortunately, in California, the state recognized as 
having the largest number of NGVs in service and the greatest vehicular natural gas sales, 
there is a comprehensive vehicular natural gas sales tracking and reporting program. 
However, as discussed further below, this fuel data is not allocated by niche market sector. 
 
Even if more utilities were required to report their vehicular natural gas sales or volumes 
to state utility regulatory authorities, the veracity of the data in many utility areas would 
be suspect because, as noted above, their systems to monitor and track vehicular natural 
gas fuel sales and/or use are inadequate. 
 
2. Collection of Federal and State Motor Fuels Excise Tax Data 
 
When compressed for use in on-road vehicles, the seller of CNG – or the user of CNG in 
cases where there is no sale – incurs a federal motor fuels excise tax liability that is 
reportable to the IRS and, in many cases, to state tax assessment bureaus.  The only 
exceptions to this federal tax liability are tax-exempt entities including most state and 
local government agencies, transit agencies, public school districts and some quasi-
government special districts and/or authorities (e.g., port and airport authorities). 
 
In nearly every state, there is an additional state-levied motor fuels excise tax and/or 
special assessment fee and, in many of these states, these taxes and fees apply to federally 
tax-exempt entities. Given the existence of these motor fuels excise tax assessments and 
reporting requirements, state tax collection agencies/bureaus were contacted to investigate 
whether this data might be made available to the US DOE on a voluntary basis. 
 
In discussions with tax assessment agencies in eleven states with known NGV fleets, 
CVEF found that less than one-half actively tracked this tax obligation for NGVs and, 
even in those states, between 20-50% of the known NGV fleets obligated to file such 
information did not do so on a regular basis.  Based on these preliminary contacts with 
state agencies, this data collection approach was determined to be unacceptable. 
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Note: Later in the data collection process, the reports’ author spoke with hundreds of 
station operators, most who did not know of the reporting requirement 
 
3. Extrapolation of NGV Fuel Use Based on State Vehicle Registration Data 
 
Another methodology investigated was the extrapolation of fuel use estimates based on 
NGV inventories as recorded in state motor vehicle registration Vehicle Identification 
Number (VIN) databases. Interviews conducted with representatives of the American 
Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators (AAMVA) and also with a sampling of state 
motor vehicle administrations revealed that there is no consistent protocol for states to 
follow regarding what data is recorded and reported, and few denote a vehicle’s fuel type. 
 
For example, while Alabama’s motor vehicle administration does not have any 
information about AFVs operating within its borders, Arizona’s vehicle registration 
records include the number of dedicated and bi-fuel NGVs on the road, but there’s no 
cross-reference capability to identify the types or class of vehicles without writing a 
custom software program to pull this information from its VIN dataset. California’s state 
motor vehicle registration database contains information on all vehicles applying for HOV 
status, including dedicated CNG vehicles. 
 
CVEF contacted R.L. Polk & Associates, an independent vendor that specializes in 
providing data storage, retrieval and search services for numerous state motor vehicle 
administrations. Given the VIN sequences to search for, company representatives 
indicated that they would be able to search state databases of registered vehicles for those 
operating on natural gas. This approach had several hurdles that ultimately made it 
unfeasible for CVEF to pursue but which may be fruitful for future DOE efforts if 
adequately funded. First, a comprehensive search would require OEM VIN sequences for 
each engine family and corresponding model for each model year, a request that has 
proven difficult for even EIA to obtain. Second, the estimated cost of this custom VIN 
data search and report exceeded the entire value of the current contract. Third, state VIN 
registration data would not capture vehicles converted, re-powered or retrofitted after 
leaving the OEMs’ factories. Lastly, even if an accurate count of all NGVs registered were 
compiled, CVEF would still have to estimate average fuel use for each vehicle type and 
duty cycle, including estimations of fuel use by bi-fuel vehicles. 
 
Note: Subsequently, NREL did purchase the R.L. Polk database and found that 
information about CNG and LNG vehicles was grossly deficient. 
 
D. Data Collection Methodology Used  
After evaluating the options discussed above, CVEF determined that none were likely to 
produce information at level that would meet the intended purpose of the report and decided 
upon the following course of action: 
 
1. Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) 
 
The process of tracking total vehicular LNG use and allocation of that fuel by niche sector 
is far simpler than that for CNG because there are a limited number of plants producing 
vehicular LNG and an even smaller number of companies that market and sell this fuel to 
fleet customers. Vehicular LNG production and delivery volume data from plants in 
Wyoming, Texas, Arizona and Colorado was cross-referenced with customer data 
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voluntarily provided by the primary suppliers, Clean Energy and Applied LNG 
Technologies (ALT).  Apollo Energy (later renamed Earth LNG) provided additional data 
as it acquired ALT’s LNG business in late 2005.  All LNG vehicles identified in this 
report operate in Texas, Arizona or California. 
 
Note: Additional LNG vehicles operate in Canada accounting for approximately 3.47 
million LNG gallons (2.28 million GGE). 
 
2. Compressed Natural Gas (CNG) 
 
After assessing the options discussed above, CVEF determined that, in most states, 
existing CNG vehicle and fuel use tracking mechanisms were – and are - inadequate to 
create repeatable yearly estimates without substantial investment of resources each year. 
The most notable exception is California, where the major natural gas utilities are still 
actively engaged in NGV market development, NGVs play an important role in the state’s 
energy and air quality policies and the PSC has fairly comprehensive reporting 
requirements in place. In states other than California, CVEF primarily relied on data 
collected through an exhaustive direct contact program to all known CNG stations and/or 
the utilities that serve them. This process is detailed further below. 
 
a) California 
 
According to California state vehicle registration records, supplemented by several 
independent publicly- and privately-underwritten reports, California’s existing in-
service NGV fleet exceeds 28,000 vehicles. In addition, the state has the greatest 
number of CNG stations, including “private access-only” and “limited public access” 
or “full public access” retail locations. California’s PSC requires that regulated natural 
gas utilities meter and report all natural gas sold for vehicular use, either directly to 
the “captive” end-use fleet customer such as a transit agency or municipality that 
compresses the fuel for its own use, or to a “retailer” that sells CNG to others. For 
purposes of this report, CNG sales and use data was taken directly from the state PSC-
required reports. 
 
However, California’s PSC does not require that utility reports include allocation of 
vehicular natural gas sales by niche sector. This report’s niche market allocation was 
accomplished by cross-referencing CNG fuel sales/use data extracted from PSC 
filings against California data gleaned from multiple NGV-related reports, surveys 
and databases published by niche market associations, federal and state government 
agencies and independent consulting firms, proprietary customer lists provided by 
independent station operators and interviews with California gas utility NGV account 
managers.  The author’s level of confidence in the California CNG allocations 
correlates to the level of detail available in these multiple information sources with the 
greatest confidence in the transit, refuse and school sectors and the least confidence in 
the government and short haul sectors. 
 
b) States Other Than California 
 
In states other than California, CVEF telephone surveyed LDCs and/or the stations 
they served to obtain 2005 calendar year utility meter data, then translate that into 
gasoline gallon equivalents (GGE). The National Renewable Energy Laboratory 
(NREL) Alternative Fuel Data Center (AFDC) database of known CNG stations was 
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the primary source from which CNG stations were located. Additional sites not on the 
AFDC database were added based on information gathered during interviews 
conducted with LDC representatives, station operators and station service contractors. 
 
For each LDC listed, the survey process entailed the following: 
 
(1) The AFDC list of stations served by that LDC was reviewed to determine if the 
LDC had its own CNG station on utility property (e.g. “Piedmont Natural Gas 
Fleet Service Yard”).  An introductory telephone call or e-mail was made to the 
AFDC database contact, who was often a fleet operations manager or service 
technician, to explain the data need and to determine awareness of and familiarity 
with the LDC’s CNG stations and also with other stations on the LDC’s 
distribution lines. This initial call inevitably led to additional calls to the LDC’s 
fleet management, marketing, accounting and/or IT staff. 
 
Once the initial contact was made and all the cognizant “data keepers” were 
identified, a follow-up introductory letter and data reporting guideline summary 
were forwarded along with a spreadsheet of all AFDC listed stations served by 
that LDC. The letter explicitly stated that submittal of data was voluntary and that 
all data submitted would be aggregated so as to protect confidentiality. The letter 
asked the LDC contacts to: 
 
(a) Confirm the continued existence and service at the stations listed. If CNG 
service had been discontinued, CVEF asked that the date of discontinuance of 
service and the disposition of the equipment be provided  (still in place, 
removed, etc).  
 
(b) Provide basic contact information (general location, owner or operator, 
telephone or e-mail) for any other CNG station not listed on the AFDC list but 
served by that LDC, including LDC-owned-and-operated stations and those 
owned and operated by customers or third-party retailers.  LDC fleet 
maintenance staff were often familiar with these additional locations because 
they either installed them and/or provided station maintenance services. 
 
(c) Provide meter throughput information for the AFDC listed and additional 
CNG locations (therms, ccf, mcf, MMBtu). Accomplishing this task was 
either very simple (e.g., pulling fuel use records previously submitted to the 
accounting department for tax reporting purposes) or very difficult (e.g. 
additional letters/calls to the LDC’s general counsel or management, 
identification of meter serial numbers to determine which meter served the 
compressor, searches of billing records, etc). 
 
(d) Allocate fuel throughput by niche sector based on their knowledge of the 
station operation using the guidelines provided by CVEF. For private access 
stations, where all fuel use fell into one niche sector (e.g. an LDC’s own 
internal-use-only site or a transit agency’s private location), this task was 
easily accomplished. In cases where the LDC had no information about the 
customer’s site other than throughput, follow-up calls to the station operator 
were necessary. 
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In many cases where the LDC either would not or could not provide the data for 
customers’ CNG stations, CVEF contacted those customers directly to ask if they 
would be willing to share this information with the same assurances of 
confidentiality. On a station-by-station interview basis, vehicular natural gas 
volumes were either compiled from utility bills or estimated based on vehicle 
counts and types provided by the interviewee. In most cases, these stations either 
were “private access only” stations that allowed fueling only for their own 
vehicles or “limited public access” stations that allowed fueling by a limited 
number of pre-approved fleet customers in the area. One example is a municipal 
fueling site on government property that only fuels the town’s vehicles or – on 
occasion – other local or state government vehicles traveling through.  For 
stations that offered “full public access,” including petroleum fuel retailers with 
CNG stations on site, volumes were often provided in GGEs from billing records, 
which were also used to determine allocation by niche market. 
 
In less than a dozen cases, LDCs refused to provide any data, never followed 
through on their agreement to supply the data despite CVEF’s repeated attempts 
to collect it, and/or never returned calls or e-mail queries. Due to time and 
resource constraints, approximately twenty-five individual CNG stations listed on 
the AFDC database were never contacted nor were the LDCs that serve them. 
Most of these stations were small volume locations, based on AFDC database 
information about the size of the compressor and the fill rate (quick-fill versus 
time-fill). 
 
3. Cross-Referencing of Data Against Known Natural Gas Fleets 
 
To ensure that major natural gas fleets were not overlooked due to the absence of their 
fueling station on the AFDC database or to LDC non-responsiveness, CVEF cross-
referenced its data collection summary against the following sources: 
 
a) American Public Transportation Association (APTA) 2005 Annual Transit Survey  
 
APTA’s survey of 280+ major transit agencies accounts for approximately 82 percent 
of all public transit buses estimated to be in revenue service in the U.S. The report, 
which includes vehicle fuel type, includes responses from most of the major market 
transit agencies and thus captures most of the CNG and LNG transit fleets in 
existence. Through web searches, press releases and proprietary member information, 
NGVAmerica supplemented information culled from APTA’s database and identified 
an additional 23 transit agencies that operate approximately 250 additional natural 
gas-powered buses or shuttles. 
 
b) INFORM Inc.’s “Greening of Garbage Trucks,” published in 2003, updated in 2006 
 
The original report evaluated the in-the-field experience of public and private refuse 
firms using natural gas powered vehicles and the opportunities and benefits for 
increased use. In preparing the report, the author created a database of all known U.S 
refuse operations (and some international operations). Lacking any government- or 
refuse association-compiled database of natural gas-powered refuse trucks in service, 
the report’s author compiled his own conducting web searches, interviewing natural 
gas utilities, and obtaining lists from natural gas engine manufacturers and refuse 
truck OEMs.  The list is widely considered the most comprehensive available for the 
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refuse sector. 
 
c) US DOE EPAct compliance reports 
 
CVEF did not have direct access to these reports but, through NREL sources, was able 
to get total aggregated NGV counts for the largest state and alternative fuel providers 
and used this data to cross-check utility fleets and flag larger state university fleets, 
which often are “under the radar.”  
 
d) Other US DOE Studies, Reports, Tool Kits and documents 
 
Over the past decade, U.S. DOE and/or its subcontractors have published numerous 
studies, reports, case studies and other reviews of NGVs (e.g. Clean Cities Program 
case studies; niche-specific transit, short-haul and other fleet performance evaluations, 
Clean Cities Coordinator Tool Kits). 
 
e) California State School Bus Inventory database 
 
CVEF searched this database of all California public school districts’ bus fleets to flag 
NGV fleets that were not already on the list compiled by NGVAmerica, which is 
based on information from gas utility representative interviews, press releases, web 
searches and lists provided by John Deere, Thomas Bus and Blue Bird and their 
distributors.  
 
f) State Agency reports 
 
State agencies, most notably those in California, Texas and New York, have either 
published or funded independent reports addressing the role of NGVs in meeting air 
quality and energy independence goals. CVEF and its sub-contractor (CNGVC) 
reviewed these reports for reference to existing NGV fleets. Reports reviewed include 
(but were not limited to) those written by/for the California Energy Commission 
(CEC), California Air Resources Board (CARB), South Coast Air Quality 
Management District (SCAQMD), Texas Emission Reduction Program, New York 
State Energy Research & Development Authority (NYSERDA) and New York State 
DOT. 
 
4. Data collection timeline 
 
The data collection and verification process described above was undertaken over a 
fourteen-month period with the initial investigation of possible resources occurring in the 
first six months and the station-by-station survey and cross-referencing taking another 
eight months. 
 
Throughout the process, CVEF took the opportunity to interview station owners and 
operators about what factors affected the original development and ongoing viability of 
their NGV fueling station(s) and how these factors might affect future station development 
investments. This information was critical to development of the Natural Gas Fueling 
Infrastructure Roadmap. Interviews were conducted with “private-access only” station 
operators in each of the target niche sectors as well as both “limited public access” and 
“full public access” retail station operators.  Discussion topics varied greatly depending on 
the interviewee. In some instances, macro issues were the focus such as how the role of 
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political and/or regulatory drivers factored into the decision to build and/or operate 
stations, how early assessments of potential markets compared to actual throughput and 
market growth, and the evolution of business development strategies. Other interviews 
focused more on specific station development concerns including both economic and 
technical issues, e.g. fuel throughput thresholds, regional variability in labor, real estate 
and material costs; site permitting, codes and standards requirements and other station 
design and construction issues; station maintenance and operations; the role of grants 
and/or other financial incentives.  
 
E. Summary of Data 
 
1. Survey Response Rates, Estimations of Data Validity and Accuracy 
 
CVEF was successful in compiling fuel use information from 892 CNG and LNG stations. 
This station count is “net,” and includes 157 “new” stations not listed on the AFDC 
database and 51 stations listed on the AFDC database that were determined to be “out of 
service” either before or during 2005. Some of the 157 “new” stations were discovered via 
the contact/interview process with station operators in nearby or adjacent utility service 
territories. Given the fact that older U.S. DOE and NGV industry reports estimated total 
station counts well in excess of 1275 stations, it is reasonable to assume that the reduction 
in total station counts is not entirely due to attrition and that some stations were missed, 
especially those located in isolated markets. Without access to – and the resources to 
evaluate – historical AFDC data sets against current databases, it is impossible for CVEF 
to state with absolute certainty an accurate count of all vehicular natural gas stations in 
existence.  However, it is equally reasonable to assume that, given the extensive cross-
check of available information noted above, stations missed in this process likely 
represent a very small portion of the total NGV inventory and – by extrapolation - an even 
smaller percentage of the total vehicular natural gas consumption. 
 
CVEF estimates that the 892 stations represent a data collection success rate of eighty-two 
percent of all stations and, based on existing AFDC database station equipment logs and 
information culled from interviews with knowledgeable local area contacts, a ninety-five 
percent vehicular natural gas volume throughput capture rate. Although extremely labor 
intensive, this direct survey and cross-reference methodology proved very successful in 
collecting vehicular natural gas volumes data and reasonably successful in allocating fuel 
use by niche sector. 
 
2. Summary of Station Access Status 
 
An assessment of the “public accessibility” status of current inventory of CNG and LNG 
stations was not included in the work scope statement, but it is valuable to understanding 
the role public accessibility has in relation to developing additional infrastructure in the 
future. Due to the different data collection methodologies used in different states and, in 
some cases, between different utility service territories within the same state, CVEF did 
not attempt – nor was it able – to verify the “accessibility” status of all stations against the 
information contained in the AFDC database.  However, based on the survey interview 
and online search process, CVEF makes the following observations about public 
accessibility: 
 
Very few LNG stations offer public access. In fact, the few that do (whether they be 
L/CNG stations or LNG stations) offer limited “public” access to other area LNG or CNG 
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fleets that have already pre-established accounts with the fuel site operator. One example 
is the L/CNG station operated by Southwestern Transportation Agency, an organization 
formed as a joint operating agreement between several adjacent school districts, which 
fuels its own school buses as well as several other non-school district accounts operating 
in the area. 
 
All of the CNG stations located on military facilities and most located on non-military 
federal property ceased offering public access shortly after the events of September 11, 
2001. 
 
Other than in the California utility service territories (and a few other utility service 
territories – notably in Utah, Oklahoma and isolated markets within New York, Indiana 
and Michigan), most utility owned-and-operated CNG stations that did offer public access 
to their fueling facilities prior to September 11, 2001, eliminated public access shortly 
thereafter due to “safety” or “terrorism” concerns.  In most cases (well over 80 percent), 
these stations offered only limited public access anyway (e.g., pre-approved accounts with 
fuel cards, etc) and their customer base typically included only a few small local 
government or private fleets comprised primarily of bi-fueled light-duty vehicles (LDVs). 
One example of a utility that closed public access after September 11, 2001 is Public 
Service Electric & Gas (New Jersey), which eliminated access to all its stations but one 
and, even there, only allowed the local law enforcement agency continued access. Another 
example is Dominion Energy, which eliminated access to all of its Pennsylvania, Ohio and 
Virginia stations. This left most of its existing western Pennsylvania area NGV customers 
without refueling capability, so vehicles had to be prematurely retired or auctioned off to 
other markets. 
 
Of the 51 CNG stations on the AFDC database that CVEF confirmed had closed prior to 
or in 2005, 35 offered private access only, twelve offered limited public access and only 
four offered full public access. Based on interviewee’s responses, most fueled only a few 
NGVs and closed either due to the retiring of the station operator’s own NGVs (e.g., a 
utility’s station), dwindling external NGV customer base and throughput and/or a 
combination of both. As such, the closing of these stations had negligible impact on total 
U.S. vehicular natural gas throughput although they further exacerbated gaps in the NGV 
fueling infrastructure.  
 
Of the 157 “new” stations, approximately fifty percent offer either limited public access or 
full public access, which is representative of more recent trends in station development 
and operation as public access facilitates better station utilization and higher fuel 
throughput. Of the “new” stations that do not offer public access, most are located at local 
government sites, refuse companies or transit agencies.  
 
3. Total Estimated 2005 NGV Inventory 
 
While it was not the scope of this contract to quantify current NGV inventories, the 
process yielded useful information that, at very least, suggests that current government 
and NGV industry estimates may be overstated. Utility company survey data collected bi-
annually between 1992-1998 likely led to the overstated base counts that were later 
extrapolated by the NGV industry and US DOE to reach the 130,000 count that has been 
widely circulated and accepted for more than five years.  Re-evaluation of that data, 
supplemented by recent interviews with federal, state and utility fleet providers about their 
NGV purchases and the disposition of many of those vehicles, indicates that, at the peak 
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of LDC and government involvement in the NGV marketplace, there may have been 
105,000-110,000 NGVs in service. 
 
However, with the exit of most aftermarket retrofit system suppliers due to EPA and 
CARB implementation of stricter emission verification requirements in 2000-2004, and 
the withdrawal of three of the major LDV OEMs between 2000 and 2005, there have been 
very limited LDV choices to replace aging vehicles. While several SVMs invested the 
technical and financial resources to meet the tougher EPA and CARB certification 
requirements, most federal and state fleets (and many local government fleets) will not or 
cannot buy these systems. And while American Honda has remained steadfast in its 
commitment to supplying CNG vehicles, its Civic GX was not a direct on-par replacement 
for the Chevrolet bi-fuel Cavalier or Ford Contour used by many of these fleets and it was 
obviously not a suitable replacement for the other OEM’s CNG pick-up trucks. 
 
The result of this perceived dearth of LDV options was major attrition in LDV inventories 
between 2004-2006.  CVEF estimates that total NGV inventory dropped to 92,000 in 2005 
and is now between 85,000 and 90,000. Many of the retired vehicles were utility-owned 
and government-owned bi-fuel vehicles that used little or no CNG. Growth in the 
medium- and heavy-duty vehicle counts have not offset the dramatic attrition in LDV 
counts but CNG and LNG fuel use has more than offset the CNG throughput associated 
with the LDV decline. 
 
4. 2005 National Vehicular Natural Gas Fuel Use 
 
While NGV inventory counts have dropped, CVEF estimates that fuel use has steadily 
risen.  2005 vehicular natural gas consumption at the 892 locations tallied 189,441,307 
GGEs. CVEF estimates that, if all stations had provided data, total 2005 vehicular natural 
gas consumption would have been about five percent more, or approximately 200 million 
GGEs.  Vehicular LNG consumption accounted for approximately 39,450,000 GGE of the 
total U.S. vehicular natural gas volumes (roughly 60 million LNG gallons); the remaining 
150 million GGEs was CNG.  The “missing” five percent (roughly 10 million GGEs) is 
all CNG. 
 
5. State and Regional Distribution of NGV Fuel Consumption 
 
Listed below are 2005 total state vehicular natural gas volumes (stated in GGEs), allocated 
regionally according to Petroleum Administration for Defense Districts (PADD). As noted 
above, the volumes listed reflect gas meter throughput and/or available vehicle-based 
estimates for the 892 stations reporting. In some states, noted by “*”, the totals are under-
reported although the missing amounts likely have a negligible impact on total U.S. 
volumes. 
 
PADD IC (Lower Atlantic): PADD IB (Central Atlantic): PADD IA (New England): 
ME 0 WV 0* NY 21,165,586 
VA 398,443 NJ 412,711 VT 3,300 
NC 171,169 PA 1,222,950 NH 0* 
SC 46,831 DE 1,460 MA 5,438,000 
GA 7,563,623 MD 1,278,262 RI 340,776 
CT 537,458 FL 317,187 DC 5,155,200 
  
PADD II (Midwest): 
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DRAFT 
OH 42,000* 
IL 404,332 
IN 178,814 
IA 0 
KS 42,761 
TN 78,101 
KY 0* 
MI 433,119 
MN 39,744 
WI 456,000 
MO 1,281,150 
NE 54,146 
OK 1,065,618 
SD 0 
ND 3,411
PADD III (Gulf Coast): 
AL 61,921 
AR 29,391 
LA 92,001 
TX 12,212,636 
NM 1,387,457 
MS 0 
 
PADD IV (Rocky Mtn.): 
CO 1,574,255 
ID 376,392 
MT 2,622 
WY 19,244* 
UT 1,794,720* 
 
 
 
 
PADD V (West Coast): 
AK 0* 
WA 1,111,093* 
OR 935,865 
CA 106,075,893 
AZ 15,133,558 
NV 501,506 
HI 0 
 
As expected, PADD V, comprising the western states, accounted for the greatest 
volume with nearly 123,758,000 GGEs or 65.33 percent of total U.S. vehicular 
natural gas sales.  LNG accounted for over 27 percent of this region’s total vehicular 
natural gas volumes.  By far, the largest total volume was in California, which alone 
accounted for about 56 percent of total U.S. volume.  While California’s transit 
sector clearly surpasses all other niche sectors combined (approximately two-thirds 
of the state’s total volume), all the major niche sectors were well represented. Also in 
PADD V is Arizona, which nationally ranks third in total vehicular natural gas 
volumes with more than 15.1 million GGEs or nearly eight percent of the national 
total.  Like California, Arizona’s top niche sector is transit (again, about two-thirds of 
the statewide total) with the airport and government sectors ranking a distant second 
and third in volumes. PADD V would dominate even more if data from the state of 
Washington were not under-reported.  
 
PADD IB, comprising Mid-Atlantic states, accounted for the second largest volume 
with 29,236,169 GGEs or 15.43 percent of total U.S. vehicular natural gas volume. 
Most notable in this district is the contributions of New York with just over 21 
million GGEs, the second highest volume state in the nation, representing 11.2 
percent of the national total.  Also notable in this region is the District of Columbia, 
which ranks seventh in the nation at just over five million gallons, over 99 percent of 
which is due to the capitol region’s public transit system, WMATA-METRO. In both 
Pennsylvania and Maryland, which contributed about one million GGEs each, one or 
two customers accounted for the majority of the volume.  
 
PADD III, comprising the gulf coast states, accounted for the third highest volume, 
13,783,407 GGEs or 7.28 percent of total U.S. vehicular natural gas use. Leading the 
region is Texas, which ranks fourth among all states with 12.2 million GGEs. Several 
large transit, airport and government accounts in Texas’ major metro areas accounted 
for more than seventy-five percent of the state’s total vehicular natural gas volume. 
While only accounting for a small percentage of Texas’ total volume, use by the 
short-haul sector ranks second only to California. New Mexico, a distant second to 
Texas in this region, ranks tenth among all states, primarily due to one transit 
customer. 
 
PADD IC, comprising the southeast coastal states from Florida north to Virginia plus 
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West Virginia, ranked fourth accounting for 8,497,253 GGEs or 4.49 percent of total 
U.S. volume. Georgia carried most of the region with over 7.5 million GGEs, most of 
which was used by just one account, Atlanta’s transit system, MARTA.  Other bright 
spots include pockets of activity in the Tidewater and suburban Washington, D.C. 
areas of Virginia. In addition, while there are few if any large accounts in North 
Carolina, a small network of independent (mostly municipal) stations remains in 
place. These could serve as a launching pad for additional growth if these local 
governments opt to encourage public fueling. 
 
The next highest volume region, PADD IA, comprising the upper northeast states, 
accounted for 6,319,534 GGEs or 3.33 percent of the total U.S. vehicular natural gas 
volume.  By far, the largest contributor to this tally is Massachusetts where 3 large 
stations serving MBTA, Boston’s regional transit system, account for more than 4.5 
million GGEs. The rest of the region’s volume is dispersed among a fairly extensive 
and growing network of smaller stations, many located at and/or operated by state 
and local governments and open to the public.  In addition, several new locations 
began operating in Maine, New Hampshire and Vermont after 2005 (not captured in 
this data set), which – if opened to public access fueling – could further expand the 
region’s fueling infrastructure. When combined with New York (allocated under 
PADD IB), the expanding network of stations positions the greater northeast U.S. for 
growth.  
 
PADD II, comprising 15 Midwest states, ranked sixth in total U.S. vehicular natural 
gas volume with just over 4 million GGEs or 2.15 percent. For its size, this large 
region lags the rest of the nation in NGV market development with none of the states 
among the top 10 in the country. There are bright spots, however. Oklahoma still 
boasts the nation’s 4th greatest number of CNG stations (54), many operated by the 
LDC and offering public access and the state enjoys very favorable natural gas GGE 
costs as compared with gasoline or diesel. Michigan’s Detroit metro area has a well-
developed network of stations that make reinvigoration of this once strong market 
viable without huge investments in equipment. In addition, the Indianapolis, St. Louis 
and Kansas City metro areas have only a few stations each but champions that are 
building NGV market. 
 
PADD IV, comprising five Rocky Mountain states, accounted for the lowest volume 
with only 3,767,233 GGEs or 1.98 percent of the U.S total. However, as a region of 
relatively sparsely populated states with few major metro centers, it represents a 
fairly vibrant NGV marketplace with Utah and Colorado nationally ranked eighth and 
ninth in total volume, respectively.  Vehicular natural gas use in Utah tallies a bit 
under 2 million GGEs and the state ranks second in total fueling locations, last 
estimated at nearly one hundred (only 64 were included in this report but many of the 
rest are fork lift operations). Colorado’s tally of about 1.5 million GGEs is primarily 
from Denver’s airport but increased throughput at the fairly extensive Denver metro 
network of public fueling stations could quickly add to this state’s tally. 
 
6. National Ranking of Fuel Use by Niche Market Sector 
 
Using metered data, billing records or information culled from station operator 
interviews, fuel use was allocated into eight niche sectors. Following is a national 
ranking of vehicular natural gas volume by niche sector: 
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Niche Sector         GGEs     Portion of National Total  
Transit:    129,258,390     68.23% 
Airport:      15,342,734       8.10% 
Refuse:        14,377,897       7.59% 
Government:       9,224,299       4.87% 
Short-Haul:        5,659,453       2.99% 
Utility:        5,181,331       2.74% 
Other:        4,978,136       2.63% 
School:        4,674,570       2.47% 
 
a) Transit Sector - Definition: Includes both metro and community transportation 
service transit buses and all light- and medium-duty natural gas vehicles used by 
maintenance, route coordination and other auxiliary personnel. 
 
Transit continues to account for the lion’s share of the vehicular natural gas 
market with nearly 130 million GGEs, representing better than two-thirds of total 
U.S. volume. This is also true in five of the seven PADDs as is discussed further 
below.  Despite continuing gains in other sectors, the transit sector will maintain 
its leadership position for years to come. CVEF estimates that nearly 10,000 
transit buses and community shuttles are in service, each consuming relatively 
high fuel amounts each year. While natural gas’s percentage of new orders in 
2005-2006 (and thus far in 2007) is less than in the 2000-2004 timeframe, 
demand from Southern California transit agencies and several east coast transit 
authorities is still strong. In addition, several new agencies deployed their first 
CNG buses in 2006. Federal motor fuels excise tax credits that went into effect in 
October 2006 – coupled with the impact of EPA’s 2007-2010 emissions 
requirements on diesel bus life-cycle costs, likely will spur new natural gas 
transit customers to emerge 
 
b) Airport Sector - Definition: Includes airport-owned and/or contracted 
terminal/parking shuttles, auxiliary and ground support operations vehicles (e.g., 
security, maintenance, runway sweepers, baggage tugs). Also includes private 
fleets primarily serving or based at airports (e.g., taxis, door-to-door services 
and off-site parking, rental car and hotel shuttles). 
 
CVEF estimates vehicular natural gas consumption in the airport sector at 15.3 
million GGEs in 2005, representing approximately 8 percent of total U.S. 
volumes.  This amount is expected to continue to grow as existing airport 
authority fleets in California, Arizona, Washington, Missouri, Massachusetts, 
Maryland, New York and Texas expand their operations and/or implement 
“special access” or “privileged access” rules that encourage private fleets to 
switch to natural gas. Additionally, a number of airports that began investigating 
NGV options in 1999-2001 but postponed action after the attacks of 9/11/2001 
(due to reprioritization of staff and budget resources) are “re-engaging.” The new 
federal vehicle and motor fuels excise tax credits are particularly well suited to 
the private fleets operating in and around airports. 
 
c) Refuse Sector – Definition: Includes both publicly owned-and-operated refuse 
vehicles and private contractor owned-and operated vehicles including 
collection, recycling and transfer trucks and any other support vehicles. 
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The refuse sector accounted for 14.3 million GGEs in 2005, or about 7.6 percent 
of total U.S. volume. Already doubling in volume since 2000, this sector 
accounted for about 1500 natural gas refuse trucks in service in 2005 and more 
have been added since.  The refuse sector is projected to experience strong and 
steady growth over the next decade as well over half the existing inventory of 
refuse vehicles is ten years old or older and communities are increasingly looking 
to their contract haulers to reduce emissions as part of the contract evaluation and 
award process. As is the case with the transit sector, California has more natural 
gas refuse vehicles than any other state, due in large part to the South Coast 
AQMD Fleet Rules. Refuse truck’s duty cycles, low MPG ratings and high 
engine operating hours translate into high yearly fuel usage.  The new federal tax 
credits for vehicles and vehicular natural gas fuel shorten the premium payback 
period significantly and further improve CNG and LNG refuse truck life-cycle 
savings over other alternatives. 
 
d) Government Sector – Definition: Includes light-, medium- and heavy-duty 
vehicles operated by a city, municipality, county, state or federal agency and 
which have not been accounted for elsewhere (e.g., police, parking enforcement, 
“fleet pool” vehicles and work trucks of all types such as public works trucks, 
plows, stake trucks and step vans). 
 
Vehicular natural gas consumption in the government sector (federal, state and 
local) accounted for 9.2 million GGEs in 2005, representing just under 5 percent 
of total U.S. volume. CVEF projects this number to drop or – at best - remain flat 
in future years as most NGVs in government fleets are LDVs and, as noted 
earlier, LDV inventories in federal and state fleets are declining due to attrition. 
Most of the NGVs purchased by federal and state agencies were LDVs as part of 
the agencies’ compliance with EPACT. With the exodus of General Motors, Ford 
and Daimler Chrysler during the 2003-2006 period and the fact that few federal 
or state agencies include SVM LDVs on their approved purchase lists, most of 
these agencies have not replaced their old NGVs with new NGVs. There are 
certainly exceptions to the rule and, in many California communities and in a 
select few cities across the nation, new CNG-powered Honda Civic GXs and 
retrofitted Ford and GM LDVs are being put into service.  However, these new 
purchases are far fewer than the number of NGVs exiting service due to attrition. 
 
e) Short-Haul Sector – Definition: Includes vehicles - usually medium- or heavy-
duty – commercial vehicles moving freight/product within a metro area, traveling 
less than 200 miles/day on regular routes/route coverage areas (e.g., mail, 
package delivery, snack/ bakery/beverage/grocery/restaurant provisions, linen 
services, newspapers and port vehicles). 
 
Unexpectedly, the short-haul sector edged out the utility sector for fifth highest 
vehicular natural gas volume.  Short-haul fleets accounted for 5.6 million GGEs 
or about 3 percent of total U.S. volume. While there are few short-haul fleets 
using CNG or LNG, estimated at less than two hundred accounts in 2005, these 
fleets’ yearly fuel usage per vehicle is substantial.  Examples include the U.S. 
Postal Service, UPS and other package delivery services, a number of grocery 
store chains and their suppliers, and a variety of snack and beverage distributors. 
Vehicular natural gas volumes in this sector are projected to grow significantly in 
the next five years as large-scale clean-air initiatives are undertaken at west coast 
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and east coast ports. 
 
f) Utility Sector – Definition: Includes light-, medium- and heavy-duty vehicles 
operated by private or public gas and electric companies or departments. 
 
The utility sector accounted for only 5.2 million GGEs or a bit less than three 
percent of total U.S. vehicular natural gas consumption. Other than a handful of 
LDCs that still actively participate in the NGV market, this niche segment has 
declined steadily since the mid 1990s. Disillusionment with slower than 
projected market growth, losses from ill-advised station development 
investments and “early adopter” technical challenges prompted many LDCs to 
abandon their early forays into NGV deployment and marketing. EPACT 
compliance options, e.g. fleet decentralization, purchasing credits and or 
purchase of flex-fuel vehicles (despite lack of E-85 fueling infrastructure) 
allowed many LDCs to retire their aging NGVs and decommission stations. 
Lackluster LDC involvement begets lackluster customer interest and, some might 
argue, a self-fulfilling prophecy. Volatile gasoline and diesel prices, combined 
with new tax incentives for vehicles, stations and fuel may prompt some LDCs to 
re-evaluate and re-engage, if only in their own fleets. 
 
g) School Sector – Definition: Includes public and private school and university 
buses and auxiliary services vehicles (e.g., school buses, driver training cars, 
shuttles and administrative, security and maintenance staff cars and trucks). 
 
The school sector accounted for about 4.7 million GGEs of vehicular natural gas 
in 2005, representing a bit less than 2.5 percent of the U.S. total volume. Despite 
slow but steady growth in this sector since the first ten units were field-tested in 
1989, CVEF estimates that there were approximately 2800-3000 natural gas 
school buses on the road in 150 school districts in 2005. Natural gas throughput 
to this sector is not expected to break out of its last place position vis-à-vis other 
niche sectors. That is because the average school bus only uses between 2,000-
2,500 GGEs a year depending on duty-cycle (urban, suburban, rural routes). 
Even if the new federal tax credits and grant incentives were to spur the market 
to double or triple its current sluggish net market growth of 400-600 school buses 
per year, vehicular natural gas volume will remain relatively low as compared to 
the other major sectors.  Despite the low volume associated with each bus, this 
sector is still important because of the public visibility of school buses 
 
h) Other – Definition: Includes all personal vehicles, miscellaneous small business 
fleets or others not specifically delineated above including off-road vehicles such 
as forklifts and ice arena resurfacing machines.  
 
This “catch-all” category accounted for nearly 5 million GGEs in 2005, or about 
2.6 percent of the U.S. total.  Most notable were PADDs IV and V, which 
accounted for more than 3.6 million GGEs or seventy percent of the national total 
allocated to “other.” In California (PADD V), CVEF estimates that there are 
nearly 7,500 LDVs owned and operated by individuals (not used primarily in a 
business) and in Utah (PADD IV), there is a burgeoning – albeit smaller - LDV 
market among consumers. This is reflected in the success of co-location of CNG 
stations at traditional petroleum-retailer locations and the thriving used-CNG 
vehicle marketplace. California and Utah also both have a considerable base of 
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small private businesses that use NGVs and are able to rely on the well 
established network of stations in these states 
 
7. PADD Ranking By Niche Sector 
 
Niche Sector         GGEs    Portion of Region Total 
 
PADD IA (New England) 
Transit:        4,801,035      75.97% 
Airport:                500,801        7.92% 
Government          476,193        7.54% 
Other:           274,186        4.34% 
Utility           178,490        2.82% 
Short-Haul            35,000          .55% 
Refuse                32,051          .51% 
School:              8,873          .14% 
 
PADD IB (Central Atlantic) 
Transit:      26,063,353       89.15% 
Utility       1,211,835         4.14% 
Government         818,242         2.80% 
Airport:              448,271         1.53% 
Other:          303,790         1.04% 
School:                299,521         1.02% 
Refuse                   75,108           .24% 
Short-Haul             9,062           .03%  
 
PADD IC (Lower Atlantic) 
Transit:       8,008,493       94.25%  
Government         188,642         2.22% 
Other          121,108         1.43% 
Utility          115,723         1.36% 
School             34,372           .40% 
Refuse            17,653           .21% 
Short-Haul             4,500           .05% 
Airport     -0-   - 
 
PADD II (Midwest) 
Utility       1,585,140       38.86% 
Transit:       1,287,076       31.55%  
Airport          412,827       10.12% 
Other          337,799         8.28% 
School          230,179         5.64% 
Government         172,815         4.24% 
Short-Haul           40,410           .99% 
Refuse            12,800           .31% 
 
 
PADD III (Gulf Coast) 
Transit:       9,389,492       68.12% 
Airport       1,980,054       14.37% 
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Government         771,296         5.60% 
Short-Haul         626,681         4.55% 
School          371,027         2.69% 
Other          338,353         2.45% 
Utility            94,811           .69% 
Refuse            91,000           .66% 
 
PADD IV (Rocky Mountain) 
Airport       1,404,165       37.27% 
Other          585,317       15.53% 
Transit          512,469       13.60% 
School          266,953         7.09% 
Government         190,003         5.04% 
Utility          146,706         3.89% 
Short-Haul           97,000         2.57% 
Refuse              - 0 -   - 
 
PADD V (West Coast) 
Transit      79,196,472       63.99% 
Refuse      14,152,885       11.44% 
Airport      10,596,616         8.56% 
Government       6,607,108         5.34% 
Short-Haul       4,846,800         3.92% 
School        3,463,645         2.80% 
Other        3,017,584         2.44% 
Utility        1,848,626         1.49% 
 
Transit accounts played an extremely important role in five of the seven PADDs.  This is 
most evident in the three eastern seaboard PADDs where transit agency natural gas use 
accounted for 88.2 percent or 38.8 million of the total 44 million GGEs dispensed. 
Transit was also the dominant sector in PADD V, where there are over 100 agencies in 
California, Arizona, Oregon, Washington and Nevada operating CNG and/or LNG buses. 
There are few transit agencies in the Midwest using CNG-powered (and none using 
LNG-powered) buses. Therefore, transit played a lesser role in PADD II. This is also true 
for the Rocky Mountain region where transit accounts play a limited role and, relative to 
the rest of the PADD, the airport sector is the biggest player. This is due to the substantial 
programs at the airports in Denver and Salt Lake City. 
 
The refuse sector, while expanding into new market areas, is still a west coast – and more 
specifically – a California phenomenon.  Of the 14.4 million GGEs dispensed into refuse 
trucks, nearly 14.2 million or 98 percent occurred in California. Otherwise, this sector 
ranks last or near last in all other PADDs.  Given the very favorable economics, this 
would suggest that all PADDs should see a significant up-tick in refuse sector vehicular 
natural gas volumes in the coming decade. 
 
The school sector had an above national average showing (7.1%) in the Rocky Mountain 
PADD, primarily due to a number of districts and universities in Utah – most notably the 
sizeable fleet operated by Jordan School District in Sandy, Utah  - and several smaller 
fleets in Colorado. In PADD IB (Central Atlantic), the large fleet at Lower Merion 
School District in suburban Philadelphia and the Long Beach Public Schools account on 
Long Island are notable but their overall impact on the total PADD IB tally is negligible 
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and, thus, the lower than national average showing (1.2 percent). Otherwise, the school 
sector – like so many others – is strongest in California where there are over 125 school 
districts operating school buses. 
 
F. Recommendations For Future Vehicular Natural Gas Data Collection and Tracking  
The impact of transportation energy use on our national economy, its implications to our 
national security and the role of alternative fuels regularly receives national press 
attention almost daily and is prominent on state and national legislative agendas. For the 
U.S. DOE to provide Congress and the President actionable intelligence about alternative 
fuel use in the transportation sector and the effects of existing and proposed energy 
policy, it is imperative that accurate and timely alternative fuel use tracking mechanisms 
be established. 
 
While this report provides a snapshot of the NGV fueling infrastructure and fuel 
consumption for 2005, the data collection process used to compile it is not easily 
repeatable. It is resource intensive, inefficient and lends itself to errors of omission and/or 
variances due to methods of extrapolation. For the U.S. DOE to implement a repeatable 
process requires changes in the tracking and reporting of vehicular natural gas use at the 
utility or market level, or at very least, at the state level. 
 
For reasons stated above, estimating fuel use by tracking registered NGVs via state motor 
vehicle records or fuel tax records is not likely to achieve the desired result.  Following 
are potential ways for U.S. DOE and the NGV industry to achieve this goal: 
 
1. Strengthen Current Vehicle and Fuel Reporting Mechanisms 
 
Vehicular natural gas consumption data is already requested by EIA via Form 176 
(“Annual Report of Natural and Supplemental Gas Supply and Disposition”) but, as 
noted earlier, LDCs’ tracking mechanisms are often inadequate. Tightening the 
reporting and back-up documentation requirements for this form may be the best way 
to track future vehicular natural gas use. It may prove useful for U.S. DOE and its 
AFDC contractor, NREL, to engage NGV and natural gas utility associations to 
communicate to their respective members the importance of more accurate tracking 
mechanisms and to help establish protocols for data collection and evaluate data 
submitted. Working with national NGV industry groups may also prove useful in 
tabulating their members’ sales of new compressor station equipment and cross-
checking it against the AFDC database. Currently, no “new station” reporting 
mechanism exists other than voluntary submittals by vendors and/or Clean Cities 
Coordinators. 
 
2. Enlist PUC Participation in Mandatory Vehicle and Fuel Reporting Mechanisms 
 
State utility regulatory authorities have a vested interest in obtaining accurate 
vehicular natural gas fuel use data for use in measuring the societal and economic 
benefits of existing and/or proposed NGV fuel tariffs. Ultimately, the data collected 
would originate from the utilities (as suggested in item #1 above) but U.S. DOE 
liaison with NARUC may prove productive in identifying the most effective and least 
burdensome ways for state utility regulatory authorities to capture this information. 
 
IV CONCLUSIONS 
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Vehicular natural gas consumption is on the rise, totaling nearly 200 million GGEs in 2005, 
despite declines in total NGV inventory in recent years. This may be attributed to greater 
deployment of higher fuel use medium- and heavy-duty NGVs as compared to the low fuel use of 
the natural gas-powered LDVs that exited the market through attrition, many of which were bi-
fuel. 
 
Natural gas station counts are down to about 1100 from their peak of about 1300. Many of the 
stations that closed were under-utilized or not used at all while most new stations were developed 
with greater attention to critical business fundamentals such as site selection, projected customer 
counts, peak and off-peak fueling capacity needs and total station throughput. Essentially, the 
nation’s NGV fueling infrastructure has been – and will continue - going through a “market 
correction.” 
 
While current economic fundamentals have shortened payback and improved life-cycle savings 
for investment in NGVs and fueling infrastructure, a combination of grants and other financial 
incentives will still be needed to overcome general fleet market inertia to maintain status quo. 
Also imperative to the market’s adoption of NGVs and other alternative fueled vehicle and 
fueling technologies is a clear statement of long-term federal government commitment to 
diversifying our nation’s transportation fuel use portfolio and, more specifically, the role of 
natural gas in that policy.  
 
Based on the current NGV market there, and the continued promulgation of clean air and 
transportation policies, the Western Region is - and will continue to be - the dominant region for 
vehicular natural gas use and growth. In other regions, especially the Northeast, Mid-Atlantic 
states and Texas, increased awareness and attention to air quality and energy security concerns by 
the public and - more important, elected officials – are spurring policies and programs that 
facilitate deployment of NGVs and fueling infrastructure. 
 
Because of their high per-vehicle fuel use, central fueling and sensitivity to fuel costs, fleets will 
continue to be the primary target for NGV deployment and station development efforts. The 
transit sector is projected to continue to account for the greatest vehicular natural gas use and for 
new volume growth. New tax incentives and improved life-cycle economics also create 
opportunities to deploy additional vehicles and install related vehicular natural gas fueling 
infrastructure in the refuse, airport and short-haul sectors. 
 
Focusing on fleets generates the highest vehicular natural gas throughout but it doesn’t 
necessarily facilitate public fueling infrastructure because, generally, fleet operators prefer not to 
allow public access due to liability concerns and revenue and tax administrative burdens. While 
there are ways to overcome this reluctance, including “outside the fence” retail dispensers and/or 
co-location of public and “anchor” fleet dispensing capability at a mutually convenient existing or 
new retail location, each has challenges that complicate an already complex business transaction. 
Partnering with independent retail fuel station companies, especially operators of large “truck 
stops” on the major interstates, to include natural gas at their facilities may build public fueling 
infrastructure and demand enough to entice the major oil companies to once again engage. 
Garnering national mass media coverage of success in California and Utah where vehicular 
natural gas fueling infrastructure is more established will help pave the way for similar consumer 
market growth and inclusion of public accessibility at stations in other regions. 
 
There isn’t one “right” business model for growing the nation’s NGV inventory and fueling 
infrastructure. Different types of station development and ownership-operation strategies will 
continue to be warranted for different customers in different markets. Factors affecting NGV 
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deployment and station development include: regional air quality compliance status and the state 
and/or local political climate regarding mandates and/or incentives; fuel price differentials 
between natural gas, diesel and gasoline; existence of NGV fleets and fueling infrastructure; 
prospective customers’ financial resources; local real estate availability, cost and traffic access; 
regional construction labor rates; code compliance and permitting issues; local gas utility and 
PSC posture regarding NGV market support; and existence of a sufficient number of vehicle 
dealers to assure competitive pricing and technical support capability. 
 
Lack of “feet on the street” is curbing the potential for NGV deployment and expanded NGV 
fueling infrastructure. Enhanced partnerships with Clean Cities Coalitions and other 
transportation energy allies, as well as re-engagement of natural gas utilities in the NGV market - 
whether they take the lead or act in a supporting role to independent station developers - is critical 
to creating more market exposure and identifying fleets that can best take advantage of NGVs and 
NGV fueling infrastructure. Additionally, commercial fleet lease-finance companies and 
municipal lease-finance companies should be engaged as they have significant fleet customer 
contacts and are well positioned to take advantage of NGV’s economic benefits.  
 
Better NGV inventory and vehicular natural gas data collection systems are needed in order for 
U.S. DOE and NGV industry groups to accurately track market development for use in policy and 
program design and implementation. Strengthening of existing utility data reporting and 
documentation mechanisms is likely the best way to achieve this goal. U.S. DOE and its 
contractors should liaise with NARUC and gas utility and NGV organizations to develop data 
reporting protocols that are most useful and least burdensome.  
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Appendix A 
 
Summary of NGV Market and Fueling Infrastructure Development 
 
 
I. 1965-1990: Gas Utilities Slowly Build An NGV Market From the Ground Up 
 
A. Pioneering Utilities Demonstrate The Technology’s Potential  
While there is historical record of one-of-a-kind NGVs as early as the 1930s, this review 
begins with the “modern” NGV market beginning in the late 1960s, when a handful of 
utilities began experimenting with conversions of their light-duty vehicles (LDV) such as 
sedans and pick-ups. Most vehicles ran on compressed natural gas and fueled at time-fill 
stations located on gas company property. The exception was Atlanta Gas Light, which 
focused its earliest efforts on vehicles fueled by LNG produced at the company’s peak-
shaving LNG liquefaction plant. While these utilities’ early vehicle development efforts 
were initially driven by interest in demonstrating the clean properties of NGVs, the 
crippling OPEC oil embargo of 1972 prompted them to accelerate their programs and 
spurred additional utilities to initiate programs in response to the nation’s first “energy 
crisis.”  
 
B. Utility Interest Grows and An Industry is Spawned 
 
Throughout the 1970s and into the mid-1980s, interest in NGVs grew and momentum 
built, albeit slowly, as additional LDCs embraced the technology, primarily for their own 
fleets and, in several utility service territories, marketing vehicles and stations to local 
private businesses and governments. The burgeoning NGV market also spurred 
emergence of numerous NGV retrofit-conversion component and system manufacturers 
and installers, CNG station packagers and independent station developer-operators, many 
who partnered with and thrived on the business generated by utilities’ marketing efforts. 
Several utilities spun off unregulated companies to handle vehicle conversions and build 
and, in some cases, operate NGV stations. Examples include Dual Fuel California - a 
SoCal Gas Company and Natural Fuels Corp - an offshoot of Public Service Company of 
Colorado. 
 
C. Maturing NGV Industry Focuses on Technology Improvement 
 
The pioneering “early adopter” utilities gleaned valuable insights into natural gas engine, 
fuel storage and fuel station technology, identifying areas for improvement, establishing 
codes and standards and setting short- and long-term research and development (R&D) 
goals necessary to achieve broader market acceptance and penetration. Primary areas of 
R&D focused on cylinders (e.g. reducing tank weight, accommodating higher pressures 
safely for greater storage capacity and vehicle range, standardization of fueling 
receptacles, nozzles and pressure relief devices); engine performance, fuel efficiency and 
reliability; and station design.  
 
Most of the earliest NGV technology development and experimentation work was done 
by utilities who shared their experiences under the auspices of the American Gas 
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Association’s (A.G.A.) Technical Committee (TC), which included fleet management, 
gas technology R&D and marketing representatives from utilities and fuel station 
equipment and services suppliers. Eventually, with establishment of the Gas Research 
Institute (GRI) in 1976, a concerted industry-wide NGV market assessment and 
technology R&D program was implemented with A.G.A.’s TC and GRI collaborating 
closely on R&D needs, priorities and funding. By 1988, utility interest in NGV market 
development had grown enough that a group of A.G.A. members voted to create and 
underwrite the independent Natural Gas Vehicle Coalition (NGVC). A collaborative of 
NGV industry groups including NGVC, GRI and others worked closely with codes and 
standards organizations in the next several years to develop NFPA 52, NGV 2 and other 
standards applicable to cylinders, stations and vehicles.   
 
D. Market Dominated by LDVs Operated by Few Early Adopter Utilities  
 
In 1990, NGVC and GRI initiated yearly surveys of utilities to track market trends for use 
in assessing future R&D needs. A 1991 survey of natural gas utilities found that 
approximately 10,000 NGVs on the road in 1990 consumed about eight million gasoline 
gallon equivalents (GGEs) of vehicular natural gas fuel, an average fuel consumption per 
vehicle of 800 GGEs. A few were dedicated vehicles and most were bi-fuel vehicles that 
operated on natural gas most of the time. Nearly ninety-five percent of these vehicles 
were LDVs and most of them were operated by utilities. The other five percent - heavy-
duty vehicles (HDVs) – comprised a mix of utility crew trucks, private delivery trucks, 
school buses and a growing transit bus sector. In the next several years, transit would 
emerge as the most successful niche market for heavy-duty NGVs, as is discussed further 
below. 
 
At this point, all LDVs were retrofit-conversions, as the major automotive OEMs did not 
introduce their first models until the mid-to-late 1990s. About thirty retrofit-conversion 
component and systems companies served the market. As there were no federal standards 
covering NGVs and the supplier base was essentially “home grown,” the quality and 
consistency of LDV retrofit-conversion systems varied widely as did the performance 
and reliability of these systems. This is important because the market’s expectations were 
based on the high level of technology reliability, service and support provided by the 
major OEMs for petroleum-powered vehicles. 
 
Survey data shows that there were less than 500 HDVs on the road in 1990, nearly all of 
which had been converted to run on natural gas by the local gas companies as part of 
field demonstration projects.  These early demos attracted the interest of several heavy-
duty engine manufacturers. After several years of collaborative work with leading 
utilities, Cummins introduced the first of three versions of its L10 in 1990.  Detroit Diesel 
began demo tests of its Series 50G engine, which would eventually be sold commercially 
in 1994.  John Deere, which began experimenting with school bus retrofits in 1989, 
would eventually offer its 8.1L engine by 1996. Several smaller, lesser-known start-ups, 
for example Tecogen, had attempted to introduce natural gas engines with mixed results. 
  
According to the 1990 survey, over eighty-five percent of the NGVs on the road operated 
in just ten LDC territories. About thirty-five other utilities located throughout the U.S 
served the remaining fifteen percent of NGVs in operation.  
 
 
E. Early NGV Infrastructure Development and Operations  
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Information presented here about fuel station counts, flow rates, fuel storage and 
dispensing capability comes from interviews with utility representatives, equipment 
suppliers and industry consultants, as there is little statistical data available prior to 1996. 
Based on these interviews, CVEF estimates that there were slightly less than four 
hundred CNG stations in operation in 1990 with all but a few dozen operated by LDCs or 
their affiliates. The rest were owned and operated by non-utility fleets or, in a very 
limited number of cases, by local/regional independent station operators. While 
compression, storage, dispensing and related control technologies were improving and 
the industry was moving toward standardization, the overall state of the CNG fueling 
infrastructure at this point was a disorganized mix. The industry had not yet developed 
the NGV1 fuel connector standard so different stations operated using different systems. 
Depending on the age of the vehicle, the CNG cylinder might have a maximum pressure 
of 2400 pounds per square inch (psi) or 3000 psi as the fuel storage technology had 
improved.  There were only a limited number of 3600 psi cylinders in test at this time, 
although 3600 psi would become the industry standard by 1994.  
 
Note: Although they are few, there are still stations operating at 2400 psi today and many 
still offer both 3000psi and 3600psi. 
 
Nearly all stations in operation in 1990 were time-fill locations for onsite fleets, although 
the concept of public fueling at so-called “fast-fill” stations was being tested with limited 
success by a few utilities. The fast-fill stations of 1990 bear little resemblance to the fast-
fill stations of today.  Most had very little capacity, usually took far longer to fuel than 
today’s fast fill stations and could not always guarantee a full fill. Furthermore, nearly all 
required that customers have pre-approved gas fuel card accounts and access was often 
restricted to specific business hours. Despite the different pressures, nozzle/receptacle 
technologies and the lack of individual market saturation, it is important to note that it 
was possible to navigate large sections of the U.S. without being “stranded” by moving 
from one utility network to the next, as long as you had the appropriate adaptors and gas 
cards for each utility. 
 
F. Snapshot 1990: The NGV Market After First Quarter Century 
 
By 1990, a group that started out as little more than a “club” of interested utility 
technicians in the mid-1960s had nurtured development of the NGV market from an 
interesting curiosity to a fledgling industry whose members included a growing number 
of utilities and a collection of compressor packagers and retrofit-conversion system 
companies supplying a miscellaneous array of non-standardized components and fueling 
services.  While the market was still in its infancy, these pioneering utilities and suppliers 
proved that the concept was viable and attracted the attention of mainstream engine and 
vehicle suppliers.  Sensing the national potential for natural gas as a vehicular fuel, 
interested stakeholders had developed enough critical mass to form their own technical, 
codes and standards and marketing organizations, setting the stage for the period of 
unprecedented growth to follow.  
 
II. 1990-1996: Boom Times For NGV Market Development 
 
A. Government Policy Energizes the Alt Fuel Vehicle Market  
Natural gas vehicle market development accelerated considerably in the 1990s, catalyzed 
by several key factors. In 1990, Congress passed the Clean Air Act Amendments 
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(CAAA), which set in motion a series of benchmarks and a timeline for the nation’s 
major metro markets to improve their air quality.  Fleet emission reduction measures, 
especially those targeting government and quasi-government fleets like transit, were to 
become a critical component of those market strategies. Furthering the goal of the CAAA 
was passage of the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA) of 1991, 
which included the Congestion Mitigation Air Quality (CMAQ) program that supports 
local state initiatives to improve air quality as part of local transportation planning 
activities. In early 1991, the Gulf War heightened awareness of U.S. energy dependency 
on Middle-East oil supplies.  Partially in response to the Gulf War, Congress passed the 
Energy Policy Act (EPACT) of 1992. It included alternative fuel vehicle purchase 
requirements for federal, state and fuel provider fleets, effective 1994, and it also 
provided tax deductions for station investment. Also authorized by EPACT, but not 
initially included in DOE’s promulgation of regulations, were private fleet alternative 
fuel vehicle purchase requirements that would take effect in 1997 if alternative fuels had 
not displaced thirty percent of the nation’s petroleum-based transportation fuel use. In the 
following several years, the U.S. DOE provided nearly $20 million per year to help 
federal agencies offset the incremental cost of AFVs purchases.  The NGV industry was 
the primary benefactor of these program funds as few other AFV options were available.  
 
Some states’ governments, most notably California and Texas, also played an important 
role in spurring NGV market interest and development by initiating or expanding 
programs aimed at reducing emissions and increasing use of alternative fuels. This 
included a mix of mandates, tax incentives, grants and other spending programs targeting 
school districts, local government, and transit agencies, among others.  
  
B. Major Vehicle OEMs Finally Engage, Market Takes Notice  
 
The early 1990s also saw several automobile original equipment manufacturers (OEM) 
begin to allocate resources into NGV platform development in earnest. In 1990, Ford, 
which had already participated in NGV industry technical forums since the late 1970s, 
committed to developing a dedicated Crown Victoria for projected market introduction 
by mid-decade with other vehicles expected to follow shortly thereafter. General Motors, 
Chrysler and, later, Toyota and American Honda also joined in, each launching their own 
NGV platform development programs. The natural gas industry co-funded much of this 
R&D, either directly from the larger utilities and/or through GRI.  While these vehicles 
would not be ready for market until the second half of the decade, most industry pundits 
viewed this engagement by the LDV OEMs as a critical step because it created 
confidence in the eventual development of a consumer market.   
 
The combination of increased public attention to energy security and air quality issues, 
new federal and state mandates, positive movement by the automobile OEMs and 
favorable fuel price differentials between CNG and petroleum fuels set the stage for what 
the natural gas utility industry thought would be a boom in NGV market growth. 
Illustrative of this outlook is a 1992 projection prepared for NGVC, which estimated that 
vehicular natural gas fuel use would grow from about eight million GGEs in 1990 to 
more than 400 million GGEs by 1998 and 1.6 billion GGEs by 2004.  Across the nation, 
natural gas utilities that previously had been only lukewarm to the NGV market now 
embraced it with fervor. 
 
The positive signs didn’t just catch the attention of the LDCs. In 1992, Amoco Oil 
Company executives saw great potential for the NGV market. NGVs were already 
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gaining a foothold in foreign markets, and the expected EPACT mandates on private 
fleets, due to be in place by 1997, would generate tremendous demand. Amoco 
management was further encouraged by the OEM commitments to bring CNG product to 
market.  By 1995, Amoco Oil had put together a business plan and created alliances with 
station equipment and installation companies to roll-out CNG stations at their retail 
locations, focusing first on the top 15 U.S. markets, then adding stations in secondary 
markets until the top 50 metro areas were covered. They worked closely with Atlanta Gas 
Light, a leading NGV utility at the time to launch the first stations there in time for the 
1996 Olympics and plans were already in place to install nearly 50 more CNG stations in 
the Atlanta, Denver, Chicago and Miami metro areas. 
 
Note: An update of the original Amoco market development plan was prepared in late 
2005and is included as Appendix B of this report.   
 
C. Early LNG Market Developments 
 
By 1993, several utilities already had implemented small LNG projects with heavy-duty 
fleet customers.  For example, using funding from parent company Consolidated Natural 
Gas, East Ohio Gas (EOG) installed a small LNG fueling station in Akron, Ohio to serve 
two Roadway LNG trucks operating in their service territory. Other LNG-powered 
vehicle projects were underway in San Diego and Atlanta. In 1994, Liquid Carbonics 
built a dedicated LNG plant in Willits, Texas to supply the Houston Metro transit agency, 
the first transit fleet to use LNG.  Amoco realized that LNG had several operational 
advantages over CNG for HDV fleets and could potentially deliver life-cycle savings as 
long as an inexpensive LNG supply could be established. Dedicated LNG plants can be 
an expensive proposition unless operating at or near capacity, so Amoco sought and 
identified several lower-cost LNG supply options. These included retrofitting existing 
petrochemical plants, oil-gas exploration field re-gasification sites, purchase from LDC 
liquefaction plants and LNG import terminals. They quickly entered the market with 
supplies based in Texas and Wyoming, capturing existing transit accounts and developing 
new ones in Texas, Arizona and California within the next three years.  
 
Amoco Oil Company’s entry into vehicular CNG and LNG created a lot of excitement in 
the natural gas and financial markets. Many NGV industry analysts believed then - and 
still do - that it will take the financial and marketing resources of the traditional 
petroleum retailers’ for the NGV market to achieve its full potential. Amoco’s early 
enthusiasm was dampened however, when the expected EPACT mandates governing 
private fleets never materialized, as is discussed further below. The company’s CNG 
station development program continued for several years but fuel sales did not meet 
expectations and, when the BP acquired the company in 1999, both the CNG and LNG 
programs were discontinued.   
 
 
D. NGV Market Experiences Sustained Double-Digit Vehicle Sales Growth  
Various analyses prepared for NGVC between 1990 and 1996 disagree about the exact 
number of NGVs on the road or fuel stations in operation or total vehicular natural gas 
fuel consumption, but all indicate double-digit yearly growth. Despite purchase price 
premiums for natural gas vehicles and less-than-optimal fueling infrastructure, the 
number of vehicles on the road more than quadrupled in less than five years. Yearly 
utility surveys show that the nation’s NGV inventory hit nearly 38,000 in 1994 and about 
47,000 by 1995.  The 1997 survey (1996 data), to which 139 utilities now responded as 
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directly or indirectly fueling NGVs, tallied almost 55,000 NGVs. LDVs represented 
eighty-four percent of the total inventory, most of which were still retrofit-conversions as 
OEM sales were just underway. Continued improvements in heavy-duty engine 
performance and reliability were increasing fleet operators’ confidence in the technology. 
Sales growth in the transit sector was especially strong because air quality plans 
frequently targeted transit fleets and because transit fleets were allocated significant 
ISTEA-CMAQ funding to move to cleaner fuels.  
 
Local and state governments, especially California and Texas, were playing an ever more 
important role in the growth of the NGV market. According to the 1996 data, government 
fleets surpassed utilities in the number of NGVs on the road for the first time. Private 
fleets still ran a distant third.  Survey data also shows that average vehicular natural gas 
consumption continued to climb. This is likely due to the fact that utility demand for 
LDVs was waning and government and transit agency use of medium- and heavy-duty 
vehicles was increasing. 
 
E. Market Growth Leads to Station Development Frenzy, Trips and Pitfalls  
An R&D Needs Assessment prepared in 1996 for GRI and NGVC indicates that there 
were 1222 CNG stations dispensing almost 43 million GGEs in 1995, a three-fold 
increase in stations and a five-fold increase in volume as compared to 1990. Installed 
fueling capacity in 1995 was estimated at 125,000-150,000 scfm and analysts projected 
double- and triple-digit growth over the next decade, largely due to expected growth of 
medium- and heavy-duty market segments. The outlook for NGVs was very positive. 
Collectively, the utilities indicated that another net 10,000 vehicles would be added by 
year-end 1997 for a total of 65,000 NGVs consuming 54 million GGEs. 
 
The frenzy of NGV fueling station installations by utilities, while generally positive, had 
its drawbacks. Of the 1222 stations in place or under construction by year-end 1995, 
some were poorly planned and/or executed and destined to fail. For example, while most 
utilities developed their station networks methodically, selecting locations that would 
meet their own needs and incrementally adding capacity to meet the needs of new 
customers, others built expensive oversized stations based on optimistic projections of 
market growth and a “if we build it, they will come” mentality. For these oversized 
stations, throughput would never justify the investment. Some stations were installed at 
undesirable locations based on proximity to the utilities’ own gas lines or convenience to 
their own fleet operations instead of being driven by customers’ needs. Again, less than 
expected sales would eventually sour many utilities’ managements concerning these 
investments and their commitment to the NGV market.  Some stations were just poorly 
engineered and constructed as utilities navigated the learning curve of designing and 
constructing high-pressure gas vehicle fueling systems. Persistent maintenance and 
operations problems doomed these locations from the start and eroded public confidence 
in the technology. Many of these poorly planned and/or executed stations would never 
achieve the necessary economics to be viable and eventually close years later – as 
described further below – as the market “self-corrected.”   
 
F. Snapshot 1996: A Market Positioned For Continued Expansion 
 
In 1996, nearly all the pieces were in place for the NGV market to flourish. The federal 
government and several states had begun implementing AFV friendly clean air and clean 
transportation policies. The major automotive OEMs were well on their way to 
introducing LDVs. Utilities all across North America were energized and eager to 
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promote the market. Overall growth in the number of NGVs on the road, stations and fuel 
throughput all indicated that the NGV industry was well on its way to building a sound, 
sustainable foundation.  
 
III. 1997-2005: Utility Deregulation, Unfulfilled Expectations Derail NGV Momentum 
 
In the 1997-2005 timeframe, the total NGV market expanded but not nearly to the level that 
industry analysts had projected. In addition, growth was very niche specific and limited to just a 
few regions.  
   
A. Deregulation Leads Many Formerly Active Utilities To Disengage From NGVs  
 
From the 1960s through the mid-1990s, natural gas utilities were the primary driving 
force behind NGV market growth. Areas with active, supportive LDCs enjoyed the 
greatest growth in NGV inventories, fuel stations and throughput – a fact that remains 
true today.  Unfortunately, as the gas utility industry transitioned to a deregulated market 
in the late 1990s and into the early-2000s, mergers and acquisitions side-tracked or 
derailed many NGV programs as new management teams focused on cost-cutting and 
reverting back to their core competency – delivery of utility services. Across the nation, 
utilities that had once been at the forefront of marketing NGVs and other new natural gas 
technology suspended their marketing programs and, in some cases, reassigned or let go 
their marketing personnel. 
 
During deregulation, a few utilities were directed by their Public Utilities Commission 
(PUC) to divest their NGV business investments. For example, in 1996, California’s PUC 
directed SoCal Gas Company to sell most of its CNG stations. Those located at private 
fleet yards were sold to the NGV customers they served. Most of the rest were sold to 
Pickens Fuel Corporation but SoCal was able to retain some locations located on their 
own property if their primary purpose was to refuel SoCal vehicles. Even though the 
company divested most of its CNG stations, they continued to promote NGVs to 
customers. Some utilities chose to voluntarily divest their NGV business interests. For 
example, when Texas Gas purchased Lone Star Gas Company (TX), it sold off non-core 
business units including the unregulated NGV station development and vehicle 
conversion businesses that Lone Star had established in 1986. Blue Energy, a private 
company, purchased the businesses and also purchased Natural Fuels Corp from Public 
Service Company of Colorado at about the same time. ENRG (later renamed Clean 
Energy), the successor company to Pickens Fuel Corporation, would eventually acquire 
Blue Energy. In all, about a dozen small independent station-development and/or 
operations companies emerged during this period of utility deregulation. Most were - and 
still are - local or regional and many did not last more than a few years, either closing 
operations or selling to others in the business. 
 
Many utilities tried unsuccessfully to sell their NGV business assets. Nationally, the 
number of utility NGV assets available for sale far exceeded market capital. Further 
complicating the situation, utilities generally rate-based their investments over extended 
periods, e.g. up to 20 years, like other gas company assets. The market value of much of 
the station equipment available for sale was far below the value listed on utility corporate 
asset sheets. The result is that stations were left in place and, without active NGV 
marketing programs to generate new customers and load, these stations went largely 
underutilized for years before finally being decommissioned. 
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There were certainly exceptions to this general utility trend to back away from NGV 
market development, most notably the three investor-owned utilities in California, which 
maintained active NGV programs, and about a dozen other utilities spread out across the 
U.S. Overall, however, nearly four out of every five U.S. utilities active in marketing 
NGVs in 1996 discontinued their programs altogether by 2005. An additional thirty to 
forty utilities maintained and operated CNG stations during this timeframe for their 
dwindling NGV fleets and/or occasional transient customers but they no longer actively 
marketed NGVs or fuel stations to customers. As is noted below, there would be more 
attrition in LDC marketing programs and fueling infrastructure during the 2006-2007 
timeframe. 
 
Increasingly, NGV market development relied on the resources of the half-dozen non-
utility companies engaged in NGV station development and operations, compressor 
equipment manufacturers and the vehicle OEMs and SVMs. Also of growing importance 
in educating the public and generating leads were clean-air and clean-transportation ally-
advocates such as Clean Cities Coordinators and their stakeholders.  
 
B. OEMs’ Vehicles Arrive as Many Utilities Exit, Price Premiums Are An Obstacle   
The process of utility industry deregulation and disengagement from the NGV market by 
some began just as the major automobile OEMs were introducing their long-awaited 
NGVs. Ford introduced the Crown Victoria in model year (MY) 1996, and by MY1998, 
brought the Contour, the F250 and E-series Econoline vans to market. GM launched the 
1500 series pick-up truck in 1998, the same year that American Honda rolled out its first 
Civic GX. After an initial unsuccessful stab at introducing a Chrysler Minivan in 1997-
98, the company regrouped and offered the Dodge Ram van and wagon in MY2000.  
That same year, GM expanded its CNG line to include the bi-fuel Cavalier and in 2001, 
the Express and Savana vans. Toyota, which had several times announced – then 
postponed – introduction of the Camry, eventually offered the vehicle in limited 
quantities to fleets located in California in 2000 and 2001.  
 
Generally, entry of the major OEMs created enthusiasm in the marketplace and built 
credibility that NGV technology was viable. Significant price premiums were an obstacle 
that was overcome by grants and incentives – where they were available. NGV industry 
efforts to secure federal tax credits for vehicles, considered essential for market 
penetration, were not successful until nearly eight years later.  
 
C. SVM Network and Vehicle Choices Dwindle as Regulation Takes its Toll  
 
Prior to entry of the major OEMs, Small Volume Manufacturers (SVMs) of retrofit-
conversion systems had been the sole source for engines and vehicles. SVMs would 
continue to play an important role and still do today but, beginning in 1994, these 
companies faced their own new set of technical and regulatory challenges. That’s when 
the major automobile OEMs began introduction of electronic control modules (ECM), 
which were designed to greatly improve engine operational efficiency and reduce 
emissions to meet EPA requirements. In September 1994, EPA issued the first 
rulemaking governing certification of CNG vehicles, effective MY1997. Under an option 
known as Memorandum 1A, Option 3, which EPA extended several times up to April 
2002, retrofit-conversion system SVMs had the option of avoiding the more costly 
certification requirements as long as they had reasonable basis to believe - and could 
document - that their systems did not degrade vehicle emissions. Over the next several 
years, most of the “kit” manufacturers that did not have the engineering expertise, 
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sophisticated testing equipment or financial resources to meet this higher-level technical 
challenge exited the market. Of the companies that did remain, several more left the 
market in 2002 when Option 3a phased out and costly full certification was required. 
Finally, in 2005, implementation of phase two On-Board Diagnostics (OBDII) 
requirements for LDVs forced all but two LDV retrofit-conversion systems 
manufacturers out of the U.S. market. The effect of the more costly and complicated 
certification process is that SVMs were forced to pass on higher prices to customers and, 
due to limited resources, offer fewer engine/vehicle choices.  
 
D. Unfulfilled Expectations Lead All But One LDV OEM to Exit Market  
Sales of OEM light-duty NGVs and retrofit-conversion systems during the 1997-2005 
time frame were not as robust as most OEMs and SVMs had projected. Fleet managers 
and NGV industry stakeholders interviewed for this report cite a variety of reasons for 
this less-than-projected sales performance. 
 
The late 1995 Clinton Administration decision to not mandate that private fleets’ 
purchase alt fuel vehicles, as allowed and expected under EPACT 92, eliminated one of 
the major market drivers OEMs had planned on when investing in their NGV 
development programs. NGV industry stakeholders cite lack of promulgation of the 
private fleet rule as a major setback then and continue to express that view today. 
Exacerbating the situation, federal agencies fell far short of their target goals for 
purchases of AFVs of all types between 1994-2003. By the time these shortfalls were 
given greater scrutiny and addressed, Flex-Fuel vehicles priced on par with standard 
gasoline vehicles and able to run on regular gasoline while still qualifying for compliance 
credit were available. In addition, EPACT program credit banking and trading provisions, 
especially those related to B100 fuel use, created an overabundance of credits that 
effectively swamped the market and eliminated the need to purchase AFVs.  At the same 
time, utilities’ demand for NGVs steadily waned between 1997-2005. Decentralization of 
fleets and, later, availability of Flex-Fuel vehicles prompted many utilities to scale back 
or eliminate their usual NGV orders.  
 
While there were exceptions to this general declining sales trend, most notably in 
California, Texas and New York, where several utilities’ and state and local 
governments’ purchase of LDVs helped sustain OEMs’ presence in the market, sluggish 
sales eventually took their toll. Toyota’s short-lived foray into the NGV market with the 
Camry in 2000-2001 never got traction and the limited market entry was pulled. By 2003, 
Daimler-Chrysler discontinued production of the Ram series and exited the market 
completely. Ford scaled back it’s offering to just the Crown Victoria and the F150 and 
GM still offered the Cavalier, 1500 series pick-ups and Express-Savana vans but, given 
the financial condition of both companies, both sent signals they would have to 
discontinue models if sales performance didn’t increase considerably. In 2004, Ford 
pulled out of the market completely, GM dropped the Cavalier from its line-up and late in 
the year announced discontinuance of its Express and Savana CNG van option for 2005. 
Only American Honda’s Civic GX and GM’s 1500 Series pick-ups remained for 
MY2006. GM announced in late 2005 that it would discontinue the CNG pick-ups in 
April 2006, leaving American Honda as the only remaining LDV OEM. 
 
Fortunately, several SVMs stayed engaged, offering a fairly broad selection of GM and 
Ford retrofit-conversion systems for light-, medium- and heavy-duty vehicles. Selling 
through the SVM channel was far more difficult however as they did not have the same 
market presence and enjoy the same market confidence as the major OEMs.  In addition, 
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conversion costs were high as the SVMs had to amortize their certification investment 
across a smaller sales base.  
 
E. As LDV Sales Falter, Steady Gains in HDV Niche Sectors Sustain Market  
Despite the exit – or pending exit - of several OEMs in the light duty sector and the 
culling out of SVMs not able to meet tougher EPA and CARB emission certification 
requirements, there were positive trends in regards to NGV inventory, most notably gains 
in sales of MDVs and HDVs.  This is due, in large part, to the strength of the high fuel 
use sector accounts, e.g. transit agencies and also to gains in sales of buses to the airport 
and school sectors and trucks to the refuse and other vocational work truck markets. 
These sales gains may be attributed primarily to three market drivers: significant 
improvements to natural gas engine performance, reliability and service infrastructure; 
implementation by California’s South Coast AQMD of its NGV-friendly “1100 Series” 
heavy-duty fleet rules, which required local governments and/or their contracted vendors 
to purchase AFVs; and improving life-cycle economic advantages of natural gas-powered 
buses and trucks as compared to diesel-powered units as EPA heavy-duty engine 
emission requirements phased in, beginning in late 2002. 
 
F. Fueling Infrastructure Experiences Market Correction For Excesses of 1990s  
 
The station development boom that started in the early-to-mid 1990s peaked at about 
1300 in 1998 and, by year-end 2005, the net number of CNG stations in the U.S. declined 
to about 1100 as the number of new stations opening lagged the number closing or 
decommissioning. This attrition in the fueling infrastructure is widely viewed by 
knowledgeable industry analysts as a market correction. Most of the stations closed or 
decommissioned were older utility-owned-and-operated stations that were underutilized 
for years and/or completely inactive. In collecting data for Part III of this report, CVEF 
identified dozens of recently closed or soon-to-be-closed stations that had throughput of 
less than 1000 GGEs per year. The customer base at these underperforming stations 
usually comprised only the utilities’ own few remaining vehicles (often bi-fuel) as NGV 
marketing to customers discontinued long ago. For the most part, these stations 
languished without proper service or investment (e.g. upgrade to higher operating 
pressure) and provided little value to the NGV fueling infrastructure anyway. 
 
On the other hand, most of the new stations installed during the 1998-2005 timeframe 
were predicated on sound economic fundamentals, whether they were small-capacity 
(less than 50scfm) stations installed for local school districts and municipal governments 
(e.g., Ingersoll-Rand or FuelMaker units) or high fuel use stations installed at transit 
agencies, airports or refuse operations. By far, the greatest investment in fueling 
infrastructure during the 1998-2005 period occurred in California, Texas and New York 
with isolated highlights in other major metro areas including Atlanta, Washington D.C., 
Boston, Seattle and Denver, among others. Capacity added during this period came in the 
form of upgrades to existing infrastructure for current CNG customers and new 
installations for both private-access-only and public-access locations.  
 
G. As NGV Inventory Peaks, Then Declines, Vehicular Natural Gas Use Climbs  
 
The net effect of the LDV, MDV and HDV sales performance was a leveling off and 
eventual decline in the number of NGVs on the road, yet - due to MDV and HDV sales - 
steady growth in fuel throughput. CVEF estimates that between 1997-2005, about 48,000 
natural gas LDVs were sold. When sales of MDVs and HDVs are added and attrition of 
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older units taken out of service is factored in, the estimated peak in NGVs was between 
105,000 and 110,000 in 2003. By 2005, CVEF estimates that due to attrition in the LDV 
market and retiring of older HDVs, especially those in the transit sector, the total NGV 
inventory had dropped to about 92,000 vehicles. This tally comprised 12,000-14,000 
HDVs, another 10,000-12,000 MDVs and 66,000-70,000 LDVs. Of that inventory, most 
– about ninety-seven percent – operated on CNG with the remaining vehicles running on 
LNG. As is presented in more detail in Part III of this report, total fuel vehicular natural 
gas throughput was approximately just shy of 200 million GGEs. 
 
In 2005, the heavy-duty fleet comprised 8,500-9,000 transit buses in operation, with 
nearly one in four new transit buses on order – between 1000 and 1300 units per year - 
specified to run on natural gas.  Steady sales growth, albeit in relatively small numbers, 
had increased the nation’s natural gas refuse fleet to just short of 1300 units and the 
school bus fleet to around 2300.  Another 1800-2300 HDVs operated in a variety of 
applications in the utility, grocery-beverage, freight, airport and local and state 
government sectors.  The nation’s MDV fleet comprised a mix of airport-based shuttles, 
community transport shuttles, smaller package and freight delivery step vans and trucks, 
and a wide assortment of HD pick-up trucks and Class 2-4 cab-and-chassis work trucks 
 
H. Snapshot 2005: Amid Mixed Market Signals, Industry Prepares to Redouble Efforts  
 
The close of 2005 presented multiple opportunities and challenges. As noted above, the 
number of stations in operation was down a bit from its 1998 peak but vehicular natural 
gas fuel use was climbing, due to successes in the high fuel use heavy-duty niche 
markets, especially transit, airports and refuse.  
 
Of the major automotive OEMs that had entered the market with a limited number of 
vehicle models, Toyota, Daimler-Chrysler and Ford had already exited and, of those that 
remained, only American Honda gave clear signs that it was committed to staying the 
course. The other, GM, had already pulled some vehicles due to lower than expected 
sales and indicated that it would pull its remaining pick-up at the close of its MY2006 
production runs in early 2006. Of the four remaining SVMs offering LDVs, two would 
likely exit in 2006 because of OBDII certification requirements but the remaining two – 
Baytech Corporation and BAF Technologies - demonstrated their ability to meet these 
requirements and their intention to bring GM- and Ford-based engine family platforms to 
market (respectively). 
 
In the heavy-duty engine market, Clean Air Power stopped offering its Caterpillar-based 
Dual-Fuel engine in January 2003, Mack Truck announced in late 2005 it’s E7G gas 
engine would not remain after MY2006 and Detroit Diesel announced it was 
discontinuing its only natural gas engine. On the positive side, two suppliers of heavy-
duty engines, Cummins Westport Inc and John Deere Power Systems, were increasing 
their market share and building truck and bus chassis OEM relationships and two 
additional engine suppliers, Westport Innovations and Emission Solutions were on the 
verge of certifying additional engines.  
 
Less than a dozen natural gas utilities still had active NGV marketing programs in place. 
In limited regions and markets, a few independent station development-operations 
companies supplemented these efforts. For much of the country, there was no NGV 
market development program at all so what remained of the dwindling existing customer 
base was declining through attrition. 
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The favorable price differential between vehicular natural gas and gasoline or diesel 
continued to get better and better, improving NGVs’ simple payback and life-cycle 
savings edge. A particularly tough hurricane season disrupted both gas production and oil 
refinery operations in fall 2005 (Katrina, Rita), causing spikes in fuel costs and further 
heightening public awareness of the nation’s delicate balance between supplies, demand 
and pricing.  
 
Last, and certainly not least in importance, was passage of two critical pieces of federal 
legislation in August 2005 - the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (“EPACT”) and the 
SAFETY-LU (“Transportation Act”). EPACT 2005 included vehicle and station tax 
credits effective January 1, 2006 and SAFETY-LU included a motor fuels excise tax 
credit of $.50 per LNG gallon or GGE of CNG, effective October 1, 2006. 
 
IV. 2006-2007: Tax Credits, Emissions Advantages, Petroleum Prices Energize NGV Market 
 
Passage of the Energy and Transportation bills in late 2005, the impending 2007 phase-in of EPA 
heavy-duty emissions requirements and the growing differential between natural gas and 
petroleum fuels all combined to substantially brighten the outlook for NGV and fueling 
infrastructure investment in 2006.  
 
A. Federal Tax Credits  
 
Of the three new long-sought-after federal tax credits, the combined effect of the vehicle 
tax credits and the federal motor fuels excise tax credit improved NGVs’ economic 
advantage and was widely expected to spur sales to the public and private sector. The 
station tax credit, while welcome, was expected to have less of an impact. Unfortunate 
delays in IRS guidance concerning how to file for the vehicle tax credits, which was 
finally issued in June 2006, dampened the initial impact of this measure as most of the 
order deadlines for CNG vehicle production runs expired by April and many fleet 
managers were hesitant to move forward without knowing the specifics. Further delayed 
still were the details on how to get the additional thirty percent “bonus” credit for 
vehicles that met stricter emissions requirements. Honda finally received notice in late 
2006 that its Civic GX qualified for the full eighty percent credit, which in this case was 
worth $4000. The heavy-duty engine manufacturers would continue to have difficulty 
getting IRS clarification and guidance on this issue until well into 2007. IRS guidance on 
the motor fuels excise tax was finally issued two days prior to its effective date (October 
1, 2006). Again, the IRS delay in clarification of issues regarding who qualified to take 
the credit created confusion but, generally, did not slow projects from moving forward. 
IRS guidance concerning the station equipment tax credits was not issued until early 
2007; its impact, if any, cannot be assessed yet. 
 
B. EPA Heavy-Duty Engine Emissions Requirements Take Effect  
Another positive market driver was the impending phase in of the EPA heavy-duty 
engine emissions requirements. By early 2006, several natural gas engines had met the 
2007 PM and NOx requirements and were confident that 2010-compliant engines could 
be ready for market introduction by early-mid 2007. Diesel engine manufacturers, on the 
other hand, had far more difficulty but were able to meet the 2007 standard using a mix 
of engine modifications and exhaust after-treatment devices. However, these solutions 
pushed truck purchase prices up and operating costs higher. Wanting to avoid price 
increases and uncertain about the performance and maintenance implications of the new 
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diesel systems, fleet managers engaged in a substantial “pre-buy” similar to the one that 
occurred in mid-late 2002. The differential in truck life-cycle costs now clearly was in 
favor of natural gas; heavy-duty natural gas engine sales of the major OEM suppliers and 
SVMs continued to do well in 2006 and into 2007. 
 
One disappointment, announced at year-end 2006, was John Deere Power System’s 
decision to discontinue production of its popular 8.1L natural gas engine effective year-
end 2007. The decision was based on the company’s need to focus engineering resources 
on getting its diesel farm and construction equipment engines to meet the next phase of 
EPA emissions requirements in time for the 2010 deadline. Deere’s departure left several 
heavy-duty school bus and truck chassis OEMs looking for a new engine and sent the 
wrong message to the market. As of this writing, several suppliers have stepped in to 
offer viable options and the availability of vehicles from these manufacturers appears to 
be uninterrupted going into MY2008.  
 
C.  Current LDV Options Are Limited But Remaining OEM, SVMs Are Optimistic 
 
On the light duty side, Honda continued to make market strides with its Civic GX, 
achieving its sales goals for 2006 and well on track for 2007. The two remaining SVMs 
with EPA and CARB-certified LDV product, Baytech Corporation and BAF 
Technologies, both certified several fully OBDII-compliant engine families covering a 
variety of vehicle models. Continued resistance to buying through the SVM channel, 
especially by federal and many state government fleets, reigned-in the full potential for 
these vehicles but sales were characterized by both as “good” and the future outlook 
appears promising. 
 
D. Price Differential Between Natural Gas and Petroleum Fuels Grows  
While oil and gas prices constantly fluctuate, the 2006-2007 time frame saw the 
differential between natural gas and diesel remain the same and/or grow. The causes were 
many: the lingering effect of the fall hurricanes of late 2005 well into 2006; world crude 
oil prices remaining at or above $60 per barrel (and as high as $78 per barrel); the strain 
on U.S refining capacities due to EPA’s 15ppm sulfur content requirement and several 
refinery outages. When coupled with the new federal motor fuels excise tax (effective 
October 2006), the differential in cost per GGE ranged from twenty to fifty percent less 
than petroleum fuels. 
 
E. Vehicle Counts Drop, Fueling Infrastructure Remains Flat, Throughput Continues to Grow 
 
Based on extrapolation of trends documented in its 2005 survey process supplemented by 
proprietary information gleaned from interviews with engine and vehicle suppliers, 
CVEF estimates that there were 85,000-90,000 NGVs on the road at the close of 2006. 
This number includes new OEM- and SVM-supplied LDVs, MDVs and HDVs entering 
the market, offset by vehicles exiting the market due to age. Although there is no tracking 
mechanism in place, CVEF’s inventory estimates assume that approximately one-half of 
the light-duty CNG vehicles being disposed of by utility and government fleets are being 
resold to consumers and small businesses. The remaining vehicles are being scrapped or 
converted back to gasoline powered vehicles before being sold at auction. 
 
Regarding fueling infrastructure, 2006 and 2007 (to date) saw consolidation in the LNG 
supplier market with Clean Energy’s purchase of Apollo Resouces/ALT’s Willis, Texas 
plant, and the addition or re-launching of 50-65 new CNG fueling stations including 
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small packages serving just a few vehicles to large high-profile stations in the transit, 
refuse, airport and school niche markets. While new stations in California grabbed the 
lion’s share of market growth and attention, there were additional CNG stations newly 
installed or re-invigorated in several northeast states, Texas, Arizona, Utah and Virginia. 
The Midwest continued to lag the rest of the nation in new CNG station installations 
although there were a few, most notably in St. Louis and the Detroit metro area. There 
also were CNG station closings, as a number of utilities (e.g., Consolidated in PA, OH 
and WV and CenterPoint in TX) and local and state governments (e.g., in FL and VA) 
finally decommissioned underutilized stations.  In several cases, independent fuel 
retailers purchased, upgraded and re-launched previously utility- and municipally-owned 
CNG stations in conjunction with landing new anchor fleet accounts.  
CVEF estimates that the net affect on total CNG station counts was minimal and that the 
current inventory remains approximately at 1100 sites. 
 
Again, based on trends observed in the 2005 data and supplemented by press 
announcements of new fleet sales and station installations, CVEF estimates that total 
vehicular natural gas throughput at year-end 2006 was 205 million GGEs and it continues 
to climb, despite the drop in total vehicle inventory and relatively flat net station counts. 
This estimate is based on the fact that most of the used LDVs sold to the general public 
will use as much as – if not more fuel than – the fleets from which they came. It is 
assumed that new LDV sales are driven by the operator’s interest in utilizing the fuel. 
Furthermore, many of the new high-profile successes (e.g., in the transit, airport and 
refuse sectors) are high-fuel use vehicles (e.g., buses, taxis, shuttles), that use more net 
fuel then the vehicles being taken out of service. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Amoco in the 1990s demonstrated in the Metro Atlanta market that a NGV market could 
grow when supported by an area wide public CNG (Compressed Natural Gas) refueling 
infrastructure. Amoco’s strategy and approach is documented in this study sponsored by 
the Clean Air Vehicle Foundation and the Department of Energy’s National Energy 
Technology Laboratory. 
 
Amoco’s NGV infrastructure strategy was to: 
Provide CNG area wide coverage for NGVs in its existing retail refueling stations, 
focus on major metropolitan markets, 
then expand into smaller markets, and  
interconnect all markets for regional refueling coverage. 
 
Amoco’s strategy at the time differed from most across the nation with its area wide 
coverage approach, focus on customer needs and satisfaction and providing transparent 
CNG and LNG refueling experiences at public retail stations. Amoco was successful in 
establishing LNG and LCNG stations as part of its strategy serving all vehicle types – 
light, medium and heavy duty. Important to its success was recognizing that a refueling 
infrastructure had to be in place to attract NGVs. 
 
From Amoco’s NGV experience, presented in this study is a modified NGV refueling 
infrastructure strategy more aligned with present government regulatory conditions and 
incentives that was developed but not implemented. Its goals were to maximize area 
coverage and refueling transparency while minimizing capital and operating costs. It 
follows basic principles identified as matching supply to demand, matching infrastructure 
growth with NGV growth, starting with central refueling or public refueling if convenient to 
fleets, adding public or card lock refueling to extend NGV operational areas,  managing 
infrastructure costs, focusing on customer needs, and considering options with CNG, 
LNG and LCNG. 
 
 
Note from the Author 
Amoco represented the only major effort by a national transportation fuel provider in the 
United States to implement CNG refueling and possibly any alternative fuel on a basis 
equivalent to traditional fuels. When Amoco exited the NGV market, it lost the 
institutional knowledge it had gained in the NGV industry. The Clean Air Vehicle 
Foundation and its support for this contract from the Department of Energy are thanked 
for supporting the retrieval and documentation of the remaining knowledge base.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
A retail area wide CNG infrastructure strategy for Natural Gas Vehicles (NGVs) was 
developed and successfully implemented in the Metropolitan Atlanta, Georgia area from 
1992 thru 1996 by Amoco Corporation, now British Petroleum (BP). This effort was part 
of a large scale trial planned to be expanded nationally. Implementation was cancelled 
when the Clinton administration did not implement the mandates for NGVs provided in 
the Energy Act of 1992. 
 
The alternative fuel knowledge base and experience within Amoco was lost in 1998 
when it merged into BP, but still resided with its ex-employees. The strategic approach 
developed by Amoco for a national retail area wide CNG infrastructure was documented 
for the Clean Vehicle Education Foundation (CVEF) as part of its National Energy 
Technology Laboratory’s contract with CVEF entitled “NGV Road Map and Data 
Collection Effort” (DE-FC26-05NT42609).  
 
The scope of the strategy encompassed the infrastructure concept, station capital, 
operating factors, customer needs, general criteria for fuel type (CNG, LNG or LCNG), 
infrastructure planning steps and a qualitative CNG versus LNG comparison for refueling 
stations. Part I reviews the Amoco CNG strategy in the 1990s. Part II provides a brief 
overview of LNG for NGV refueling. Part III provides a modified model  for building a 
NGV refueling infrastructure in the present economic environment. 
 
Implementing NGVs successfully requires having concurrently an area wide 
infrastructure providing a supply of NGVs, demand for NGVs and NGV refueling. 
Previous attempts have proven to be difficult creating all three concurrently which has 
been a major reason inhibiting natural gas from becoming a viable transportation 
alternative fuel. It’s the classical “egg versus chicken” which comes first dilemma - NGVs 
or NGV refueling. A viable and robust NGV strategy must address all three aspects. This 
study addresses the NGV refueling strategy needed to grow the NGV industry. 
 
NOTE:    In this study, NGV (natural gas vehicles) refueling refers to refueling of NGVs 
using either CNG (compressed natural gas),  LNG (liquid natural gas) or LCNG (CNG  
produced from LNG). CNG refueling refers specifically to refueling NGVs with CNG. 
Where LNG is not emphasized, the reader could interchangeably use NGV refueling with 
CNG refueling. 
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SITUATION 
 
Economics drives business and consumer decisions. Historically the federal government 
builds transportation infrastructures and industry supports it with vehicles and refueling 
capabilities. In the case of highways and road infrastructures, gasoline and diesel 
vehicles are the norm that society has developed around. To change this, there has to 
be a compelling economic reason that will positively impact a business or consumer. For 
light to medium duty NGVs using CNG, the economic advantages even with tax 
incentives have proven inadequate to promote growth.  For heavy duty vehicles using 
LNG, the economics can be better than diesel and are expected to improve as additional 
LNG port facilities come on line in the United States. 
 
The solution for NGVs has been and continues to be driven by utilities and small  
refueling companies focusing on light to medium duty vehicles fueled by CNG. Efforts 
have been local and limited in state wide efforts. Only one major transportation fuel 
provider had actively participated in the NGV industry, and that was Amoco, presently 
part of British Petroleum (BP). 
 
Amoco Corporation 
The Energy Act of 1992 passed by the first Bush administration provided 
the economic incentives and mandates for industry to make the 
investments in both NGVs and NGV refueling facilities. Based on this, 
Amoco Corporation as a leading transportation fuel provider recognized 
the NGV opportunity and began investing in CNG refueling facilities as an integral part of 
its retail refueling business. Its NGV industry partners continued in a growth mode with 
Amoco focusing on the area wide refueling infrastructure strategy into 1996. Amoco re-
evaluated the NGV opportunity soon after the Clinton Administration decided in 1995 to 
not adopt the optional mandates provided in the Energy Act of 1992. Without these 
mandates, the economics of natural gas refueling changed from a mid term (3-5 years) 
ROI (Return On Investment) to a long term (10+ years) ROI. Fleets without the 
mandates or economic incentives quickly abandon plans for using NGVs. Automakers in 
turn reduced their NGV efforts and Amoco exited the CNG refueling business. 
CNG
Amoco
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A major study in 1995 by Booz Allen for Amoco recommended that Amoco stay active 
with its then successful Metro-Atlanta area wide retail refueling even without the Energy 
Act mandates. It was in Atlanta that Amoco developed its area wide refueling retail 
strategy with 14 stations in place and 7 more in progress being built.1 Amoco by 1996 
was financially focused on other strategic businesses offering higher near term ROIs. Its 
CNG Refueling business with only a long term ROI was cancelled. 
 
Amoco in 1995 began to invest in LNG for heavy duty NGVs 
where economic incentives and acceptable ROIs were 
demonstrated for all aspects of the infrastructure – fleets, 
equipment and engine supplies and fuel providers. 
Recognized was the value that a LNG refueling infrastructure could have providing 
LCNG (CNG produced from LNG) to light and medium duty vehicles. Amoco exited in 
1999 the heavy duty NGV market when it was merged into British Petroleum (BP) whose 
industry strategy did not encompass alternative transportation fuels.  
 
Had Amoco maintained its Metro Atlanta CNG business and had BP stayed in the heavy 
duty NGV business with LNG refueling, its believed by some BP (ex-Amoco) insiders 
that these two businesses would be viable and possibly profitable in 2006 even with the 
high natural gas costs. But without federal economic incentives or any strong U.S. 
energy policy supporting alternative fuels with immediate and economically viable 
applications, there is no incentive for BP or any major transportation fuel provider to 
change their strategy from traditional fuels. 
 
Role of the Government 
To change an infrastructure that has become a norm for both industry and society 
requires compelling economic incentives. For practical reasons, only the federal 
government can change a national transportation infrastructure.  The Energy Act of 1992 
passed by the first Bush administration provided mandates with economic incentives for 
industry to make the investments in both NGVs and NGV refueling facilities. At the time 
it impacted fleets operating in over 150 cites in the U.S., focused on light duty vehicles, 
and would mandate fleets to begin purchasing alternative fuel vehicles beginning in 
1996.  Had the Energy Act of 1992 mandates been implemented, a national NGV 
infrastructure would likely have evolved. 
 
                                                 
1 The General Manager for Amoco’s Metro-Atlanta CNG Business who developed Amoco’s area wide retail 
refueling strategy was Bruce Cotterman, author of this study. 
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Building a successful infrastructure requires private enterprise to make long term 
financial investments in an environment demanding near term results. This has 
prevented the growth of any nation wide alternative fuel infrastructure to date. With no 
foreseen solution providing an economical or compelling reason to change, only 
government policy backed by funding, mandates, regulatory support and economic 
incentives can implement a new infrastructure on the scale needed to have an impact on 
energy security. 
 
Part III of this study provides suggestions on how to continue building a NGV refueling 
infrastructure in today’s environment with limited government support. 
 
 
PART I – AMOCO’s CNG REFUELING INFRASTRUCTURE STRATEGY 1992-1997 
 
With the Energy Act of 1992 and the Clean Air Act of 1990, Amoco had a viable strategy 
to be the market leader in CNG refueling as a first mover in the 33 states it operated in 
with over 12,000 public access retail stations. This same situation does not exist in 2006 
and consequently the same strategy may not work today.  
 
Proposed later in Part III is a NGV refueling strategy based on the lessons learned by 
Amoco for present times to build a robust area wide CNG refueling infrastructure. In 
some aspects, this proposed strategy is being pursued today. At the same time, it is not 
achieving the NGV growth needed and may benefit from the Amoco experience. 
 
To understand and implement the proposed NGV refueling infrastructure strategy 
presented in Part III, the reader needs to first understand the Amoco strategy pursued, 
and the lessons learned and where it differs from other NGV strategies. 
 
CONCEPT 
 
To many in the NGV industry, building a successful infrastructure is having concurrently 
a supply of NGVs, demand for NGVs and NGV refueling to support it. From a 
transportation fuel provider’s perspective, the components were the same but are 
defined differently as: 
 
INFRASTRUCTURE  NGV refueling and support such as maintenance for 
both NGVs and refueling stations. 
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SALES Demand from fleets and consumers combined with 
availability of NGVs. 
 
ACCEPTANCE Acknowledging NGVs and natural gas fuels (CNG and 
LNG) as cost effective, transparent, safe and reliable 
alternatives to traditional gasoline and diesel fuels. 
 
Figure 1: Components and 
Development Phases of NGV 
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I  Market Initiation  Build the start-up refueling infrastructure and initiate pilot 
NGV programs and acceptance by fleets, local 
government agencies, communities and consumers.  
 
II Market Development Expand usage of NGVs to generate CNG fuel demand 
and expand the refueling infrastructure. 
 
III Growth & Profitability Grow demand of NGVs and CNG fuel to establish 
reinvestment quality profitability. 
 
  
 
 
NGV INFRASTRUCTURE GOALS 
 
As a transportation fuel company, Amoco understood fleets, consumers and their 
transportation refueling needs. It identified from its experience a set of goals to establish 
a successful NGV refueling business as: 
 
• Maximize area coverage and refueling transparency 
• Minimize capital costs and operating costs 
 
These goals are counter to each other and required a balanced and phased approach 
to achieve concurrently. 
 
Area Coverage and Capital Costs 
Maximizing area coverage means to provide the ability for any driver whose CNG fuel 
gauge is near empty to find a relatively close CNG refueling station. This is how fleets 
and motorists presently refuel. With CNG, the choice was to either change 100 years of 
refueling habits which have become the norm or adapt CNG refueling to the norm. To 
not would limit the number of fleet vehicles using CNG to small scale fleet projects 
which often is the case rather than building a true NGV infrastructure. Adapt was 
chosen. 
 
Building an area wide refueling infrastructure requires large capital investments. To 
balance cost versus coverage requires starting with area wide refueling coverage to 
effectively service multiple fleet refueling needs, yet in a phased approach expanding 
area coverage as NGVs and fleets are added. It also requires starting with small but 
adequate CNG stations having the flexibility to adjust each station’s volume upwards to 
meet growing demand. 
 
In another perspective, provide adequate coverage means avoiding point coverage, 
minimizing central refueling and going straight to area wide coverage with multiple 
stations. In time multiple area coverage would either overlap or gaps would be filled to 
provide regional coverage. 
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This can be accomplished using the existing public refueling sites (where Amoco had an 
advantage) or the more difficult approach providing public access to private stations. 
For creating regional coverage, stations are needed along interstates and intrastate 
highways. 
 
Refueling Transparency and Operating Costs 
Maximizing refueling transparency means the driver‘s CNG or LNG refueling experience 
closely resembles a traditional refueling experience with gasoline or diesel with: 
 
• Easy access to and from all major highways 
• Locations near fleets 
• Covering all quadrants of operational areas 
• Easy entrance and exit during rush hours 
• Extended hours of operation 
• Fast fill 
• Dispensers and hoses similar to gasoline or diesel 
• Measurements in equivalent gallons 
• Safety 
• Convenient locations 
• Self-service 
• Honoring most forms of payment 
• Fleet cards 
• 24 hour service 
• Oil, gasoline, diesel, water, air, etc. available 
• Emergency refueling 
• Conveniences such as restrooms, food and drinks 
 
Transparency is critical to have acceptance. Without acceptance, alternative fuels will 
not grow. Forcing drivers to use alternative fuels or lacking transparency has been 
shown to not work. It must be wanted and accepted. This is an area where many non-
traditional fuel providers such as utilities have struggled. 
 
To balance cost versus transparency requires planning in fuel transparency from the 
beginning to include site selection. Fleet drivers and motorists have many refueling 
options. This includes which fuel – CNG or gasoline – to use as well as which CNG 
station to use. Providing transparency encourages and assures the successful use of 
CNG. 
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Amoco had many examples where any deviation from transparency even with traditional 
fuels had resulted in motorists and fleet drivers avoiding use. A classic example was the 
overnight drop in gasoline sales when Amoco stations converted from gallons to metric 
liters. Customers went to competitors simply because of reduced transparency to 
traditional refueling measurements. The remedy was to quickly return to consumer 
expectations by reverting back to gallons. Another example was the reluctance of 
motorists to adopt diesel vehicles requiring refueling at diesel pumps on separate 
islands. The remedy was to establish refueling transparency by mixing diesel dispensers 
with the gasoline dispensers, then later designing in diesel as an option on gasoline 
dispensers. 
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STRATEGY FOR NGV INFRASTRUCTURE 
 
Amoco NGV Goal 
For Amoco, the NGV goal was to:  
 
Develop a NGV refueling business with profitable growth within 5 years and 
achieving within 10 years $500 million in revenues, $50 million operating profit 
and 15% return on investment. 
 
A goal of this magnitude was realistic for a national transportation fuel provider entering 
a new market. Based on the opportunity presented in 1992 with the Energy Act, NGVs 
vehicles were either going to become part of the national transportation infrastructure or 
remain a small technical experiment supported by small niche businesses. 
 
Amoco NGV Strategy 
The NGV infrastructure strategy to accomplish the goal was to: 
 
Provide CNG area wide coverage for NGVs in its existing retail refueling stations, 
focus on major metropolitan markets, 
then expand into smaller markets, and  
interconnect those markets for regional refueling coverage. 
 
Analysis of market drivers leading into the strategy indicated that using central refueling 
would limit development of the NGV infrastructure. Additionally, there were trends that 
indicated a move for many fleets back to using public access retail stations.  Increasing 
environmental costs for underground storage tanks and the capital costs to build above 
ground in the 1990s was driving this. Lastly, the strategy was consistent with Amoco’s 
strengths and capabilities with over 12,000 public access retail stations in 33 states.  
 
Its noted that of the four major metropolitan areas targeted by Amoco – Metro Chicago, 
Northern Virginia/Baltimore/Washington, DC, Metro Atlanta and the Florida Gold Coast – 
only the Metro Atlanta area followed the Amoco NGV Infrastructure strategy. The 
explanation was the difficulties in implementing the strategy based on issues with either 
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the local utility, local and state government agencies, the general fiscal and risk taking 
conservatism of the Amoco managers or all of these.  
 
The Atlanta Market was successful based on several preconditions identified as: 
 
(1) Cooperative utility – Atlanta Natural Gas and Light Company,  
(2) Pro-alternative fuel local and state governments,  
(3) Management with a business development background experienced in 
entering new markets, and 
(4) Strategic focus on area wide refueling coverage. 
 
Yet success was achieved within Metro Atlanta in a highly competitive environment 
consisting of low gasoline prices compared to across the country, three CNG fuel 
providers and multiple alternative fuels including LPG (propane), electric and ethanol (E-
85) competing for the same fleet customers. 
 
The lesson learned from this were the pre-conditions listed above are critical to 
successfully develop a NGV infrastructure or enter any market with NGVs. 
 
Central Refueling Shortfall 
Area wide coverage was chosen by Amoco over central refueling, yet central refueling is 
seen as the optimal solution balancing the economics of bringing supply and demand 
together.  Central refueling is popular due to the lower investment, lower operating costs 
and physical control of fleets who start and return to the same location daily. Central 
refueling sites are located in industrial areas and at the convenience of the on site fleet it 
serves. Therefore it would seem the obvious approach for meeting refueling needs. 
 
Except in a few sites, this approach, though found attractive by fleets and utilities 
providing the refueling, was not producing the demand expected or needed for 
developing the NGV refueling infrastructure.  
 
Shortfalls in central refueling for developing the NGV infrastructure were identified as: 
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• Not functional for other commercial refueling if utilizing slow filled refueling,  lacking a 
metered refueling pump, having inadequate CNG storage capability or undersize 
compression capability for fast filling or lacking capabilities for recording and 
crediting fleet and vehicle accounts. 
• Limited in the area served based on location or metro area traffic patterns 
• Limited access, availability or convenience to other fleets. 
• Non functional design for public use. 
• No incentive for public transportation refuel providers to participate. 
• Motorists in personal cars unlikely to use fleet facilities as demonstrated with diesel. 
• Higher capital and operating costs to provide public access. 
• Small stations often could not meet the fast fill or peak load requirements 
 
Amoco was able to overcome the issues involving central refueling with its experience, 
capabilities, capital and existing retail sites. A major challenge to building any NGV 
infrastructure is how to overcome these issues without the cooperation and support of public 
access retail stations or how to get their cooperation, support and capital. This issue is beyond the 
scope of this study, but is one that needs addressed for NGVs to grow beyond localized areas and 
become a major source of transportation. 
 
 
INFRASTRUCTURE APPROACH 
 
With each NGV market such as the Metro Atlanta market, developing the NGV 
infrastructure was in the three phase approach described earlier as Initiation, Market 
Development and Growth and Profitability. The timing and goals of each phase are 
shown in  Figure 2 and Table 1 respectively. 
 
YEAR1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 90
I  MARKET
INITIATION
II  MARKET
DEVELOPMENT III
GROWTH &
PROFITABILITY
10
Figure 2:  NGV Refueling Infrastructure Approach 
 
Table 1:  Phases of Building a NGV Market 
 
I  Market Initiation Develop initial “Skeleton”  infrastructure 
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Initiate new customer test programs 
 
II  Market Development ocus on meeting customer needs  
sed on market demand 
F
Expand refueling infrastructures  ba
Focus on reducing fixed and variable refueling costs 
 
III  Growth & Profitability xpand refueling infrastructures  based on market demand E
Develop intrastate and interstate refueling infrastructures 
 
 
he time periods are relevant. As with any program with high capital costs and operating  
the 
w 
ldom 
he exception is with heavy duty vehicles that operate based on life cycle costs versus the light to 
arket Initiation – Phase I
 
T
costs, entering a market has to start achieving a positive impact within a one year time 
period. A “toe in water” approach seldom works. At the same time this approach 
demands in depth research and planning before committing. As with any project, 
phases will overlap. By year 3, growth and profitability, or at least break even status, 
should be achieved. Though new market entry effort usually has a 5 year scenario, fe
companies have the cash flow luxury or management patience to go beyond 3 years. 
This is especially true for the fleets and the motorist. If they can’t see the financial 
payback within 2 to 3 years for a vehicle with a 5 year life, then the program will se
succeed or be supported.  
 
T
medium duty vehicles that budget based on annual operating costs. This subtle point will be 
discussed later and is what differentiated the LNG refueling market from CNG. 
 
M  
 all the market research and planning is completed. It includes Market initiation begins after
adding the first refueling station(s) as a “skeleton” infrastructure for a major metropolitan area. 
This provides a value proposition to fleets that 
encourages pilot NGV programs to test the 
concept. They can then budget for the 
following year to begin converting the 
remaining fleet upon completion of a 
successful pilot program. With this comes 
creditability, attention as a “real” fuel to take 
seriously, support from NGV converters and 
 88
5
15
25
CNG
Amoco
CNG
Amoco
CNG
Amoco
CNG
Amoco
CNG
Amoco
CNG
Amoco
CNG
Amoco
  
 
OEMs, faster acceptance and a steep learning curve. 
 
Figure 3: Phase I  Market Initiation - Amoco Refueling Infrastructure in Metropolitan 
he plan was for one station every 25 square miles or 5 miles apart. In the case of Atlanta, 7 
arket Development – Phase II
Atlanta, Georgia completed in 1993. 
 
T
stations were added establishing instant area wide coverage though limited. Station sites were 
based on earlier NGV adopters identified during the pre-Phase I market research and planning. 
Each station was over designed in capacity to assure a successful fast fill experience for any NGV 
and fleets, especially during peak times. Based on all the unknowns in establishing area wide 
coverage and gaining acceptance, starting off with smaller refueling stations was not an option. 
The stations located five miles apart in a dense urban area with heavy traffic patterns provided 
marginal coverage which limited NGV growth. Four miles apart or closer would have encouraged 
greater NGV growth. 
 
M  
focused on growing demand by transitioning pilot NGV 
his was accomplished through improved meeting of customer needs, expanded refueling 
 Atlanta, an additional 7 stations were 
The Market Development phase 
programs into fleet conversions and initiating new customer fleet pilot programs with a wider 
area refueling coverage. Gaining acceptance was a key goal. 
 
T
infrastructures based on market demand and reducing fixed and variable refueling costs. The 
Market Development phase was heavily dependent on lessons learned during the Market 
Initiation phase and adjusting the business and market plans accordingly. Focusing on reducing 
costs was an important effort during this phase in preparation for achieving sustainable profit 
growth. 
 
In
added for a total of 14.  Most of the new 
stations were located near fleets in high 
density industrial areas and federal, 
state and local government fleets that 
were converting to NGVs. Several 
stations were added beyond the 15 
miles radius of metro Atlanta to provide 
the area coverage needed to convert a 
larger percentage of fleets. 
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Figure 4: Phase II  Market Development - Amoco Refueling Infrastructure in Metropolitan 
Atlanta, Georgia completed in 1994. 
 
The second set of 7 stations added were designed and installed based on lessons 
learned the first year. Factors involved lower operation costs, higher automated 
monitoring capabilities, higher reliability, greater peak load capability, faster fill times, 
greater capacity for stations with higher demand potential and positioning within retail 
stations to improve through put and refueling times for commercial fleets. Greater 
emphasis was placed on NGVs with high mileage than numbers of NGVs to increase 
CNG demand. 
 
Once again oversized stations were introduced as in Phase I to assure continual 
acceptance and support growth during the Market Development phase. With hindsight, 
the stations placed to extend driving distances and area coverage should have had 
smaller capacity with lower capital and operating costs. 
 
Growth and Profitability – Phase III 
Achieving profitable growth is an absolute requirement. Its possible to rationalize 
negative financials based on pulling through additional natural gas sales. But this does 
not build a NGV infrastructure nor encourage businesses to enter the industry or 
markets. During this phase, aggressive Market Development from Phase II continues. 
 
The refueling infrastructure continues to be expanded but only when justified based on 
market demand. Concurrently, intrastate and interstate refueling stations are planned 
and added to begin regional coverage and encourage NGV travel between major 
markets.  
 
Expanding into heavy duty NGVs with LNG is evaluated in this phase. Though 
dependent on the cost effectiveness and availability, LNG offers range and fuel density 
advantages that could greatly open up demand and establish regional coverage with 
interstate and intrastate travels. With LNG refueling, CNG can be made available with 
LCNG facilities.  
 
This is the phase were CNG stations have their refueling capabilities matched  with 
demand to optimized capital and operating costs.  
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Figure 5: Phase III  Growth & Profitability - 
Amoco Refueling Infrastructure in 
Metropolitan Atlanta, Georgia planned for 
1995-6. 
 
Planned for Metro Atlanta was a third set 
of 7 stations for expanding the area 
coverage bringing the total to 21 stations 
plus one LNG truck stop. This CNG set 
included newer and improved designs 
with higher reliability, lower operating 
costs and smaller stations for balancing 
capacity with demand. Once demand was 
understood at each site, the stations were to be moved around to balance capacity with 
demand as part of the refueling infrastructure expansion.  
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The Metro Atlanta market with 21 stations of varying capacity would have completed the 
area coverage providing CNG refueling to over 80% of the fleets and motorists. 
 
Motorists began to be emphasized and marketed to during Phase III. Their shear 
numbers and fuel usage for commuting would easily provide Amoco the means to meet 
and exceed its financial goals. 
 
The LNG station was planned for local heavy duty vehicles such as waste haulers and 
local delivery medium duty trucks. The same LNG station would allow interstate travel 
when eventually liked with another LNG station either in South Florida, going west 
through Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana and Texas, or north toward Virginia and 
Maryland. The U.S. Postal Services and Amoco tractor trailers based in Georgia were 
the initial target interstate fleets. CNG produced from the LNG would support the light 
and medium duty vehicles in the area as an additional CNG station. 
 
While phase III and the addition of stations 15 through 21 were in progress, Amoco 
decided to exit the market in 1996 as previously discussed. Had Amoco stayed in the 
Atlanta market and fully implemented phase III, indications were that the financial goals 
as originally planned in 1993 with the Atlanta market would have been met in 1996-7 
with profitable growth achieved as new fleets continued to convert to NGVs. This 
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statement of profitability does not factor in the unforeseen high rise in natural gas prices 
caused by deregulation and other events around 1998 on. 
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REFUELING INFRASTRUCTURE COST 
 
One of the main inhibitors to the development of the NGV market is the cost of installing 
and then operating a refueling station until there is adequate CNG demand to cover 
operating costs and provide an acceptable ROI on the capital. The refueling 
infrastructure costs has three components – station capital, operating costs and the cost 
to meet customer needs. The latter is important for gaining acceptance and growth. 
 
Infrastructure Cost  =  Station Capital +  Station Operating Costs  + Customer Needs 
 
Amoco as a national transportation fuel provider understood the needs and psychology 
that motivates and creates a successful refueling experience for motorists and fleet 
operators. It translated this knowledge to its CNG refueling approach and was 
successful in growing volume at its stations by increasing the participating fleets, 
numbers of vehicles per fleet and CNG usage per vehicle. Though many of the points to 
be listed may seem obvious, several continue to not be applied by some CNG providers. 
Reasons range from the cost to simple lack of understanding of the needs and 
motivations of vehicle operators. 
 
Station Capital 
The components of station capital are listed below. Since the 1990s, refueling equipment’s performance and reliability has 
improved considerably. The costs identified in the 1990s may differ by today’s standards. Land  availability and site 
preparation can be a significant portion of station capital. 
 
Station Capital   =  Compressor size (CNG) or pump size (LNG /LCNG) 
    + Compressor motor (gas or electric) 
    + Storage (Volume and pressure) 
    + Dispenser (s) 
    + Automation 
    + Land acquisition or lease 
    + Site prep 
    + Building/Brick and Mortar  
 
Minimizing refueling time is important to a cost effective and efficient fleet operation. 
Storage offers assurance for quick fast refills and meeting peak or unexpected demand, 
yet is often undersized. Amoco choose to use 5000 psi cylinders plus extra storage to 
assure the customers achieved that fastest fill possible.  
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Dispensers are important to acceptance and need to be transparent. That is similar to 
traditional gasoline and diesel dispensers in appearance and function. Attractive and 
flashy designs are acceptable as marketing tools as long as they do not deviate from 
transparency.  With high pressure CNG, they could have a menacing look. This was 
found to actually discourage the use of CNG, generate apprehension on safety and 
cause unqualified rumors to spread within fleets. 
 
Metering in equivalent gallons was found to be a necessity, otherwise there was 
confusion and suspicion that the value per energy unit was not there. Fleet managers 
also found that without equivalent gallons they lost control of operating costs per vehicle 
and sometimes discouraged or stopped the use of CNG.2
 
Dual dispensers were utilized by Amoco in every situation for two reasons even if 
demand did not warrant it. First, as a back up. There were multiple things that could go 
wrong. Dispensers occasionally failed and operator error sometimes caused failure to 
refill even with the most standard and automated of dispensers, hoses and nozzles. 
Simply observing any retail gasoline refueling station for 20 minutes emphasizes this 
point. Without a functioning dispenser, a refueling site is out of business. Secondly, for 
those times a second vehicle pulls in to refill, waiting for an available dispenser creates 
an inconvenience that will discourage acceptance and prevent growth. Operators tend to 
avoid sites where quick access is an issue, even if only a one time situation. Having dual 
dispensers at every retail refueling site regardless of its capacity proved from Amoco’s 
perspective to be the correct decision. 
 
Station Operation 
Along with site location, the operation and maintenance of a refueling station are important to 
acceptance of CNG or LNG by vehicle operators.  The components are identified below. 
 
Station Operating Costs  = Energy demand (Electric and/or Natural Gas) 
    +   Cost of gas delivered 
    +   Gas losses 
    +   Maintenance – Preventive and other 
    +   Automated monitoring 
    +   Billing and record keeping 
    +   Station service and personnel 
                                                 
2 The use of equivalent gallons is mentioned based on the rigid stand Amoco took within the NGV 
community and the present trend for hydrogen fuels away from equivalent gallons. 
 94
  
 
    +   Third party margins 
 
The station has to work the first time and every time a vehicle operator uses it. If not, then 
operators have no choice but to seek alternatives. Then they will avoid, as many motorists would, 
coming back to a dysfunctional or inconvenient refueling site and inform others of their 
difficulties. The reverse is true for a refueling station that operates well and is convenient. 
 
Maintenance needs to be proactive and preventive, but is too often a reactive repair situation. 
Having continuous maintenance capability is expensive but necessary to the successful operation 
of any refueling station regardless of the fuel type. This was observed as an issue with some 
stations and an area where Amoco excelled.  
 
Observed by Amoco was the need for automated monitoring of performance. Even with the retail 
sites having on site personnel, mechanical problems were seldom reported in a timely manner. 
Continuous monitoring was an evolving technology and added expense in the 1990s but less an 
issue today. Critical is assuring that storage cylinders are full and the station is fully functional 
prior to peak refueling times. The result in assuring a reliable and fast refueling experience was 
acceptance by NGV operators to using CNG, especially in bi-fuel vehicles, and operators 
switching from slower or less reliable stations to refuel at Amoco’s CNG dispensers in its retail 
stations. 
 
Billing with detailed vehicle and operator information for fleets is readily available and 
easy to implement. Though an added cost, it provides valuable information for both fleet 
managers and fuel providers to understand refueling patterns. It should be a standard 
offering. 
 
Energy demand is a hidden cost that can generate significant operating costs if not planned from the design forward. This 
is an area that deserves management attention. 
 
Energy demand =  Function (Compressor size, peak demand, continuous      
 demand, storage requirements, lighting and ancillary equipment) 
 
Customer Needs 
There is another component often overlooked. It is the cost of meeting the customer’s 
needs. This is an area where many non-traditional transportation fuel providers struggle. 
Its an area where the customer is “king” or “queen” and always right. Its what drives the 
highly competitive retail stations and differentiates the successful ones from the others. 
CNG should be treated no less to achieve acceptance and drive growth. 
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Though many customers’ refueling needs are covered in the station capital or operating costs, 
there may incur added incremental costs to meet customer needs. 
 
Customer Refueling Needs = Easy access to and from all major highways 
Near fleets 
Covers all quadrants of operational area 
Easy entrance and exit during rush hours 
Extended hours of operation 
Fast fill 
Safe 
Convenient locations 
Self-service 
Honor most forms of payment 
Fleet cards 
24 hour service 
Oil, gasoline, diesel, water, air, etc. available 
Emergency refueling 
 
 
CNG LESSONS LEARNED 
 
The lessons learned by Amoco from its efforts in building both area wide public CNG and central 
CNG stations are basic to transportation refueling. 
 
? Pre-conditions of cooperative utilities, pro alternative fuel local and state governments, 
management talent with business development background and an area wide refueling strategy 
need to be in place to successfully develop the NGV infrastructure in a new market. 
? A refueling infrastructure needs to be in place to create NGV demand. 
? Utilize smaller capacity stations where demand is low, yet still providing fast fill capabilities. 
? Central refueling limits NGV growth whereas public refueling promotes NGV growth. 
? Without government incentives to assure rapid growth of NGVs, the return on investment (ROI) 
for an area wide NGV refueling infrastructure is too long term for industry participation as 
demonstrated by the limited number of participants today. 
? For NGV growth, CNG refueling needs to be transparent to traditional gasoline and diesel 
refueling. 
? Each time a NGV fuels with CNG , it must be successful requiring back up dispenser hoses, 
reliable compressor stations and alternate refueling sites in close proximity, i.e. an area wide 
refueling infrastructure similar to traditional fuels. 
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? Public refueling stations offer many advantages with their added services which attracts fleet 
refueling, though fleet managers prefer central refueling to avoid driver distractions.  
? Driver refueling satisfaction is paramount to the successful growth of NGVs. 
? NGV trials by fleet managers were typically successful with a well maintained vehicle and good 
driver with a positive attitude, whereas they almost always failed when the pilot test used a poor 
driver and poorly maintained vehicle. 
? Fleet economics based on operational costs for light to medium duty fleets ultimately dictate the 
growth of NGVs assuming reasonable incremental acquisition costs for the NGVs.  
? Life cycle costs apply only to heavy duty fleets. 
? Stations located five miles apart in a dense urban area with heavy traffic patterns provided 
marginal coverage which limited NGV growth. Four miles apart is recommended (reduces travel 
time by 20% and area coverage by one third from approximately 25 sq. mi. to 16 sq. mi.). 
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PART II – IMPLEMENTING LNG REFUELING INTO THE  INFRASTRUCTURE STRATEGY 
 
Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) as a source of natural gas fuel provides higher density storage and distance advantages than CNG. 
This is especially important for heavy duty and select medium duty vehicles who consume large volumes of fuel and/or travel 
long distances. The disadvantage to LNG was its limited supply, need to be distributed by truck and the special handling and 
safety aspect as a cryogenic liquid. LNG could easily be converted into CNG referring to it as LCNG for its source offering a dual 
refueling capability as either LNG or CNG. 
 
VEHICLE TYPE 
 
Light Duty Medium Duty Heavy Duty
Vehicle Type
CNG
or
Gasoline
LNG
or
Diesel
0
100%
Figure 6 depicts the general 
preference for CNG or LNG as 
transportation fuels by vehicle 
type. 
Figure 6:  CNG and LNG Fuel 
Mix by Vehicle Type 
 
Light - Medium Duty Vehicles needs were best served by CNG as a substitute for gasoline refueling with: 
? Self service refueling 
? Emphasis on operating costs 
? Range and space limitations 
? 4-10 gals per minute fueling 
 
The physics of refueling for cryogenic LNG were found to not be practical for small tank sizes commonly found in light duty 
vehicles. Therefore, LNG was best used in medium and heavy duty vehicle with large tanks of 20 liquid gallons and larger. 
 
Medium - Heavy Duty Vehicles needs were best served by LNG as a substitute for diesel refueling 
with: 
? Serviced or trained operator refueling for safety 
? Emphasis on life cycle economics 
? Range, weight and space limitations 
? 20-50 gallons per minute fueling 
 
Amoco found three key advantages with LNG for heavy duty and select medium duty vehicles.  The first was in how their ROI 
was calculated. With light to medium duty vehicles, the ROI for switching to CNG was based on operating costs and short term 
vehicle life. Therefore the incremental conversion cost had to be low for a payback. For medium to heavy duty vehicles, the ROI 
was measured based on life cycle costs. Heavy and select medium duty vehicles have the vehicle and engines specified 
separately allowing for a cost effective natural gas engine substitution. The engine life advantage using LNG combined with the 
lower particulate emissions and lower equivalent gallon cost in the mid 1990s provided a competitive life cycle cost advantage to 
LNG. 
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The second advantage for Amoco at the time was its low cost sources of LNG where it was produced as a secondary product 
without the high acquisition, operation and overhead costs of dedicated LNG plants. This could be duplicated where there are 
abundant sources of lower cost natural gas such as found in the western United States or as low priced LNG imports become 
available as new LNG terminals are opened. 
 
The third advantage was in the psychology of refueling. Heavy duty operators are use to refueling and safety issues not found in 
public or gasoline refueling stations. Amoco found the operators had no issues or safety concerns using another liquid, LNG, 
even though it was cryogenic, whereas they did with compressed natural gas, CNG. The acceptance among operators of heavy 
duty trains, construction equipment and tractor trailers was immediate. 
 
In summary, LNG with its 3.5 times greater energy density compared to CNG was found to: 
? Be acceptable to operators 
? Use same diesel tank locations without frame modifications 
? Have fast fueling rates of 30-50 gpm regardless of outdoor temperature 
? Vapor is delivered to engine (same engines for CNG and LNG) 
? Be a safe, simple, reliable refueling system 
? Generate acceptable ROIs for heavy duty and many medium duty vehicles 
? Be an alternative fuel to diesel as LNG and gasoline as LCNG 
 
 
LNG IN THE CNG REFUELING INFRASTRUCTURE 
 
LNG provides many advantages with its high density and ability to be used in areas where no natural gas pipelines service an 
area. With the technology of cryogenic storage tanks, LNG has several weeks life with minimal off gassing. As LCNG it reduced 
the compression pump and storage costs for a CNG refueling station. It has the potential to be a cost effective refueling source 
along the interstate highways and truck stops and where high volume demand is needed to service medium and heavy duty 
vehicles. 
 
Fast fill LNG stations can be integrated into the NGV refueling infrastructure with the following 
capabilities. 
? Designed to serve 50 vehicles or more per day 
? 30 - 40 gpm. fueling rate with fills not affected by ambient temp. 
? 6,000 gal. storage, instant-on service 
? 10-13,000 gal. storage add on capability 
? Dispenser  with card-lock capability 
? Designed for CNG alone as LCNG 
 
Comparing station and refueling economics (based on costs from 1994-1998), the advantage of LNG 
assuming equal costs of natural gas supply are seen in Table 2. 
 
Table 2:  NGV Refueling Station Comparison - CNG, LNG, LCNG 
  
 Economic Station Typical Vol # NGVs 
 Station Size Cost per NGV * per Station 
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CNG 8-10,000 $250,000 1-20 gal/day 40-500 
    gal/month - $350,000 20-500 gal/month/NGV 
 
LNG 80-100,000 $300,000 50-200 gal/day 16-100 
 gal/month - $400,000 1000-5000 gal/month/NGV 
 
L/CNG    8-10,000 $150,000 1-20 gal/day 40-500 
 gal/month - $200,000** 20-500 gal/month/NGV 
 
*   Based on 20-25 days per month 
** LNG station modification cost to produce CNG 
 
 
With LNG, it can be simpler to grow a positive cash flow business based on central refueling 
with: 
? 1 station per fleet or 1 station servicing several fleets 
? Typical customer tests using 2-5 trucks utilizing 40-80,000 gal/yr/truck or  
 80-400,000 gallons per year per fleet of 10 heavy duty vehicles 
? 3 -12 Fleet Customers per 1,000,000 gal/year station  
 
 
The approach for LNG is: 
? Central refueling 
? Add full size stations only and then based on demand 
? Match economics with diesel to start 
? Grow based on LNG economic advantage over diesel 
? Develop area coverage: Based on demand 
       With government assistance 
       Combination of both 
? Add truck stop refueling as Intrastate and interstate NGV travel occurs 
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PART III – STARTING OVER and BUILDING A NGV REFUELING INFRASTRUCTURE 
TODAY 
 
Many lessons were learned by Amoco from developing the CNG and LNG refueling 
infrastructures from 1992 to 1998. For building a NGV refueling infrastructure in 2006, 
presented is a different approach based on Amoco’s experience. 
 
Motorists still represent the ultimate goal for NGV growth. Yet, it’s the fleets who will drive the 
development of the NGV infrastructure. Though none of the issues with central refueling 
have changed, economics and practicality dictate that central refueling be a major part of any 
viable NGV Refueling Infrastructure today. The only scenario that would change this is the 
active participation by a major transportation fuel providers’ with their retail stations similar to 
Amoco’s involvement in the 1990s. 
 
APPROACH 
 
The overall three phase approach used by Amoco – Market Initiation, Market Development, 
and Growth & Profitability – is recommended keeping the same goals to maximize area 
coverage and fuel transparency while minimizing capital and operating costs.  
 
Principles were identified to follow for establishing NGV refueling from Amoco’s experience 
that reflect today’s economic environment.  
 
Table 3:  Principles for Establishing NGV Refueling 
• Provide area wide coverage 
• Start with central refueling or public refueling if convenient to fleet 
• Match supply to demand 
• Match infrastructure growth with NGV growth 
• Add public and/or card lock refueling to extend NGV operation area 
• Manage aggressively on infrastructure costs 
• Focus religiously on customer needs  
• Consider options:    CNG, LNG, LCNG 
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This strategy differs from Amoco’s earlier one by starting with point coverage using central 
refueling or key lock stations where public access stations are unavailable for high volume 
fleet customers. Area wide coverage will follow with key lock stations or public access 
stations for multiple customers. In time multiple area coverage will either overlap or gaps will 
be filled to provide regional coverage. 
 
This approach is necessary with profitable economics being harder to achieve having fewer 
government driven incentives for both fleets owning NGVs and refueling stations, higher 
natural gas prices and slower growth projected.  
 
All other recommendations on station capital, operations and meeting customer needs are 
still applicable. A lesson learned from the Amoco strategy that may differ from other 
strategies is to still provide area wide coverage utilizing smaller capacity stations where 
demand will be low, yet still providing fast fill capabilities. 
 
 
CONCEPT  - REFUELING OPTIONS & STATIONS LOCATIONS 
 
The first step is to define the target metropolitan area and its high traffic areas and size. The 
next step is to define the CNG station 
type, area coverage and number of 
stations needed. 
5
10
15
25
 
Figure 7: Metro Area Definition 
 
Table 4: Number of CNG Stations by 
Area Coverage  
Radius  Area  Stations 
5 mi  80 sq. mi. 3 
10 mi  300 sq. mi. 12 
15 mi  700 sq. mi. 28 
25 mi  2000 sq. mi. 80 
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For estimating the number of CNG stations needed, Amoco’s original plan of one station 
every 25 square miles or 5 miles apart was used. Theoretically, the Metro Atlanta area as 
defined in 1992 and shown in Figure 7 requires 80 stations to adequately provide CNG 
refueling coverage. Since areas within the metro area differ in traffic density, and not all 
areas can justify supporting a NGV infrastructure, stations would be added in phases to 
match the growth and density of NGVs. Amoco had found that 21 stations would provide 
initial area wide refueling within the 25 mile radius circle area considered metro Atlanta. 
 
The focus remains on area wide coverage. Where there are central CNG stations, the area 
wide CNG refueling coverage could support those NGVs who need to refuel before returning 
to their home base. With this concept, a more exact approach is provided for a NGV refueling 
infrastructure that meets the goals and principles defined earlier. 
 
 
NGV REFUELING INFRASTRUCTURE PLANNING 
 
Step 1 - Identify customer fleet fuel requirements 
The first step is to identify the fleets for converting to NGVs and their refueling volumes. The focus is on high volume fleets to 
base load the CNG stations. 
Table 5:  Light Duty NGVs per CNG Station 
  Gallons per Vehicle per No. NGVs per 
  Day Week Month  10,000 gal/month station 
  1  5 20  500 
  2 10 40  250 
  5 25 100  100   Target high volume fleets 
  10 50 200   50  
 
Few fleets have homogeneous refueling needs among all of its vehicles.  The example for light duty NGVs shown in Table 6 
uses the average gallons per month which typically varies greatly among fleet vehicles. 
Table 6:  NGV Fuel Demand Based on Daily Distances Traveled 
   Distance   Average      
 Operating # NGVs Gal/month 
   5  200  40 
   10  200  60 
   15  200  80 
   25  200  100   
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    Average 70 
 
 
Step 2 - Identify Customer Fleet Operating Area 
In Figure 8 and Table 7 Areas I through IV are defined as between the area of two radii of 
circles.  For example, Area III is between the circles formed by the 10 and 15 mile radii. Its 
area is then 700 – 300 = 400 square miles (See Table 7). 
 
For the fleet in this example, it services the area with 200 vehicles for every 5 miles from its 
fleet location.3  With a 15 mile operating distance covering about 700 square miles that 
include Areas I, II and III, 600 fleet 
vehicles are required averaging one per 
0.9 square miles. Within Area III itself, 2
fleet vehicles operate averaging one per 
0.5 square miles as shown in 
5
10
15
25
Miles from
fleet location
I II III IV
200
200
200
200
Vehicles
per area
00 
Figure 8 
and Table 7. This needs to be done for 
each fleet. 
 
Figure 8:  Fleet Operating Area and NGVs  
 
 
 
Table 7: Number and Density of NGVs from 
One Fleet Location 
 
  Operating Sq. Mi. within Total # NGVs # NGVs per  
Area Distance Circle Area Circle Area Circle Area 
I 5 80 80 200 200 2.5 2.5 
II 10 300 220 400 200 1.3 0.9 
III 15 700 400 600 200 0.9 0.5 
IV 25 2000 1300 800 200 0.4 0.2  
 
                                                 
3 Assumes that a fleet’s NGVs customer base decreases away from its fleet’s central location. 
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Step 3 - Identify Refueling Demand 
Central refueling typically meets a vehicle’s needs within a 
5-10 radius from the fleets location. Area coverage is often 
required to add NGVs requiring refueling outside the 
fleet’s location as depicted in Figure 9. From this, the 
number of NGVs requiring area wide refueling and their 
estimated fuel demand can be determined as reflected in 
Table 8. 
0
Distance from Fleet (Miles)
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Figure 9:  Defining Central Refueling from Area Wide 
Refueling in Terms of Distance from a Fleets Home 
Base 
 
The NGVs serving each area are surveyed or assumptions are made determining where they refuel as shown in Table 8. For 
example, the 200 NGVs in Area III refill 40% of the time in Area I, 40% in Area II where they travel through and 20% in Area III 
as they travel about. CNG demand is then calculated as shown in Table 8. For example, the: 
 
Total Monthly Fuel Consumption in Area I within the 5 mile radius =  
200*40*100% + 200*60*60% + 200*80*40%+ 200*100*40% = 29,600 gallons  
 
The total CNG demand within the 25 mile radius is 56,000 gallons. 
 
Table 8: Calculating CNG Demand 
 
  Distance # Vehicles Gal. per Percent refueling from fleet location 
Area Operating in Area Month 5 mi 10 mi 15 mi 25 mi 
I 5 200 40 100% 0% 0% 0% 
II 10 200 60 60% 40% 0% 0% 
III 15 200 80 40% 40% 20% 0% 
IV 25 200 100 40% 30% 20% 10%  
   -----  ----- ----- ----- ----- TOTAL 
   800  29.6 17.2 7.2 2.0 56.0 
               Gallons (000s) per month   
 
 
Step 4 - Match supply with demand 
The principles in Table 3 dictate this step. That is providing area wide coverage, matching supply to demand, matching 
infrastructure growth with NGV growth, starting with central refueling or public refueling if convenient to fleet, adding public 
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and/or card lock refueling to extend NGV operation area and managing on infrastructure costs. This is accomplished by 
establishing four types of CNG stations identified in Table 9. The costs are updated  2006 estimates. 
 
Based on Table 8, stations from Table 9  are allocated to each area as shown in Table 10. 
The actual station size in gallons per month and area coverage can vary based on the metro 
area. As shown in Figure 10  the large central or public refueling Anchor Stations are in the 
center or Area I where the fleet is located. In the next ring between 5 and 10 miles out or 
Area II are the Growth Stations. In Area III further out are the Satellite Stations with their 
smaller volume for occasional refueling needs. In Area IV are Emergency Stations that allow 
fleet vehicles to return to their base or nearest refueling stations closer in. Billing from the 
Emergency Station could be either by dispenser or determined as storage containers are 
refilled combined with an ID card-lock system to keep cost down. 
 
Table 9:  CNG Station Options to Match Supply with Demand 
 
Anchor 
 Station (ANC) 
? Full Size station 
? 10,000 – 20,000+ gal/month with dispensers 
? Permanent 
? $500,000+ installed 
Growth 
 Station (GRO) 
? 5000+ gal/month with dispenser(s) 
? Expandable capacity by adding storage or upgrading 
compressors 
? Station re-locatable as market develops (minimize in ground 
costs) 
? $300,000 installed 
 
Satellite 
  Station (SAT)  
? 1-2000 gal/month with dispenser 
? Temporary, will relocate as demand shifts or be replaced with 
larger station as demand increases 
? Options include fuel makers, small compressors or simply 
storage tanks 
? $100,000 installed 
 
Emergency 
 Station (EM) 
? <200 gal/month, dispenser optional 
? Used for emergency or occasional refueling 
? Filled tanks refueling by pressure exchange  
? Options for refilling Satellite or Emergency tanks: 
o FuelMaker attached 
o Replace tanks periodically 
o Refill tanks on site with portable compressor 
o Refilling truck carrying LNG or CNG 
? $20-50,000 installed + refilling capability 
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Table 10: Allocating CNG Stations Matching Supply with Demand 
 
 Operating Monthly No. Stations by Type     
Area Distance Volume ANC GRO SAT EM  
I 5  29600  2    
II 10  21200   3   
III 15  7200    4  
IV 25  2000     10 
 
I II
III IV
5
10
15
25
Miles from
fleet location
The stations are located along the 
highway infrastructure and routes that 
best service the fleet vehicles while 
concurrently allowing new NGV fleets to 
conveniently use the CNG refueling 
infrastructure. 
 
  
Figure 10 : Allocating CNG Stations 
matching Supply with Demand 
 
 
 
Step 5 -  Match infrastructure development with NGV growth 
CNG stations would be added as NGV demand grew. Figure 11 shows how they can be 
phased in matching the market growth. Stations are added, adjusted in size and type and 
moved around to match the NGV demand and forecasted growth. Ideally all the CNG 
stations are added as early as possible from year 1 on to promote NGV growth with an area 
wide refueling infrastructure. 
 
With multiple fleets and as the NGV market grows, the CNG refueling infrastructures will 
overlap. This could occur during any phase of market growth. Overlapping areas are needed 
to foster NGV growth and a true area wide infrastructure. 
 
 107
  
 
Figure 11: Match Infrastructure Development with NGV Growth and Marketing Phases 
5
10
15
25
Miles from
fleet location
Year 1 Market Initiation
Year 2 Market Development
Year 3 Market Development
Year 4 Market Growth
 
Figure 12:  Match Infrastructure Development with Overlapping NGV Growth 
 
 
Figur
e 12 
an 
xam
ple 
of 
overl
appi
ng 
areas where larger Growth and Satellite stations are located to service both areas. Eventually 
permanent Anchor stations could go in as NGV demand rises and more areas overlap. In time LNG 
with LCNG can be added at truck stops and CNG or LCNG stations added along interstate and 
intrastate highways to connect metro and other NGV areas. Then a true regional NGV area wide 
infrastructure has been developed. 
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SUMMARY 
 
Amoco in the 1990s demonstrated in the Metro Atlanta market that a NGV market could grow 
when supported by an area wide public CNG (Compressed Natural Gas) refueling 
infrastructure.  
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The NGV infrastructure strategy was to: 
Provide CNG area wide coverage for NGVs in its existing retail refueling stations, 
focus on major metropolitan markets, 
then expand into smaller markets, and  
interconnect all markets for regional refueling coverage. 
 
Amoco’s strategy differed from most across the nation at the time with its area wide coverage 
approach, focus on customer needs and satisfaction and providing transparent CNG and 
LNG refueling experiences. Amoco was successful in establishing LNG and LCNG stations 
as part of its strategy serving all vehicle types – light, medium and heavy duty. Key to its 
success was recognizing that a refueling infrastructure had to be in place to attract NGVs. 
 
From Amoco’s NGV experience, presented in Part III of this study is a modified NGV 
refueling infrastructure strategy more aligned with present government regulatory conditions 
and incentives. This updated strategy was developed but not implemented. Its goals are to 
maximize area coverage and refueling transparency while minimizing capital costs and 
operating costs. It follows basic principles identified as matching supply to demand, matching 
infrastructure growth with NGV growth, starting with central refueling or public refueling if 
convenient to fleets, adding public and/or card lock refueling to extend NGV operational 
areas, managing infrastructure costs, focusing on customer needs, and considering options 
with CNG, LNG and LCNG. 
 
Following the Clinton Administration’s decision to not adopt the optional mandate incentives 
in the Energy Act of 1992, Amoco exited CNG refueling for light and medium duty NGVs and 
refocused its efforts on the heavy duty NGVs fueled with LNG. When Amoco merged into 
British Petroleum (BP) in 1999, it exited the NGV industry entirely.  
 
To change an infrastructure that has become a norm for both industry and society requires 
compelling economic incentives. For practical reasons, only the federal government can 
change a national transportation infrastructure. Had the Energy Act of 1992 mandates been 
implemented in 1996, Amoco would have continued its strategy attracting additional national 
fuel providers and support from auto OEMS. From this a national NGV infrastructure would 
likely have evolved with BP maintaining the Amoco NGV strategy. 
 
////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
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